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A Large Term Rewrite System Modelling a Pioneering Cryptographic Algorithm

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We present a term rewrite system that formally models the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA), which was one of the first cryptographic functions for computing a Message Authentication Code and was adopted, between 1987 and 2001, in international standards (ISO 8730 and ISO 8731-2) to ensure the authenticity and integrity of banking transactions. Our term rewrite system is large (13 sorts, 18 constructors, 644 non-constructors, and 684 rewrite rules), confluent, and terminating. Implementations in thirteen different languages have been automatically derived from this model and used to validate 200 official test vectors for the MAA.

1 Introduction

In data security, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a short sequence of bits that is computed from a given message; the MAC ensures both the authenticity and integrity of the message, i.e., that the message sender is the stated one and that the message contents have not been altered. A MAC is more than a mere checksum, as it must be secure enough to defeat attacks; its design usually involves cryptographic keys shared between the message sender and receiver.

One of the first MAC algorithm to gain widespread acceptance was the Message Authenticator Algorithm (also known as Message Authentication Algorithm, MAA for short) [1] [2] [18] designed in 1983 by Donald Davies and David Clayden at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in response to a request of the UK Bankers Automated Clearing Services. The MAA was adopted by ISO in 1987 and became part of the international standards 8730 [10] and 8731-2 [11]. Later, cryptanalysis of MAA revealed various weaknesses, including feasible brute-force attacks, existence of collision clusters, and key-recovery techniques [19] [22] [21] [20] [18]. For this reason, MAA was withdrawn from ISO standards in 2002.

From the point of view of formal methods, the MAA is interesting because of its pioneering nature, because its definition is freely available and stable, and because it is involved enough while remaining of manageable complexity. Over the past decades, various formal specifications of the MAA have been developed using VDM, Z, abstract data types (i.e., algebraic specifications), term rewrite systems, etc. For such formalisms, the usual examples often deal with syntax trees, which are explored using standard traversals (breadth-first, depth-first, etc.); contrary to such commonplace examples, cryptographic functions (and the MAA, in particular) exhibit more diverse behaviour, as they rather seek to perform irregular computations than linear ones.

The present article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an algorithmic overview of the MAA. Section 3 lists the preexisting formal specifications of the MAA. Section 4 presents the modelling of the MAA using term rewrite systems. Section 5 discusses validation steps applied to this model. Finally, Section 6 gives concluding remarks.

2 Overview of the MAA

Nowadays, Message Authentication Codes are computed using different families of algorithms based on either cryptographic hash functions (HMAC), universal hash functions (UMAC), or block ciphers (CMAC, OMAC, PMAC, etc.). Contrary to these modern approaches, the MAA was designed as a standalone algorithm that does not rely on any preexisting hash function or cipher.

In this section, we briefly explain the principles of the MAA. More detailed explanations can be found in [1], [2] and [14, Algorithm 9.68].

The MAA was intended to be implemented in software and to run on 32-bit computers. Hence, its design intensively relies on 32-bit words (called *blocks*) and 32-bit machine operations.

The MAA takes as inputs a key and a message. The key has 64 bits and is split into two blocks J and K . The message is seen as a sequence of blocks. If the number of bytes of the message is not a multiple of four, extra null bytes are added at the end of the message to complete the last block. The size of the message should be less than 1,000,000 blocks; otherwise, the MAA result is said to be undefined; we believe that this restriction, which is not inherent to the algorithm itself, was added in the ISO 8731-2 standard to provide MAA implementations with an upper bound (four megabytes) on the size of memory buffers used to store messages.

The MAA produces as output a block, which is the MAC value computed from the key and the message. The fact that this result has only 32 bits proved to be a major weakness enabling cryptographic attacks; MAC values computed by modern algorithms now have a much larger number of bits. Apart from the aforementioned restriction on the size of messages, the MAA behaves as a totally-defined function; its result is deterministic in the sense that, given a key and a message, there is only a single MAC result, which neither depends on implementation choices nor on hidden inputs, such as nonces or randomly-generated numbers.

The MAA calculations rely upon conventional 32-bit logical and arithmetic operations, among which: AND (conjunction), OR (disjunction), XOR (exclusive disjunction), CYC (circular rotation by one bit to the left), ADD (addition), CAR (carry bit generated by 32-bit addition), MUL (multiplication, sometimes decomposed into HIGH_MUL and LOW_MUL, which denote the most- and least-significant blocks in the 64-bit product of a 32-bit multiplication). On this basis, more involved operations are defined, among which MUL1 (result of a 32-bit multiplication modulo $2^{32} - 1$), MUL2 (result of a 32-bit multiplication modulo $2^{32} - 2$), MUL2A (faster version of MUL2), FIX1 and FIX2 (two unary functions¹ respectively defined as $x \rightarrow \text{AND}(\text{OR}(x, A), C)$ and $x \rightarrow \text{AND}(\text{OR}(x, B), D)$, where A, B, C, and D are four hexadecimal block constants A = 02040801, B = 00804021, C = BFEF7FDF, and D = 7DFEFBFF). The MAA operates in three successive phases:

- The *prelude* takes the two blocks J and K of the key and converts them into six blocks X_0, Y_0, V_0, W, S , and T . This phase is executed once. After the prelude, J and K are no longer used.
- The *main loop* successively iterates on each block of the message. This phase maintains three variables X, Y , and V (initialized to X_0, Y_0 , and V_0 , respectively), which are modified at each iteration. The main loop also uses the value of W , but neither S nor T .
- The *coda* adds the blocks S and T at the end of the message and performs two more iterations on these blocks. After the last iteration, the MAA result is $\text{XOR}(X, Y)$.

In 1987, the ISO 8731-2 standard [9, Section 5] introduced an additional feature (called *mode of operation*), which concerns messages longer than 256 blocks and which, seemingly, was not present

¹The names FIX1 and FIX2 are borrowed from [15, pages 36 and 77].

in the early MAA versions designed at NPL. Each message longer than 256 blocks must be split into *segments* of 256 blocks each, with the last segment possibly containing less than 256 blocks. The above MAA algorithm (prelude, main loop, and coda) is applied to the first segment, resulting in a value noted Z_1 . This block Z_1 is then inserted before the first block of the second segment, leading to a 257-block message to which the MAA algorithm is applied, resulting in a value noted Z_2 . This is done repeatedly for all the n segments, the MAA result Z_i computed for the i -th segment being inserted before the first block of the $(i + 1)$ -th segment. Finally, the MAC for the entire message is the MAA result Z_n computed for the last segment.

3 Prior Formal Specifications of the MAA

The informal description of the MAA can be found both in ISO standard 8731-2 [11] or in a 1988 NPL technical report [2]. On this basis, several formal models of the MAA have been developed:

- In 1990, G. I. Parkin and G. O’Neill designed a formal specification of the MAA in VDM [16] [17]. To our knowledge, this was the first attempt at applying formal methods to the MAA. The VDM specification became part of the ISO standard defining the MAA [11, Annex B]. Three implementations in C [16, Annex C], Miranda [16, Annex B], and Modula-2 [13] were written by hand along the lines of the VDM specification.
- In 1991, M. K. F. Lai formally described the MAA using the set-theoretic Z notation [12]. He adopted Knuth’s “literate programming” approach, by inserting formal fragments of Z code in the natural-language description of the MAA.
- In 1991, Harold B. Munster produced a formal specification of the MAA in LOTOS [15]. The MAA was described using only the data part of LOTOS: the behavioural part of LOTOS, which serves to describe concurrent processes, was not used. The LOTOS specification, which made intensive use of the predefined LOTOS data-type libraries, was mainly declarative but not executable, as all facilities of LOTOS abstract data types were used in an unconstrained way. For instance, some equations could be rephrased as: “*given x , the result is y such that $x = f(y)$ ”, which required to invert function f in order to compute y .*
- In 1992, Hubert Garavel and Philippe Turlier, taking the aforementioned LOTOS specification as a starting point, gradually transformed it by successive modifications. Their goal was to obtain an executable specification that could be processed by the CÆSAR.ADT compiler [6] [7], while staying as close as possible to the original LOTOS specification. To do so, three main kinds of modifications were applied: (i) the LOTOS algebraic equations, which are not oriented, were turned into rewrite rules, which are oriented from left to right and, thus, more amenable to automatic execution; (ii) a distinction was made between constructor and non-constructor operations, and the discipline of “free” constructors was enforced — namely, each rule defining a non-constructor f must have the form “ $f(P_1, \dots, P_n) \rightarrow \dots$ ”, where each P_i contains only constructors and free variables; (iii) some LOTOS sorts and operations were implemented as C types and functions, by importing manually-written C code — for instance, addition, multiplication, and bit shifts on 32-bit words were implemented directly in C. From this specification, the CÆSAR.ADT compiler could automatically generate C code that, combined with a small handwritten main program, computed the MAC value corresponding to a message and a key.

4 Specification of the MAA as a Term Rewrite System

Taking Garavel & Turlier’s LOTOS specification as a starting point, our central contribution is a formal model of the MAA specified as a term rewrite system. This model is expressed using the notations of the simple rewriting language REC proposed in [5, Sect. 3] and [4, Sect. 3.1], which was lightly enhanced to distinguish between free constructors (declared in the “CONS” part) and non-constructors (declared in the “OPNS” part and defined by rewrite rules given in the “RULES” part).

