Abstract : In this paper, we propose a new variant of indistinguishability-based security model for the RFID authentication protocol, which allows an adversary to obtain an authentication result and secret key of a target tag. Ng et al. showed that symmetric-key based RFID authentication protocols cannot be resilient to the above information leakage simultaneously in the Paise-Vaudenay security model. We review the existing result and extend the Juels-Weis security model to satisfy these properties by using a suitable restriction. Moreover, we give two example protocols that satisfy the modified security model.
Lorenzo Cavallaro; Dieter Gollmann. 7th International Workshop on Information Security THeory and Practice (WISTP), May 2013, Heraklion, Greece. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-7886, pp.98-111, 2013, Information Security Theory and Practice. Security of Mobile and Cyber-Physical Systems. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-38530-8_7〉
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01485936
Contributeur : Hal Ifip
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Soumis le : jeudi 9 mars 2017 - 15:16:20
Dernière modification le : jeudi 9 mars 2017 - 15:21:21
Document(s) archivé(s) le : samedi 10 juin 2017 - 14:24:13
Daisuke Moriyama, Miyako Ohkubo, Shin’ichiro Matsuo. A Forward Privacy Model for RFID Authentication Protocols. Lorenzo Cavallaro; Dieter Gollmann. 7th International Workshop on Information Security THeory and Practice (WISTP), May 2013, Heraklion, Greece. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-7886, pp.98-111, 2013, Information Security Theory and Practice. Security of Mobile and Cyber-Physical Systems. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-38530-8_7〉. 〈hal-01485936〉
