Abstract : In this paper, we propose a new variant of indistinguishability-based security model for the RFID authentication protocol, which allows an adversary to obtain an authentication result and secret key of a target tag. Ng et al. showed that symmetric-key based RFID authentication protocols cannot be resilient to the above information leakage simultaneously in the Paise-Vaudenay security model. We review the existing result and extend the Juels-Weis security model to satisfy these properties by using a suitable restriction. Moreover, we give two example protocols that satisfy the modified security model.
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01485936 Contributor : Hal IfipConnect in order to contact the contributor Submitted on : Thursday, March 9, 2017 - 3:16:20 PM Last modification on : Friday, September 25, 2020 - 3:50:04 PM Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, June 10, 2017 - 2:24:13 PM
Daisuke Moriyama, Miyako Ohkubo, Shin’ichiro Matsuo. A Forward Privacy Model for RFID Authentication Protocols. 7th International Workshop on Information Security THeory and Practice (WISTP), May 2013, Heraklion, Greece. pp.98-111, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-38530-8_7⟩. ⟨hal-01485936⟩