The model is given in Annex B of the present article. Notice that the model has a few (only six) conditional rules and is thus a conditional term rewrite system; if needed, it could easily be turned into a non-conditional term rewrite system by slightly modifying the definitions of three functions (i.e., adding extra parameters and auxiliary functions), as explained in Annex B. Our main results are the following:

- Our model is *large*. It is 1575-line long and contains 13 sorts, 18 constructors, 644 non-constructors, and 684 rewrite rules. Although research on term rewriting led to a wealth of scientific publications, it is difficult to find concrete examples of large term-rewrite systems: for instance, in the data base of models accumulated during the three Rewrite Engines Competition (2006, 2008, and 2010), the largest models are less than 300-line long. There exist indeed larger (e.g., 10,000-line long) term rewrite systems, but they are either generated automatically (and, thus, difficult to understand by humans) or they are actual implementations of compilers or translators (and, often, are not “pure” term rewrite systems, as they rely upon higher-level features, e.g., subsorts or strategies).
- Our model is *exhaustive*, as it fully describes the MAA algorithm, including its “mode of operation” and its segmentation of messages larger than 1024 bytes.
- Our model is *self-contained*, as each detail of the MAA is expressed using term rewrite systems only; the model does not rely upon any externally-defined type or function and is thus independent from machine-specific assumptions, e.g., 32-bit vs 64-bit words or little- vs big-endian ordering.
- Our model is *executable*. From a theoretical point of view, this was enabled by the aforementioned shift from general LOTOS abstract data types to term rewrite systems, which are less declarative and more operational. From a practical point of view, this shift was not sufficient, as the MAA intensively manipulates block values (i.e., 32-bit numbers), which cannot be reasonably implemented in the Peano style (the execution stack quickly overflows when these numbers are represented using the `zero` and `succ` constructors). To overcome this issue, we chose to represent blocks in binary form, as words of four octets. So doing, the logical operations on blocks (AND, OR, XOR, and CYC) are easy to define using bitwise and octetwise manipulations. The arithmetical operations (ADD, CAR, and MUL) are more involved: we implemented them using 8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit adders and multipliers, more or less inspired from the theory of digital circuits.
- Our model is *minimal*, in the sense that each sort, constructor, and non-constructor defined in our model is actually used (i.e., the model does not contain “dead” code).
- Our model is *readable*. Despite its size, efforts have been made to give it a modular structure, which is reflected in the sections of Annex B. Particular care has been taken to choose constructors appropriately and to keep non-constructor definitions as simple as possible.

5 Validation of the MAA Model

In this section, we detail the various steps performed to make sure that our model is correct:

- Our model is *self-checking*. Because the REC language has no input/output primitive and no provision for interfacing with external C code, it cannot be used to compute the MAC value of a given file. In order to check whether our model was correct or not, we enriched it with 203 test vectors originating from three sources, namely: (i) all the test vectors provided in Tables 1 to 6 of [11, Annex A] and [2]; (ii) all the test vectors provided in [10, Annex E.3.3] — the subsequent test vectors of [10, Annexes E.3.4 and E.4] were discarded because of their size (they deal with two messages having 84 and 588 blocks, which would have led to a much too large REC specification); (iii) supplementary test vectors intended to specifically check for certain aspects (byte permutations and message segmentation) that were not enough covered by the above tests; this was done by introducing a `makeMessage` function acting as a pseudo-random message generator (see Annex B.12).
- Our model is *confluent*. This is easy to see, because all constructors are free and all the rules defining non-constructors have disjoint patterns and mutually exclusive premises; for safety, the disjunction of patterns and exclusion of guards has been checked mechanically by translating the REC specification to the Opal language [3], whose compiler emits warnings in presence of “ambiguous” (i.e., nondeterministic) rules.
- Our model is *terminating*. This has been verified by automatically translating our REC model into the input formalism TRS of the AProVE tool [8], which produced a proof of quasi-decreasingness in 76 steps.
- Our model was *validated*. We checked that the REC specification satisfies all the aforementioned test vectors. Because it enjoys the confluence and termination properties, all rewrite strategies should lead to the same result. Using a software framework² under development at INRIA Grenoble, we automatically translated our REC model into thirteen different languages: Clean, Haskell, LNT, LOTOS, Maude, mCRL2, OCaml, Opal, Rascal, Scala, SML, Stratego/XT, and Tom. We submitted these translations to sixteen compilers, interpreters, and rewrite engines: eleven of them reported that all the 203 tests passed successfully, while the other tools halted or timed out. Moreover, some involved components (namely, the binary adders and multipliers) have been validated separately using more than 30,000 test vectors.

6 Conclusion

Twenty-five years after, we revisited the Message Authenticator Algorithm (MAA), which used to be a pioneering case study for cryptography in the 80s and for formal methods in the early 90s.

We developed a formal specification of the MAA, expressed as a term rewrite system encoded in the REC language. As far as we are aware, it is one of the largest handwritten term rewrite systems publicly available. This specification is self-contained and self-checking, as it includes 203 test vectors. It has been carefully validated using a dozen tools.

Parts of this specification (in particular, the binary adders and multipliers) are certainly reusable for different purposes, e.g., formal libraries for modular arithmetic or cryptography.

²<http://gforge.inria.fr/scm/viewvc.php/rec/2015-CONVECS>

This study enabled us to discover various mistakes in prior MAA specifications. For instance, we corrected the test vectors given for function PAT at the bottom of Table 3 in [11, Annex A] and [2] (see Annex A of the present article for details). We also corrected the handwritten implementation in C of the function HIGH_MUL imported by the aforementioned LOTOS specification (this illustrates the risks arising when formal and non-formal codes are mixed).

It is however fair to warn the reader that term rewrite systems are a low-level theoretical model that does not scale well to large problems. The REC specification is between two and six times longer than any other (formal or informal) description of the MAA, and it took considerable effort to come up with a REC specification that is readable, properly structured, and seemingly straightforward. Similar results might not be easy to reproduce on a regular basis with other case studies.

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³<http://www.cix.co.uk/~klockstone>

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A Errata Concerning Annex A of the ISO-8731-2:1992 Standard

After checking carefully all the test vectors contained in the original NPL report defining the MAA [2] and in the 1992 version of the MAA standard [11], we believe that there are mistakes⁴ in the test vectors given for function PAT.

More precisely, the three last lines of Table 3 [2, page 15] — identically reproduced in Table A.3 of [11, Sect. A.4] — are written as follows:

{X0,Y0}	0103 0703 1D3B 7760	PAT{X0,Y0}	EE
{V0,W}	0103 050B 1706 5DBB	PAT{V0,W}	BB
{S,T}	0103 0705 8039 7302	PAT{S,T}	E6

Actually, the inputs of function PAT should not be {X0,Y0}, {V0,W}, {S,T} but rather {H4,H5}, {H6,H7}, {H8,H9}, the values of H4, ..., H9 being those listed above in Table 3. Notice that the confusion was probably caused by the following algebraic identities:

{X0,Y0}	=	BYT (H4, H5)
{V0,W}	=	BYT (H6, H7)
{S,T}	=	BYT (H8, H9)

If one gives {X0,Y0}, {V0,W}, {S,T} as inputs to PAT, then the three results of PAT are equal to 00 and thus cannot be equal to EE, BB, E6, respectively.

But if one gives {H4,H5}, {H6,H7}, {H8,H9} as inputs to PAT, then the results of PAT are the expected values EE, BB, E6.

Thus, we believe that the three last lines of Table 3 should be modified as follows:

{H4,H5}	0000 0003 0000 0060	PAT{H4,H5}	EE
{H6,H7}	0003 0000 0006 0000	PAT{H6,H7}	BB
{H8,H9}	0000 0005 8000 0002	PAT{H8,H9}	E6

B Formal Specification of the MAA in the REC Language

This annex presents the specification of the MAA in the REC language. This specification is fully self-contained, meaning that it does not depend on any externally-defined library — with the minor disadvantage of somewhat lengthy definitions for octet and blocks constants.

For readability, the specification has been split into 21 parts, each part being devoted to a particular sort, a group of functions sharing a common purpose, or a collection of test vectors. The first parts contain general definitions that are largely independent from the MAA; starting from Sect. B.11, the definitions become increasingly MAA-specific.

The complete REC specification is obtained by concatenating all these parts, grouping their various sections (i.e., merging all SORTS sections into a single one, all CONS sections into a single one, etc.) and, after this, removing duplicated variable declarations in the VARS section, and pasting broken lines so that each rewrite rule that was split across several lines now fits on one single line.

For readability, the rewrite rules concerning the same non-constructors have been put together and separated with blank lines when appropriate. Also, the arguments of certain non-constructors are separated by semicolons rather than commas when it helps to distinguish arguments of different nature (e.g., summand bits, carry, or sum bits).

⁴We used the French version of this standard, but we believe that the language plays no role, as the same mistakes were already present in the 1988 NPL report.

All machine words (octets, blocks, etc.) are represented according to the “big endian” convention, i.e., the first argument of each corresponding constructor denote the most significant bit.

B.1 Definitions for sort Bool

We first define Booleans using the `false` and `true` constructors, together with two non-constructors implementing logical conjunction and disjunction.

```

SORTS
  Bool
CONS
  false : -> Bool
  true  : -> Bool
OPNS
  andBool : Bool Bool -> Bool
  orBool  : Bool Bool -> Bool
VARS
  L : Bool
RULES
  andBool (false, L) -> false
  andBool (true, L)  -> L

  orBool (false, L) -> L
  orBool (true, L)  -> true

```

B.2 Definitions for sort Nat

We then define natural numbers in the Peano style using the `zero` and `succ` constructors, together with non-constructors implementing addition, multiplication, equality, strict order, and a few constants.

```

SORTS
  Nat
CONS
  zero : -> Nat
  succ : Nat -> Nat
OPNS
  addNat : Nat Nat -> Nat
  multNat : Nat Nat -> Nat
  eqNat : Nat Nat -> Bool
  ltNat : Nat Nat -> Bool
  n1 : -> Nat
  n2 : -> Nat
  n3 : -> Nat
  n4 : -> Nat
  n5 : -> Nat
  n6 : -> Nat
  n7 : -> Nat
  n8 : -> Nat
  n9 : -> Nat
  n10 : -> Nat
  n11 : -> Nat
  n12 : -> Nat

```

```

n13 : -> Nat
n14 : -> Nat
n15 : -> Nat
n16 : -> Nat
n17 : -> Nat
n18 : -> Nat
n19 : -> Nat
n20 : -> Nat
n21 : -> Nat
n22 : -> Nat
n254 : -> Nat
n256 : -> Nat
n4100 : -> Nat
VARS
  N N' : Nat
RULES
  addNat (N, zero) -> N
  addNat (N, succ (N')) -> addNat (succ (N), N')

  multNat (N, zero) -> zero
  multNat (N, succ (N')) -> addNat (N, multNat (N, N'))

  eqNat (zero, zero) -> true
  eqNat (zero, succ (N')) -> false
  eqNat (succ (N), zero) -> false
  eqNat (succ (N), succ (N')) -> eqNat (N, N')

  ltNat (zero, zero) -> false
  ltNat (zero, succ (N')) -> true
  ltNat (succ (N'), zero) -> false
  ltNat (succ (N), succ (N')) -> ltNat (N, N')

  n1 -> succ (zero)
  n2 -> succ (n1)
  n3 -> succ (n2)
  n4 -> succ (n3)
  n5 -> succ (n4)
  n6 -> succ (n5)
  n7 -> succ (n6)
  n8 -> succ (n7)
  n9 -> succ (n8)
  n10 -> succ (n9)
  n11 -> succ (n10)
  n12 -> succ (n11)
  n13 -> succ (n12)
  n14 -> succ (n13)
  n15 -> succ (n14)
  n16 -> succ (n15)
  n17 -> succ (n16)
  n18 -> succ (n17)
  n19 -> succ (n18)
  n20 -> succ (n19)

