Database Fragmentation with Encryption: Under Which Semantic Constraints and A Priori Knowledge Can Two Keep a Secret?

Abstract : Database outsourcing to semi-honest servers raises concerns against the confidentiality of sensitive information. To hide such information, an existing approach splits data among two supposedly mutually isolated servers by means of fragmentation and encryption. This approach is modelled logic-orientedly and then proved to be confidentiality preserving, even if an attacker employs some restricted but nevertheless versatile class of a priori knowledge to draw inferences. Finally, a method to compute a secure fragmentation schema is developed.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Lingyu Wang; Basit Shafiq. 27th Data and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec), Jul 2013, Newark, NJ, United States. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-7964, pp.17-32, 2013, Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVII. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-39256-6_2〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01490715
Contributeur : Hal Ifip <>
Soumis le : mercredi 15 mars 2017 - 17:16:15
Dernière modification le : jeudi 16 mars 2017 - 09:24:24
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 16 juin 2017 - 15:03:26

Fichier

978-3-642-39256-6_2_Chapter.pd...
Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Paternité 4.0 International License

Identifiants

Citation

Joachim Biskup, Marcel Preuß. Database Fragmentation with Encryption: Under Which Semantic Constraints and A Priori Knowledge Can Two Keep a Secret?. Lingyu Wang; Basit Shafiq. 27th Data and Applications Security and Privacy (DBSec), Jul 2013, Newark, NJ, United States. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-7964, pp.17-32, 2013, Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVII. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-39256-6_2〉. 〈hal-01490715〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

136

Téléchargements de fichiers

106