```

```

n21 -> succ (n20)
n22 -> succ (n21)

n254 -> addNat (n12, multNat (n11, n22))

n256 -> multNat (n16, n16)

n4100 -> addNat (n4, multNat (n16, n256))

```

B.3 Definitions for sort Bit

We now define bits using two constructors `x0` and `x1`, together with non-constructors implementing bit equality and logical operations on bits.

```

SORTS
  Bit
CONS
  x0 : -> Bit
  x1 : -> Bit
OPNS
  eqBit : Bit Bit -> Bool
  notBit : Bit -> Bit
  andBit : Bit Bit -> Bit
  orBit : Bit Bit -> Bit
  xorBit : Bit Bit -> Bit
VARS
  B : Bit
RULES
  eqBit (x0, x0) -> true
  eqBit (x0, x1) -> false
  eqBit (x1, x0) -> false
  eqBit (x1, x1) -> true

  notBit (x0) -> x1
  notBit (x1) -> x0

  andBit (B, x0) -> x0
  andBit (B, x1) -> B

  orBit (B, x0) -> B
  orBit (B, x1) -> x1

  xorBit (B, x0) -> B
  xorBit (B, x1) -> notBit (B)

```

B.4 Definitions for sort Octet

We now define octets using a constructor `buildOctet` that takes eight bits and returns a byte, together with non-constructors implementing equality, bitwise logical operations, left-shift and right-shift operations on octets, as well as all octet constants needed to formally describe the MAA and its test vectors.

```

SORTS

```

```
Octet
CONS
  buildOctet : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> Octet
  % the first argument of buildOctet contains the most significant bit
OPNS
  eqOctet : Octet Octet -> Bool
  andOctet : Octet Octet -> Octet
  orOctet : Octet Octet -> Octet
  xorOctet : Octet Octet -> Octet
  leftOctet1 : Octet -> Octet
  leftOctet2 : Octet -> Octet
  leftOctet3 : Octet -> Octet
  leftOctet4 : Octet -> Octet
  leftOctet5 : Octet -> Octet
  leftOctet6 : Octet -> Octet
  leftOctet7 : Octet -> Octet
  rightOctet1 : Octet -> Octet
  rightOctet2 : Octet -> Octet
  rightOctet3 : Octet -> Octet
  rightOctet4 : Octet -> Octet
  rightOctet5 : Octet -> Octet
  rightOctet6 : Octet -> Octet
  rightOctet7 : Octet -> Octet
  x00 : -> Octet
  x01 : -> Octet
  x02 : -> Octet
  x03 : -> Octet
  x04 : -> Octet
  x05 : -> Octet
  x06 : -> Octet
  x07 : -> Octet
  x08 : -> Octet
  x09 : -> Octet
  x0A : -> Octet
  x0B : -> Octet
  x0C : -> Octet
  x0D : -> Octet
  x0E : -> Octet
  x0F : -> Octet
  x10 : -> Octet
  x11 : -> Octet
  x12 : -> Octet
  x13 : -> Octet
  x14 : -> Octet
  x15 : -> Octet
  x16 : -> Octet
  x17 : -> Octet
  x18 : -> Octet
  x1A : -> Octet
  x1B : -> Octet
  x1C : -> Octet
  x1D : -> Octet
```

x1E : -> Octet
x1F : -> Octet
x20 : -> Octet
x21 : -> Octet
x23 : -> Octet
x24 : -> Octet
x25 : -> Octet
x26 : -> Octet
x27 : -> Octet
x28 : -> Octet
x29 : -> Octet
x2A : -> Octet
x2B : -> Octet
x2D : -> Octet
x2E : -> Octet
x2F : -> Octet
x30 : -> Octet
x31 : -> Octet
x32 : -> Octet
x33 : -> Octet
x34 : -> Octet
x35 : -> Octet
x36 : -> Octet
x37 : -> Octet
x38 : -> Octet
x39 : -> Octet
x3A : -> Octet
x3B : -> Octet
x3C : -> Octet
x3D : -> Octet
x3F : -> Octet
x40 : -> Octet
x46 : -> Octet
x48 : -> Octet
x49 : -> Octet
x4A : -> Octet
x4B : -> Octet
x4C : -> Octet
x4D : -> Octet
x4E : -> Octet
x4F : -> Octet
x50 : -> Octet
x51 : -> Octet
x53 : -> Octet
x54 : -> Octet
x55 : -> Octet
x58 : -> Octet
x5A : -> Octet
x5B : -> Octet
x5C : -> Octet
x5D : -> Octet
x5E : -> Octet

```
x5F : -> Octet
x60 : -> Octet
x61 : -> Octet
x62 : -> Octet
x63 : -> Octet
x64 : -> Octet
x65 : -> Octet
x66 : -> Octet
x67 : -> Octet
x69 : -> Octet
x6A : -> Octet
x6B : -> Octet
x6C : -> Octet
x6D : -> Octet
x6E : -> Octet
x6F : -> Octet
x70 : -> Octet
x71 : -> Octet
x72 : -> Octet
x73 : -> Octet
x74 : -> Octet
x75 : -> Octet
x76 : -> Octet
x77 : -> Octet
x78 : -> Octet
x79 : -> Octet
x7A : -> Octet
x7B : -> Octet
x7C : -> Octet
x7D : -> Octet
x7E : -> Octet
x7F : -> Octet
x80 : -> Octet
x81 : -> Octet
x83 : -> Octet
x84 : -> Octet
x85 : -> Octet
x86 : -> Octet
x88 : -> Octet
x89 : -> Octet
x8A : -> Octet
x8C : -> Octet
x8D : -> Octet
x8E : -> Octet
x8F : -> Octet
x90 : -> Octet
x91 : -> Octet
x92 : -> Octet
x93 : -> Octet
x95 : -> Octet
x96 : -> Octet
x97 : -> Octet
```

x98 : -> Octet
x99 : -> Octet
x9A : -> Octet
x9B : -> Octet
x9C : -> Octet
x9D : -> Octet
x9E : -> Octet
x9F : -> Octet
xA0 : -> Octet
xA1 : -> Octet
xA2 : -> Octet
xA3 : -> Octet
xA4 : -> Octet
xA5 : -> Octet
xA6 : -> Octet
xA7 : -> Octet
xA8 : -> Octet
xA9 : -> Octet
xAA : -> Octet
xAB : -> Octet
xAC : -> Octet
xAE : -> Octet
xAF : -> Octet
xB0 : -> Octet
xB1 : -> Octet
xB2 : -> Octet
xB3 : -> Octet
xB5 : -> Octet
xB6 : -> Octet
xB8 : -> Octet
xB9 : -> Octet
xBA : -> Octet
xBB : -> Octet
xBC : -> Octet
xBE : -> Octet
xBF : -> Octet
xC0 : -> Octet
xC1 : -> Octet
xC2 : -> Octet
xC4 : -> Octet
xC5 : -> Octet
xC6 : -> Octet
xC7 : -> Octet
xC8 : -> Octet
xC9 : -> Octet
xCA : -> Octet
xCB : -> Octet
xCC : -> Octet
xCD : -> Octet
xC E : -> Octet
xD0 : -> Octet
xD1 : -> Octet


```

xD2 : -> Octet
xD3 : -> Octet
xD4 : -> Octet
xD5 : -> Octet
xD6 : -> Octet
xD7 : -> Octet
xD8 : -> Octet
xD9 : -> Octet
xDB : -> Octet
xDC : -> Octet
xDD : -> Octet
xDE : -> Octet
xDF : -> Octet
xE0 : -> Octet
xE1 : -> Octet
xE3 : -> Octet
xE6 : -> Octet
xE8 : -> Octet
xE9 : -> Octet
xEA : -> Octet
xEB : -> Octet
xEC : -> Octet
xED : -> Octet
xEE : -> Octet
xEF : -> Octet
xF0 : -> Octet
xF1 : -> Octet
xF2 : -> Octet
xF3 : -> Octet
xF4 : -> Octet
xF5 : -> Octet
xF6 : -> Octet
xF7 : -> Octet
xF8 : -> Octet
xF9 : -> Octet
xFA : -> Octet
xFB : -> Octet
xFC : -> Octet
xFD : -> Octet
xFE : -> Octet
xFF : -> Octet

```

VARs
 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 : Bit
 B'1 B'2 B'3 B'4 B'5 B'6 B'7 B'8 : Bit

RULES
 eqOctet (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8),
 buildOctet (B'1, B'2, B'3, B'4, B'5, B'6, B'7, B'8))
 -> andBool (eqBit (B1, B'1), andBool (eqBit (B2, B'2),
 andBool (eqBit (B3, B'3), andBool (eqBit (B4, B'4),
 andBool (eqBit (B5, B'5), andBool (eqBit (B6, B'6),
 andBool (eqBit (B7, B'7), eqBit (B8, B'8)))))))))

```

andOctet (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8),
           buildOctet (B'1, B'2, B'3, B'4, B'5, B'6, B'7, B'8))
-> buildOctet (andBit (B1, B'1), andBit (B2, B'2),
              andBit (B3, B'3), andBit (B4, B'4),
              andBit (B5, B'5), andBit (B6, B'6),
              andBit (B7, B'7), andBit (B8, B'8))

orOctet (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8),
          buildOctet (B'1, B'2, B'3, B'4, B'5, B'6, B'7, B'8))
-> buildOctet (orBit (B1, B'1), orBit (B2, B'2),
              orBit (B3, B'3), orBit (B4, B'4),
              orBit (B5, B'5), orBit (B6, B'6),
              orBit (B7, B'7), orBit (B8, B'8))

xorOctet (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8),
           buildOctet (B'1, B'2, B'3, B'4, B'5, B'6, B'7, B'8))
-> buildOctet (xorBit (B1, B'1), xorBit (B2, B'2),
              xorBit (B3, B'3), xorBit (B4, B'4),
              xorBit (B5, B'5), xorBit (B6, B'6),
              xorBit (B7, B'7), xorBit (B8, B'8))

leftOctet1 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, x0)

leftOctet2 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, x0, x0)

leftOctet3 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, x0, x0, x0)

leftOctet4 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (B5, B6, B7, B8, x0, x0, x0, x0)

leftOctet5 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (B6, B7, B8, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)

leftOctet6 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (B7, B8, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)

leftOctet7 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (B8, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)

rightOctet1 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (x0, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7)

rightOctet2 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (x0, x0, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6)

rightOctet3 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5)

rightOctet4 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))

```

```

->          buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, B1, B2, B3, B4)

rightOctet5 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, B1, B2, B3)

rightOctet6 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, B1, B2)

rightOctet7 (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8))
->          buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, B1)

x00 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x01 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x02 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0)
x03 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x04 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x05 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x06 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x07 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1)
x08 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x09 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x0A -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x0B -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x0C -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x0D -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x0E -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x0F -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x10 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x11 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x12 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0)
x13 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x14 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x15 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x16 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x17 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1)
x18 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x1A -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x1B -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x1C -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x1D -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x1E -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x1F -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x20 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x21 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x23 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x24 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x25 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x26 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x27 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1)
x28 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x29 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x2A -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0)

```

```
x2B -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x2D -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x2E -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x2F -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x30 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x31 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x32 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0)
x33 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x34 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x35 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x36 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x37 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1)
x38 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x39 -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x3A -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x3B -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x3C -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x3D -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x3F -> buildOctet (x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x40 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x46 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x48 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x49 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x4A -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x4B -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x4C -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x4D -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x4E -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x4F -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x50 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x51 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x53 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x54 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x55 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x58 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x5A -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x5B -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x5C -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x5D -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x5E -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x5F -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x60 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x61 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x62 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0)
x63 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x64 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x65 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x66 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x67 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1)
x69 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x6A -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x6B -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1)
```

```
x6C -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x6D -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x6E -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x6F -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x70 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x71 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x72 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0)
x73 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x74 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x75 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x76 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x77 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1)
x78 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x79 -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x7A -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x7B -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x7C -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x7D -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x7E -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x7F -> buildOctet (x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x80 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x81 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x83 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x84 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0)
x85 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x86 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x88 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x89 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x8A -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x8C -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x8D -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x8E -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x8F -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1)
x90 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0)
x91 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1)
x92 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0)
x93 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1)
x95 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1)
x96 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0)
x97 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1)
x98 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0)
x99 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1)
x9A -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0)
x9B -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1)
x9C -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0)
x9D -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1)
x9E -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0)
x9F -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1)
xA0 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)
xA1 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1)
xA2 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0)
xA3 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1)
```

```
xA4 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0)
xA5 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1)
xA6 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0)
xA7 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1)
xA8 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0)
xA9 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1)
xAA -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0)
xAB -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1)
xAC -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0)
xAE -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0)
xAF -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1)
xB0 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0)
xB1 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1)
xB2 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0)
xB3 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1)
xB5 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1)
xB6 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0)
xB8 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0)
xB9 -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1)
xBA -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x0)
xBB -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1)
xBC -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0)
xBE -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0)
xBF -> buildOctet (x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1, x1)
xC0 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0)
xC1 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1)
xC2 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0)
xC4 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0)
xC5 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1)
xC6 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0)
xC7 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1)
xC8 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0)
xC9 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1)
xCA -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0)
xCB -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1)
xCC -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0)
xCD -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1)
xCE -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0)
xD0 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x0)
xD1 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x0, x1)
xD2 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x0)
xD3 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0, x1, x1)
xD4 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x0)
xD5 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1)
xD6 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0)
xD7 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1)
xD8 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x0)
xD9 -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x0, x1)
xDB -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x0, x1, x1)
xDC -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x0)
xDD -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x0, x1)
xD E -> buildOctet (x1, x1, x0, x1, x1, x1, x1, x0)
```



```

-> OctetSum
addOctet6 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> OctetSum
addOctet5 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> OctetSum
addOctet4 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> OctetSum
addOctet3 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> OctetSum
addOctet2 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> OctetSum
addOctet1 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> OctetSum
addOctet0 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit -> OctetSum
dropCarryOctetSum : OctetSum -> Octet
addOctet : Octet Octet -> Octet
VARS
B B' Bcarry : Bit
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 : Bit
B'1 B'2 B'3 B'4 B'5 B'6 B'7 B'8 : Bit
B"1 B"2 B"3 B"4 B"5 B"6 B"7 B"8 : Bit
O O' : Octet
RULES
eqOctetSum (buildOctetSum (B, O), buildOctetSum (B', O'))
-> andBool (eqBit (B, B'), eqOctet (O, O'))

% addBit (B, B', Bcarry) is the sum of bits (B + B' + Bcarry) without carry
addBit (B, B', Bcarry) -> xorBit (xorBit (B, B'), Bcarry)

% carBit (B, B', Bcarry) is the carry for the sum of bits (B + B' + Bcarry)
carBit (B, B', Bcarry) -> orBit (andBit (andBit (B, B'), notBit (Bcarry)),
andBit (orBit (B, B'), Bcarry))

addOctetSum (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8),
buildOctet (B'1, B'2, B'3, B'4, B'5, B'6, B'7, B'8), Bcarry)
-> addOctet8 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5, B6, B'6, B7, B'7, B8,
B'8; Bcarry)

addOctet8 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5, B6, B'6, B7, B'7, B8, B'8;
Bcarry)
-> addOctet7 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5, B6, B'6, B7, B'7;
carBit (B8, B'8, Bcarry); addBit (B8, B'8, Bcarry))

addOctet7 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5, B6, B'6, B7, B'7;
Bcarry; B"8)
-> addOctet6 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5, B6, B'6;
carBit (B7, B'7, Bcarry); addBit (B7, B'7, Bcarry), B"8)

addOctet6 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5, B6, B'6;
Bcarry; B"7, B"8)
-> addOctet5 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5;
carBit (B6, B'6, Bcarry); addBit (B6, B'6, Bcarry), B"7, B"8)

addOctet5 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4, B5, B'5;
Bcarry; B"6, B"7, B"8)
-> addOctet4 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4;
carBit (B5, B'5, Bcarry); addBit (B5, B'5, Bcarry), B"6, B"7, B"8)

```



```

addOctet4 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3, B4, B'4;
          Bcarry; B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)
-> addOctet3 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3; carBit (B4, B'4, Bcarry);
            addBit (B4, B'4, Bcarry), B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)

addOctet3 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2, B3, B'3;
          Bcarry; B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)
-> addOctet2 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2; carBit (B3, B'3, Bcarry);
            addBit (B3, B'3, Bcarry), B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)

addOctet2 (B1, B'1, B2, B'2;
          Bcarry; B"3, B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)
-> addOctet1 (B1, B'1; carBit (B2, B'2, Bcarry);
            addBit (B2, B'2, Bcarry), B"3, B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)

addOctet1 (B1, B'1;
          Bcarry; B"2, B"3, B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)
-> addOctet0 (carBit (B1, B'1, Bcarry);
            addBit (B1, B'1, Bcarry), B"2, B"3, B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)

addOctet0 (Bcarry; B"1, B"2, B"3, B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8)
-> buildOctetSum (Bcarry, buildOctet (B"1, B"2, B"3, B"4, B"5, B"6, B"7, B"8))

dropCarryOctetSum (buildOctetSum (Bcarry, 0)) -> 0

addOctet (0, 0') -> dropCarryOctetSum (addOctetSum (0, 0', x0))

```

B.6 Definitions for sort Half

We now define 16-bit words (named “half words”) using a constructor `buildHalf` that takes two octets and returns a half word, together with non-constructors implementing equality, two usual constants, and an operation `mulOctet` that takes two octets and computes their 16-bit product; the other non-constructors are auxiliary functions implementing an 8-bit multiplier.

```

SORTS
  Half
CONS
  buildHalf : Octet Octet -> Half
  % the first argument of buildHalf contain the most significant bits
OPNS
  eqHalf : Half Half -> Bool
  x0000 : -> Half
  x0001 : -> Half
  mulOctet : Octet Octet -> Half
  mulOctet1 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Octet Half -> Half
  mulOctet2 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Octet Half -> Half
  mulOctet3 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Octet Half -> Half
  mulOctet4 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Bit Octet Half -> Half
  mulOctet5 : Bit Bit Bit Bit Octet Half -> Half
  mulOctet6 : Bit Bit Bit Octet Half -> Half
  mulOctet7 : Bit Bit Octet Half -> Half
  mulOctet8 : Bit Octet Half -> Half

```

```

mulOctetA : Half Octet Octet -> Half
mulOctetB : Octet OctetSum -> Half
VARS
  B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 : Bit
  O' O1 O2 O'1 O'2 : Octet
RULES
  eqHalf (buildHalf (O1, O2), buildHalf (O'1, O'2))
  -> andBool (eqOctet (O1, O'1), eqOctet (O2, O'2))

  x0000 -> buildHalf (x00, x00)
  x0001 -> buildHalf (x00, x01)

  mulOctet (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8), O')
  -> mulOctet1 (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', x0000)

  mulOctet1 (x0, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet2 (B2, B3, B4, B5, B6,
    B7, B8, O', H)
  mulOctet1 (x1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet2 (B2, B3, B4, B5, B6,
    B7, B8, O', mulOctetA (H, rightOctet1 (O'), leftOctet7 (O')))

  mulOctet2 (x0, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet3 (B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8,
    O', H)
  mulOctet2 (x1, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet3 (B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8,
    O', mulOctetA (H, rightOctet2 (O'), leftOctet6 (O')))

  mulOctet3 (x0, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet4 (B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H)
  mulOctet3 (x1, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet4 (B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, O',
    mulOctetA (H, rightOctet3 (O'), leftOctet5 (O')))

  mulOctet4 (x0, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet5 (B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H)
  mulOctet4 (x1, B5, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet5 (B5, B6, B7, B8, O',
    mulOctetA (H, rightOctet4 (O'), leftOctet4 (O')))

  mulOctet5 (x0, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet6 (B6, B7, B8, O', H)
  mulOctet5 (x1, B6, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet6 (B6, B7, B8, O',
    mulOctetA (H, rightOctet5 (O'), leftOctet3 (O')))

  mulOctet6 (x0, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet7 (B7, B8, O', H)
  mulOctet6 (x1, B7, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet7 (B7, B8, O',
    mulOctetA (H, rightOctet6 (O'), leftOctet2 (O')))

  mulOctet7 (x0, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet8 (B8, O', H)
  mulOctet7 (x1, B8, O', H) -> mulOctet8 (B8, O',
    mulOctetA (H, rightOctet7 (O'), leftOctet1 (O')))

  mulOctet8 (x0, O', H) -> H
  mulOctet8 (x1, O', H) -> mulOctetA (H, x00, O')

  mulOctetA (buildHalf (O1, O2), O'1, O'2)
  -> mulOctetB (addOctet (O1, O'1), addOctetSum (O2, O'2, x0))

  mulOctetB (O1, buildOctetSum (x0, O2)) -> buildHalf (O1, O2)

```

```
mulOctetB (O1, buildOctetSum (x1, O2)) -> buildHalf (addOctet (O1, xO1), O2)
```

B.7 Definitions for sort HalfSum

We now define sort `HalfSum` that stores the result of the addition of two half words. Values of this sort are 17-bit words, made up using the constructor `buildHalfSum` that gathers one bit for the carry and a half word for the sum. The five principal non-constructors for this sort are `eqHalfSum` (which tests equality), `addHalfSum` (which adds two half words and returns both a carry bit and a 16-bit sum), `addHalf` (which is derived from the former one by dropping the carry bit), `addHalfOctet` and `addHalfOctets` (which are similar to the former one but take octet arguments that are converted to half words before summation); the other non-constructors are auxiliary functions implementing a 16-bit adder built using two 8-bit adders.

```

SORTS
  HalfSum
CONS
  buildHalfSum : Bit Half -> HalfSum
OPNS
  eqHalfSum : HalfSum HalfSum -> Bool
  addHalfSum : Half Half -> HalfSum
  addHalf2 : Octet Octet Octet Octet -> HalfSum
  addHalf1 : Octet Octet OctetSum -> HalfSum
  addHalf0 : OctetSum Octet -> HalfSum
  dropCarryHalfSum : HalfSum -> Half
  addHalf : Half Half -> Half
  addHalfOctet : Octet Half -> Half
  addHalfOctets : Octet Octet -> Half
VARS
  B B' : Bit
  O O' O1 O2 O'1 O'2 O"1 O"2 : Octet
  H H' : Half
RULES
  eqHalfSum (buildHalfSum (B, H), buildHalfSum (B', H'))
  -> andBool (eqBit (B, B'), eqHalf (H, H'))

  addHalfSum (buildHalf (O1, O2), buildHalf (O'1, O'2)) -> addHalf2 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2)

  addHalf2 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2) -> addHalf1 (O1, O'1, addOctetSum (O2, O'2, x0))

  addHalf1 (O1, O'1, buildOctetSum (B,O"2)) -> addHalf0 (addOctetSum (O1, O'1, B),O"2)

  addHalf0 (buildOctetSum (B, O"1), O"2) -> buildHalfSum (B, buildHalf (O"1, O"2))

  dropCarryHalfSum (buildHalfSum (B, H)) -> H

  addHalf (H, H') -> dropCarryHalfSum (addHalfSum (H, H'))

  addHalfOctet (O, H) -> addHalf (buildHalf (x00, O), H)

  addHalfOctets (O, O') -> addHalf (buildHalf (x00, O), buildHalf (x00, O'))

```

B.8 Definitions for sort Block

We now define 32-bit words (named “blocks” according to the MAA terminology) using a constructor `buildBlock` that takes four octets and returns a block. The seven principal non-constructors for this sort are `eqBlock` (which tests equality), `andBlock`, `orBlock`, and `xorBlock` (which implement bitwise logical operations on blocks), `HalfU` and `HalfL` (which decompose a block into two half words), and `mulHalf` (which takes two half words and computes their 32-bit product); the other non-constructors are auxiliary functions implementing a 16-bit multiplier built using four 8-bit multipliers, as well as all block constants needed to formally describe the MAA and its test vectors.

```

SORTS
  Block
CONS
  buildBlock : Octet Octet Octet Octet -> Block
  % the first argument of buildBlock contain the most significant bits
OPNS
  eqBlock : Block Block -> Bool
  andBlock : Block Block -> Block
  orBlock : Block Block -> Block
  xorBlock : Block Block -> Block
  HalfU : Block -> Half
  HalfL : Block -> Half
  mulHalf : Half Half -> Block
  mulHalfA : Half Half Half Half -> Block
  mulHalf4 : Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet -> Block
  mulHalf3 : Octet Octet Octet Octet Half Octet -> Block
  mulHalf2 : Octet Half Octet Octet -> Block
  mulHalf1 : Half Octet Octet Octet -> Block
  x00000000 : -> Block
  x00000001 : -> Block
  x00000002 : -> Block
  x00000003 : -> Block
  x00000004 : -> Block
  x00000005 : -> Block
  x00000006 : -> Block
  x00000007 : -> Block
  x00000008 : -> Block
  x00000009 : -> Block
  x0000000A : -> Block
  x0000000B : -> Block
  x0000000C : -> Block
  x0000000D : -> Block
  x0000000E : -> Block
  x0000000F : -> Block
  x00000010 : -> Block
  x00000012 : -> Block
  x00000014 : -> Block
  x00000016 : -> Block
  x00000018 : -> Block
  x0000001B : -> Block
  x0000001D : -> Block
  x0000001E : -> Block

```

```
x0000001F : -> Block
x00000031 : -> Block
x00000036 : -> Block
x00000060 : -> Block
x00000080 : -> Block
x000000A5 : -> Block
x000000B6 : -> Block
x000000C4 : -> Block
x000000D2 : -> Block
x00000100 : -> Block
x00000129 : -> Block
x0000018C : -> Block
x00004000 : -> Block
x00010000 : -> Block
x00020000 : -> Block
x00030000 : -> Block
x00040000 : -> Block
x00060000 : -> Block
x00804021 : -> Block % MAA special constant 'B'
x00FF00FF : -> Block
x0103050B : -> Block
x01030703 : -> Block
x01030705 : -> Block
x0103070F : -> Block
x02040801 : -> Block % MAA special constant 'A'
x0297AF6F : -> Block
x07050301 : -> Block
x077788A2 : -> Block
x07C72EAA : -> Block
x0A202020 : -> Block
x0AD67E20 : -> Block
x10000000 : -> Block
x11A9D254 : -> Block
x11AC46B8 : -> Block
x1277A6D4 : -> Block
x13647149 : -> Block
x160EE9B5 : -> Block
x17065DBB : -> Block
x17A808FD : -> Block
x1D10D8D3 : -> Block
x1D3B7760 : -> Block
x1D9C9655 : -> Block
x1F3F7FFF : -> Block
x204E80A7 : -> Block
x21D869BA : -> Block
x24B66FB5 : -> Block
x270EEDAF : -> Block
x277B4B25 : -> Block
x2829040B : -> Block
x288FC786 : -> Block
x28EAD8B3 : -> Block
x29907CD8 : -> Block
```

```
x29C1485F : -> Block
x29EEE96B : -> Block
x2A6091AE : -> Block
x2BF8499A : -> Block
x2E80AC30 : -> Block
x2FD76FFB : -> Block
x30261492 : -> Block
x303FF4AA : -> Block
x33D5A466 : -> Block
x344925FC : -> Block
x34ACF886 : -> Block
x3CD54DEB : -> Block
x3CF3A7D2 : -> Block
x3DD81AC6 : -> Block
x3F6F7248 : -> Block
x48B204D6 : -> Block
x4A645A01 : -> Block
x4C49AAE0 : -> Block
x4CE933E1 : -> Block
x4D53901A : -> Block
x4DA124A1 : -> Block
x4F998E01 : -> Block
x4FB1138A : -> Block
x50DEC930 : -> Block
x51AF3C1D : -> Block
x51EDE9C7 : -> Block
x550D91CE : -> Block
x55555555 : -> Block
x55DD063F : -> Block
x5834A585 : -> Block
x5A35D667 : -> Block
x5BC02502 : -> Block
x5CCA3239 : -> Block
x5EBA06C2 : -> Block
x5F38EEF1 : -> Block
x613F8E2A : -> Block
x63C70DBA : -> Block
x6AD6E8A4 : -> Block
x6AEBACF8 : -> Block
x6D67E884 : -> Block
x7050EC5E : -> Block
x717153D5 : -> Block
x7201F4DC : -> Block
x7397C9AE : -> Block
x74B39176 : -> Block
x76232E5F : -> Block
x7783C51D : -> Block
x7792F9D4 : -> Block
x7BC180AB : -> Block
x7DB2D9F4 : -> Block
x7DFEFBFF : -> Block % MAA special constant 'D'
x7F76A3B0 : -> Block
```

```
x7F839576 : -> Block
x7FFFFFF0 : -> Block
x7FFFFFF1 : -> Block
x7FFFFFFC : -> Block
x7FFFFFFD : -> Block
x80000000 : -> Block
x80000002 : -> Block
x800000C2 : -> Block
x80018000 : -> Block
x80018001 : -> Block
x80397302 : -> Block
x81D10CA3 : -> Block
x89D635D7 : -> Block
x8CE37709 : -> Block
x8DC8BBDE : -> Block
x9115A558 : -> Block
x91896CFA : -> Block
x9372CDC6 : -> Block
x98D1CC75 : -> Block
x9D15C437 : -> Block
x9DB15CF6 : -> Block
x9E2E7B36 : -> Block
xA018C83B : -> Block
xA0B87B77 : -> Block
xA44AAAC0 : -> Block
xA511987A : -> Block
xA70FC148 : -> Block
xA93BD410 : -> Block
xA93BD410 : -> Block
xA93BD410 : -> Block
AAAAAAAAAA : -> Block
xAB00FFCD : -> Block
xAB01FCCD : -> Block
xAB6EED4A : -> Block
xABEED6B : -> Block
xACBC13DD : -> Block
xB1CC1CC5 : -> Block
xB8142629 : -> Block
xB99A62DE : -> Block
xBA92DB12 : -> Block
xBBA57835 : -> Block
xBE9F0917 : -> Block
xBF2D7D85 : -> Block
xBF7F7FDF : -> Block % MAA special constant 'C'
xC1ED90DD : -> Block
xC21A1846 : -> Block
xC4EB1AEB : -> Block
xC6B1317E : -> Block
xCBC865BA : -> Block
xCD959B46 : -> Block
xD0482465 : -> Block
xD636250D : -> Block
xD7843FDC : -> Block
xD78634BC : -> Block
```

```

xD8804CA5 : -> Block
xDB79FBDC : -> Block
xDB9102B0 : -> Block
xE0C08000 : -> Block
xE6A12F07 : -> Block
xEB35B97F : -> Block
xF0239DD5 : -> Block
xF14D6E28 : -> Block
xF2EF3501 : -> Block
xF6A09667 : -> Block
xFD297DA4 : -> Block
xFDC1A8BA : -> Block
xFE4E5BDD : -> Block
xFEAA1D334 : -> Block
xFECCAA6E : -> Block
xFEFC07F0 : -> Block
xFF2D7DA5 : -> Block
xFFEF0001 : -> Block
xFFFF00FF : -> Block
FFFFFFFF2D : -> Block
FFFFFFFF3A : -> Block
FFFFFFFFF0 : -> Block
FFFFFFFFF1 : -> Block
FFFFFFFFF4 : -> Block
FFFFFFFFF5 : -> Block
FFFFFFFFF7 : -> Block
FFFFFFFFF9 : -> Block
FFFFFFFFFA : -> Block
FFFFFFFFFB : -> Block
FFFFFFFFFC : -> Block
FFFFFFFFFD : -> Block
FFFFFFFFFE : -> Block
FFFFFFFFFF : -> Block

```

VARs

```

01 02 03 04 0'1 0'2 0'3 0'4 0"1 0"2 0"3 0"4 : Octet
011U 011L 012U 012L 021U 021L 022U 022L 0carry : Octet

```

RULES

```

eqBlock (buildBlock (01, 02, 03, 04), buildBlock (0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4))
-> andBool (andBool (eqOctet (01, 0'1), eqOctet (02, 0'2)),
            andBool (eqOctet (03, 0'3), eqOctet (04, 0'4)))

andBlock (buildBlock (01, 02, 03, 04), buildBlock (0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4))
-> buildBlock (andOctet (01, 0'1), andOctet (02, 0'2),
              andOctet (03, 0'3), andOctet (04, 0'4))

orBlock (buildBlock (01, 02, 03, 04), buildBlock (0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4))
-> buildBlock (orOctet (01, 0'1), orOctet (02, 0'2),
              orOctet (03, 0'3), orOctet (04, 0'4))

xorBlock (buildBlock (01, 02, 03, 04), buildBlock (0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4))
-> buildBlock (xorOctet (01, 0'1), xorOctet (02, 0'2),
              xorOctet (03, 0'3), xorOctet (04, 0'4))

```



```

HalfU (buildBlock (O1, O2, O3, O4)) -> buildHalf (O1, O2)

HalfL (buildBlock (O1, O2, O3, O4)) -> buildHalf (O3, O4)

mulHalf (buildHalf (O1, O2), buildHalf (O'1, O'2))
-> mulHalfA (mulOctet (O1, O'1), mulOctet (O1, O'2),
            mulOctet (O2, O'1), mulOctet (O2, O'2))

mulHalfA (buildHalf (O11U, O11L), buildHalf (O12U, O12L),
          buildHalf (O21U, O21L), buildHalf (O22U, O22L))
-> mulHalf4 (O11U, O11L, O12U, O12L, O21U, O21L; O22U; O22L)

mulHalf4 (O11U, O11L, O12U, O12L, O21U, O21L; O22U; O"4)
-> mulHalf3 (O11U, O11L, O12U, O21U;
            addHalfOctet (O12L, addHalfOctets (O21L, O22U)); O"4)

mulHalf3 (O11U, O11L, O12U, O21U; buildHalf (Ocarry, O"3); O"4)
-> mulHalf2 (O11U; addHalfOctet (Ocarry,
            addHalfOctet (O11L, addHalfOctets (O12U, O21U))); O"3, O"4)

mulHalf2 (O11U; buildHalf (Ocarry, O"2); O"3, O"4)
-> mulHalf1 (addHalfOctets (Ocarry, O11U); O"2; O"3, O"4)

mulHalf1 (buildHalf (Ocarry, O"1); O"2; O"3, O"4)
-> buildBlock (O"1, O"2, O"3, O"4) % assert eqOctet (Ocarry, x00)

x00000000 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x00)
x00000001 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x01)
x00000002 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x02)
x00000003 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x03)
x00000004 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x04)
x00000005 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x05)
x00000006 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x06)
x00000007 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x07)
x00000008 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x08)
x00000009 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x09)
x0000000A -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x0A)
x0000000B -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x0B)
x0000000C -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x0C)
x0000000D -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x0D)
x0000000E -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x0E)
x0000000F -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x0F)
x00000010 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x10)
x00000012 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x12)
x00000014 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x14)
x00000016 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x16)
x00000018 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x18)
x0000001B -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x1B)
x0000001D -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x1D)
x0000001E -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x1E)
x0000001F -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x1F)

```

```

x00000031 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x31)
x00000036 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x36)
x00000060 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x60)
x00000080 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, x80)
x000000A5 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, xA5)
x000000B6 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, xB6)
x000000C4 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, xC4)
x000000D2 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x00, xD2)
x00000100 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x01, x00)
x00000129 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x01, x29)
x0000018C -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x01, x8C)
x00004000 -> buildBlock (x00, x00, x40, x00)
x00010000 -> buildBlock (x00, x01, x00, x00)
x00020000 -> buildBlock (x00, x02, x00, x00)
x00030000 -> buildBlock (x00, x03, x00, x00)
x00040000 -> buildBlock (x00, x04, x00, x00)
x00060000 -> buildBlock (x00, x06, x00, x00)
x00804021 -> buildBlock (x00, x80, x40, x21) % MAA special constant 'B'
x00FF00FF -> buildBlock (x00, xFF, x00, xFF)
x0103050B -> buildBlock (x01, x03, x05, x0B)
x01030703 -> buildBlock (x01, x03, x07, x03)
x01030705 -> buildBlock (x01, x03, x07, x05)
x0103070F -> buildBlock (x01, x03, x07, x0F)
x02040801 -> buildBlock (x02, x04, x08, x01) % MAA special constant 'A'
x0297AF6F -> buildBlock (x02, x97, xAF, x6F)
x07050301 -> buildBlock (x07, x05, x03, x01)
x077788A2 -> buildBlock (x07, x77, x88, xA2)
x07C72EAA -> buildBlock (x07, xC7, x2E, xAA)
x0A202020 -> buildBlock (x0A, x20, x20, x20)
x0AD67E20 -> buildBlock (x0A, xD6, x7E, x20)
x10000000 -> buildBlock (x10, x00, x00, x00)
x11A9D254 -> buildBlock (x11, xA9, xD2, x54)
x11AC46B8 -> buildBlock (x11, xAC, x46, xB8)
x1277A6D4 -> buildBlock (x12, x77, xA6, xD4)
x13647149 -> buildBlock (x13, x64, x71, x49)
x160EE9B5 -> buildBlock (x16, x0E, xE9, xB5)
x17065DBB -> buildBlock (x17, x06, x5D, xBB)
x17A808FD -> buildBlock (x17, xA8, x08, xFD)
x1D10D8D3 -> buildBlock (x1D, x10, xD8, xD3)
x1D3B7760 -> buildBlock (x1D, x3B, x77, x60)
x1D9C9655 -> buildBlock (x1D, x9C, x96, x55)
x1F3F7FFF -> buildBlock (x1F, x3F, x7F, xFF)
x204E80A7 -> buildBlock (x20, x4E, x80, xA7)
x21D869BA -> buildBlock (x21, xD8, x69, xBA)
x24B66FB5 -> buildBlock (x24, xB6, x6F, xB5)
x270EEDAF -> buildBlock (x27, x0E, xED, xAF)
x277B4B25 -> buildBlock (x27, x7B, x4B, x25)
x2829040B -> buildBlock (x28, x29, x04, x0B)
x288FC786 -> buildBlock (x28, x8F, xC7, x86)
x28EAD8B3 -> buildBlock (x28, xEA, xD8, xB3)
x29907CD8 -> buildBlock (x29, x90, x7C, xD8)
x29C1485F -> buildBlock (x29, xC1, x48, x5F)

```

```

x29EEE96B -> buildBlock (x29, xEE, xE9, x6B)
x2A6091AE -> buildBlock (x2A, x60, x91, xAE)
x2BF8499A -> buildBlock (x2B, xF8, x49, x9A)
x2E80AC30 -> buildBlock (x2E, x80, xAC, x30)
x2FD76FFB -> buildBlock (x2F, xD7, x6F, xFB)
x30261492 -> buildBlock (x30, x26, x14, x92)
x303FF4AA -> buildBlock (x30, x3F, xF4, xAA)
x33D5A466 -> buildBlock (x33, xD5, xA4, x66)
x344925FC -> buildBlock (x34, x49, x25, xFC)
x34ACF886 -> buildBlock (x34, xAC, xF8, x86)
x3CD54DEB -> buildBlock (x3C, xD5, x4D, xEB)
x3CF3A7D2 -> buildBlock (x3C, xF3, xA7, xD2)
x3DD81AC6 -> buildBlock (x3D, xD8, x1A, xC6)
x3F6F7248 -> buildBlock (x3F, x6F, x72, x48)
x48B204D6 -> buildBlock (x48, xB2, x04, xD6)
x4A645A01 -> buildBlock (x4A, x64, x5A, x01)
x4C49AAE0 -> buildBlock (x4C, x49, xAA, xE0)
x4CE933E1 -> buildBlock (x4C, xE9, x33, xE1)
x4D53901A -> buildBlock (x4D, x53, x90, x1A)
x4DA124A1 -> buildBlock (x4D, xA1, x24, xA1)
x4F998E01 -> buildBlock (x4F, x99, x8E, x01)
x4FB1138A -> buildBlock (x4F, xB1, x13, x8A)
x50DEC930 -> buildBlock (x50, xDE, xC9, x30)
x51AF3C1D -> buildBlock (x51, xAF, x3C, x1D)
x51EDE9C7 -> buildBlock (x51, xED, xE9, xC7)
x550D91CE -> buildBlock (x55, x0D, x91, xCE)
x55555555 -> buildBlock (x55, x55, x55, x55)
x55DD063F -> buildBlock (x55, xDD, x06, x3F)
x5834A585 -> buildBlock (x58, x34, xA5, x85)
x5A35D667 -> buildBlock (x5A, x35, xD6, x67)
x5BC02502 -> buildBlock (x5B, xC0, x25, x02)
x5CCA3239 -> buildBlock (x5C, xCA, x32, x39)
x5EBA06C2 -> buildBlock (x5E, xBA, x06, xC2)
x5F38EEF1 -> buildBlock (x5F, x38, xEE, xF1)
x613F8E2A -> buildBlock (x61, x3F, x8E, x2A)
x63C70DBA -> buildBlock (x63, xC7, x0D, xBA)
x6AD6E8A4 -> buildBlock (x6A, xD6, xE8, xA4)
x6AEBACF8 -> buildBlock (x6A, xEB, xAC, xF8)
x6D67E884 -> buildBlock (x6D, x67, xE8, x84)
x7050EC5E -> buildBlock (x70, x50, xEC, x5E)
x717153D5 -> buildBlock (x71, x71, x53, xD5)
x7201F4DC -> buildBlock (x72, x01, xF4, xDC)
x7397C9AE -> buildBlock (x73, x97, xC9, xAE)
x74B39176 -> buildBlock (x74, xB3, x91, x76)
x76232E5F -> buildBlock (x76, x23, x2E, x5F)
x7783C51D -> buildBlock (x77, x83, xC5, x1D)
x7792F9D4 -> buildBlock (x77, x92, xF9, xD4)
x7BC180AB -> buildBlock (x7B, xC1, x80, xAB)
x7DB2D9F4 -> buildBlock (x7D, xB2, xD9, xF4)
x7DFEFBFF -> buildBlock (x7D, xFE, xFB, xFF) % MAA special constant 'D'
x7F76A3B0 -> buildBlock (x7F, x76, xA3, xB0)
x7F839576 -> buildBlock (x7F, x83, x95, x76)

```

```

x7FFFFFF0 -> buildBlock (x7F, xFF, xFF, xF0)
x7FFFFFF1 -> buildBlock (x7F, xFF, xFF, xF1)
x7FFFFFFC -> buildBlock (x7F, xFF, xFF, xFC)
x7FFFFFFD -> buildBlock (x7F, xFF, xFF, xFD)
x80000000 -> buildBlock (x80, x00, x00, x00)
x80000002 -> buildBlock (x80, x00, x00, x02)
x800000C2 -> buildBlock (x80, x00, x00, xC2)
x80018000 -> buildBlock (x80, x01, x80, x00)
x80018001 -> buildBlock (x80, x01, x80, x01)
x80397302 -> buildBlock (x80, x39, x73, x02)
x81D10CA3 -> buildBlock (x81, xD1, x0C, xA3)
x89D635D7 -> buildBlock (x89, xD6, x35, xD7)
x8CE37709 -> buildBlock (x8C, xE3, x77, x09)
x8DC8BBDE -> buildBlock (x8D, xC8, xBB, xDE)
x9115A558 -> buildBlock (x91, x15, xA5, x58)
x91896CFA -> buildBlock (x91, x89, x6C, xFA)
x9372CDC6 -> buildBlock (x93, x72, xCD, xC6)
x98D1CC75 -> buildBlock (x98, xD1, xCC, x75)
x9D15C437 -> buildBlock (x9D, x15, xC4, x37)
x9DB15CF6 -> buildBlock (x9D, xB1, x5C, xF6)
x9E2E7B36 -> buildBlock (x9E, x2E, x7B, x36)
xA018C83B -> buildBlock (xA0, x18, xC8, x3B)
xA0B87B77 -> buildBlock (xA0, xB8, x7B, x77)
xA44AAAC0 -> buildBlock (xA4, x4A, xAA, xC0)
xA511987A -> buildBlock (xA5, x11, x98, x7A)
xA70FC148 -> buildBlock (xA7, x0F, xC1, x48)
xA93BD410 -> buildBlock (xA9, x3B, xD4, x10)
xA9AAAAAA -> buildBlock (xAA, xAA, xAA, xAA)
xAB00FFCD -> buildBlock (xAB, x00, xFF, xCD)
xAB01FCCD -> buildBlock (xAB, x01, xFC, xCD)
xAB6EED4A -> buildBlock (xAB, x6E, xED, x4A)
xABEEED6B -> buildBlock (xAB, xEE, xED, x6B)
xACBC13DD -> buildBlock (xAC, xBC, x13, xDD)
xB1CC1CC5 -> buildBlock (xB1, xCC, x1C, xC5)
xB8142629 -> buildBlock (xB8, x14, x26, x29)
xB99A62DE -> buildBlock (xB9, x9A, x62, xDE)
xBA92DB12 -> buildBlock (xBA, x92, xDB, x12)
xBBA57835 -> buildBlock (xBB, xA5, x78, x35)
xBE9F0917 -> buildBlock (xBE, x9F, x09, x17)
xBF2D7D85 -> buildBlock (xBF, x2D, x7D, x85)
xBFEF7FDF -> buildBlock (xBF, xEF, x7F, xDF) % MAA special constant 'C'
xC1ED90DD -> buildBlock (xC1, xED, x90, xDD)
xC21A1846 -> buildBlock (xC2, x1A, x18, x46)
xC4EB1AEB -> buildBlock (xC4, xEB, x1A, xEB)
xC6B1317E -> buildBlock (xC6, xB1, x31, x7E)
xCBC865BA -> buildBlock (xCB, xC8, x65, xBA)
xCD959B46 -> buildBlock (xCD, x95, x9B, x46)
xD0482465 -> buildBlock (xD0, x48, x24, x65)
xD636250D -> buildBlock (xD6, x36, x25, x0D)
xD7843FDC -> buildBlock (xD7, x84, x3F, xDC)
xD78634BC -> buildBlock (xD7, x86, x34, xBC)
xD8804CA5 -> buildBlock (xD8, x80, x4C, xA5)

```

```

xDB79FBDC -> buildBlock (xDB, x79, xFB, xDC)
xDB9102B0 -> buildBlock (xDB, x91, x02, xB0)
xE0C08000 -> buildBlock (xE0, xC0, x80, x00)
xE6A12F07 -> buildBlock (xE6, xA1, x2F, x07)
xEB35B97F -> buildBlock (xEB, x35, xB9, x7F)
xF0239DD5 -> buildBlock (xF0, x23, x9D, xD5)
xF14D6E28 -> buildBlock (xF1, x4D, x6E, x28)
xF2EF3501 -> buildBlock (xF2, xEF, x35, x01)
xF6A09667 -> buildBlock (xF6, xA0, x96, x67)
xFD297DA4 -> buildBlock (xFD, x29, x7D, xA4)
xFDC1A8BA -> buildBlock (xFD, xC1, xA8, xBA)
xFE4E5BDD -> buildBlock (xFE, x4E, x5B, xDD)
xFEAA1D334 -> buildBlock (xFE, xA1, xD3, x34)
xFECCAA6E -> buildBlock (xFE, xCC, xAA, x6E)
xFEFC07F0 -> buildBlock (xFE, xFC, x07, xF0)
xFF2D7DA5 -> buildBlock (xFF, x2D, x7D, xA5)
xFFEF0001 -> buildBlock (xFF, xEF, x00, x01)
xFFFF00FF -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, x00, xFF)
FFFFFFFF2D -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, x2D)
FFFFFFFF3A -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, x3A)
FFFFFFFFF0 -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xF0)
FFFFFFFFF1 -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xF1)
FFFFFFFFF4 -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xF4)
FFFFFFFFF5 -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xF5)
FFFFFFFFF7 -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xF7)
FFFFFFFFF9 -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xF9)
FFFFFFFFFA -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFA)
FFFFFFFFFB -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFB)
FFFFFFFFFC -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFC)
FFFFFFFFFD -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFD)
FFFFFFFFFE -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFE)
FFFFFFFFFF -> buildBlock (xFF, xFF, xFF, xFF)

```

B.9 Definitions for sort BlockSum

We now define sort `BlockSum` that stores the result of the addition of two blocks. Values of this sort are 33-bit words, made up using the constructor `buildBlockSum` that gathers one bit for the carry and a block for the sum. The five principal non-constructors for this sort are `eqBlockSum` (which tests equality), `addBlockSum` (which adds two blocks and returns both a carry bit and a 32-bit sum), `addBlock` (which is derived from the former one by dropping the carry bit), `addBlockHalf` and `addBlockHalves` (which are similar to the former one but take half-word arguments that are converted to blocks before summation); the other non-constructors are auxiliary functions implementing a 32-bit adder built using four 8-bit adders.

```

SORTS
  BlockSum
CONS
  buildBlockSum : Bit Block -> BlockSum
OPNS
  eqBlockSum : BlockSum BlockSum -> Bool
  addBlockSum : Block Block -> BlockSum

```

```

addBlock4 : Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet -> BlockSum
addBlock3 : Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet OctetSum -> BlockSum
addBlock2 : Octet Octet Octet Octet OctetSum Octet -> BlockSum
addBlock1 : Octet Octet OctetSum Octet Octet -> BlockSum
addBlock0 : OctetSum Octet Octet Octet -> BlockSum
dropCarryBlockSum : BlockSum -> Block
addBlock : Block Block -> Block
addBlockHalf : Half Block -> Block
addBlockHalves : Half Half -> Block
VARS
  B B' Bcarry : Bit
  O1 O2 O3 O4 O'1 O'2 O'3 O'4 O"1 O"2 O"3 O"4 : Octet
  W W' : Block
RULES
  eqBlockSum (buildBlockSum (B, W), buildBlockSum (B', W'))
  -> andBool (eqBit (B, B'), eqBlock (W, W'))

  addBlockSum (buildBlock (O1, O2, O3, O4), buildBlock (O'1, O'2, O'3, O'4))
  -> addBlock4 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2, O3, O'3, O4, O'4)

  addBlock4 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2, O3, O'3, O4, O'4)
  -> addBlock3 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2, O3, O'3, addOctetSum (O4, O'4, x0))

  addBlock3 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2, O3, O'3, buildOctetSum (Bcarry, O"4))
  -> addBlock2 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2, addOctetSum (O3, O'3, Bcarry); O"4)

  addBlock2 (O1, O'1, O2, O'2, buildOctetSum (Bcarry, O"3); O"4)
  -> addBlock1 (O1, O'1, addOctetSum (O2, O'2, Bcarry); O"3, O"4)

  addBlock1 (O1, O'1, buildOctetSum (Bcarry, O"2); O"3, O"4)
  -> addBlock0 (addOctetSum (O1, O'1, Bcarry); O"2, O"3, O"4)

  addBlock0 (buildOctetSum (Bcarry, O"1); O"2, O"3, O"4)
  -> buildBlockSum (Bcarry, buildBlock (O"1, O"2, O"3, O"4))

  dropCarryBlockSum (buildBlockSum (Bcarry, W)) -> W

  addBlock (W, W') -> dropCarryBlockSum (addBlockSum (W, W'))

  addBlockHalf (buildHalf (O1, O2), W)
  -> addBlock (buildBlock (x00, x00, O1, O2), W)

  addBlockHalves (buildHalf (O1, O2), buildHalf (O'1, O'2))
  -> addBlock (buildBlock (x00, x00, O1, O2), buildBlock (x00, x00, O'1, O'2))

```

B.10 Definitions for sort Pair

We now define 64-bit words (named “pairs” according to the MAA terminology) using a constructor `buildPair` that takes two blocks and returns a pair. The two principal non-constructors for this sort are `eqPair` (which tests equality) and `mulBlock` (which takes two blocks and computes their 64-bit product); the other non-constructors are auxiliary functions implementing a 32-bit multiplier built using

four 16-bit multipliers.

```

SORTS
  Pair
CONS
  buildPair : Block Block -> Pair
  % the first argument of buildPair contain the most significant bits
OPNS
  eqPair : Pair Pair -> Bool
  mulBlock : Block Block -> Pair
  mulBlockA : Block Block Block Block -> Pair
  mulBlock4 : Half Half Half Half Half Half Half Half -> Pair
  mulBlock3 : Half Half Half Half Block Half -> Pair
  mulBlock2 : Half Block Half Half -> Pair
  mulBlock1 : Block Half Half Half -> Pair
  mulBlockB : Half Half Half Half -> Pair
VARS
  O1 O2 O3 O4 O'1 O'2 O'3 O'4 : Octet
  O1U O1L O2U O2L O3U O3L O4U O4L : Octet
  H"2 H"3 H"4 : Half
  H11U H11L H12U H12L H21U H21L H22U H22L : Half
  W W1 W2 W'1 W'2 : Block
  W11 W12 W21 W22 : Block
RULES
  eqPair (buildPair (W1, W2), buildPair (W'1, W'2))
  -> andBool (eqBlock (W1, W'1), eqBlock (W2, W'2))

  mulBlock (W1, W2)
  -> mulBlockA (mulHalf (HalfU (W1), HalfU (W2)), mulHalf (HalfU (W1), HalfL (W2)),
               mulHalf (HalfL (W1), HalfU (W2)), mulHalf (HalfL (W1), HalfL (W2)))

  mulBlockA (W11, W12, W21, W22)
  -> mulBlock4 (HalfU (W11), HalfL (W11), HalfU (W12), HalfL (W12),
               HalfU (W21), HalfL (W21); HalfU (W22); HalfL (W22))

  mulBlock4 (H11U, H11L, H12U, H12L, H21U, H21L; H22U; H"4)
  -> mulBlock3 (H11U, H11L, H12U, H21U;
               addBlockHalf (H12L, addBlockHalves (H21L, H22U)); H"4)

  mulBlock3 (H11U, H11L, H12U, H21U; W; H"4)
  -> mulBlock2 (H11U; addBlockHalf (HalfU (W),
               addBlockHalf (H11L, addBlockHalves (H12U, H21U))); HalfL (W), H"4)

  mulBlock2 (H11U; W; H"3, H"4)
  -> mulBlock1 (addBlockHalves (HalfU (W), H11U); HalfL (W), H"3, H"4)

  mulBlock1 (W; H"2, H"3, H"4)
  -> mulBlockB (HalfL (W), H"2, H"3, H"4) % assert eqHalf (HalfU (W), x0000)

  mulBlockB (buildHalf (O1U, O1L), buildHalf (O2U, O2L),
             buildHalf (O3U, O3L), buildHalf (O4U, O4L))
  -> buildPair (buildBlock (O1U, O1L, O2U, O2L), buildBlock (O3U, O3L, O4U, O4L))

```

B.11 Definitions for sort Key

We now define a sort `Key` that is intended to represent the 64-bit keys (J, K) used by the MAA. This sort has a constructor `buildKey` that takes two blocks and returns a key. In [15], keys are represented using the sort `Pair`, but we prefer introducing a dedicated sort to clearly distinguish between keys and, e.g., results of the multiplication of two blocks.

```

SORTS
  Key
CONS
  buildKey : Block Block -> Key
  % the 1st argument of buildKey was noted J in the MAA specification
  % the 2nd argument of buildKey was noted K in the MAA specification

```

B.12 Definitions for sort Message

We now define messages, which are non-empty lists of blocks built using two constructors `unitMessage` and `consMessage`; there are three non-constructors for this sort: `appendMessage` (which inserts a block at the end of a list), `reverseMessage` (which reverses a list), and `makeMessage` (which generates a message of a given length, the blocks of which follow an arithmetic progression).

```

SORTS
  Message
CONS
  unitMessage : Block -> Message
  consMessage : Block Message -> Message
OPNS
  appendMessage : Message Block -> Message
  reverseMessage : Message -> Message
  makeMessage : Nat Block Block -> Message
VARS
  M M' : Message
  W W' : Block
RULES
  appendMessage (unitMessage (W), W') -> consMessage (W, unitMessage (W'))
  appendMessage (consMessage (W, M), W') -> consMessage (W, appendMessage (M, W'))

  reverseMessage (unitMessage (W)) -> unitMessage (W)
  reverseMessage (consMessage (W, M)) -> appendMessage (reverseMessage (M), W)

  makeMessage (succ (N), W, W')
  -> unitMessage (W) if eqNat (N, zero) -><- true
  makeMessage (succ (N), W, W')
  -> consMessage (W, makeMessage (N, ADD (W, W'), W')) if eqNat (N, zero) -><- false

```

If needed, the two conditional rules could be eliminated by modifying the definition of `makeMessage` as follows:

```

makeMessage (succ (zero), W, W')
-> unitMessage (W)
makeMessage (succ (succ (N)), W, W')
-> consMessage (W, makeMessage (succ (N), ADD (W, W'), W'))

```


B.13 Definitions for sort `SegmentedMessage`

We now define segmented messages, which are non-empty lists of messages, each message containing up to 1204 octets (i.e., 256 blocks). Values of this sort are built using two constructors `unitSegment` and `consSegment`; the principal non-constructor is `splitSegment`, which converts a message into a segmented message.

```

SORTS
  SegmentedMessage
CONS
  unitSegment : Message -> SegmentedMessage
  consSegment : Message SegmentedMessage -> SegmentedMessage
OPNS
  splitSegment : Message -> SegmentedMessage
  cutSegment : Message Message Nat -> SegmentedMessage
VARS
  M M' : Message
  N : Nat
  S : SegmentedMessage
  W : Block
RULES
  splitSegment (unitMessage (W)) -> unitSegment (unitMessage (W))
  splitSegment (consMessage (W, M)) -> cutSegment (M, unitMessage (W), n254)

  cutSegment (unitMessage (W), M', N)
  -> unitSegment (reverseMessage (consMessage (W, M')))
  cutSegment (consMessage (W, M), M', zero)
  -> consSegment (reverseMessage (consMessage (W, M')), splitSegment (M))
  cutSegment (consMessage (W, M), M', succ (N))
  -> cutSegment (M, consMessage (W, M'), N)

```

B.14 Definitions (1) of MAA-specific cryptographic functions

We now define a first set of functions to be used for MAA computations, most of which were present in [2] or have been later introduced in [15]. Operations `ADD`, `AND`, `MUL`, `OR`, and `XOR` are merely aliases of already-defined functions on `Blocks`; operations `BYT'` and `ADDC'` are just auxiliary functions.

```

OPNS
  ADD : Block Block -> Block
  AND : Block Block -> Block
  MUL : Block Block -> Pair
  OR : Block Block -> Block
  XOR : Block Block -> Block
  XOR' : Pair -> Block
  CYC : Block -> Block
  nCYC : Nat Block -> Block
  FIX1 : Block -> Block
  FIX2 : Block -> Block
  needAdjust : Octet -> Bool
  adjustCode : Octet -> Bit
  adjust : Octet Octet -> Octet
  PAT : Block Block -> Octet

```

```

BYT : Block Block -> Pair
BYT' : Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet Octet -> Pair
ADDC : Block Block -> Pair
ADDC' : BlockSum -> Pair
VARS
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 : Bit
B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 : Bit
B17 B18 B19 B20 B21 B22 B23 B24 : Bit
B25 B26 B27 B28 B29 B30 B31 B32 : Bit
O O' : Octet
W W' : Block
RULES
ADD (W, W') -> addBlock (W, W')

AND (W, W') -> andBlock (W, W')

MUL (W, W') -> mulBlock (W, W')

OR (W, W') -> orBlock (W, W')

XOR (W, W') -> xorBlock (W, W')

XOR' (buildPair (W, W')) -> XOR (W, W')

CYC (buildBlock (buildOctet (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8),
                    buildOctet (B9, B10, B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B16),
                    buildOctet (B17, B18, B19, B20, B21, B22, B23, B24),
                    buildOctet (B25, B26, B27, B28, B29, B30, B31, B32)))
-> buildBlock (buildOctet (B2, B3, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B9),
                buildOctet (B10, B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B16, B17),
                buildOctet (B18, B19, B20, B21, B22, B23, B24, B25),
                buildOctet (B26, B27, B28, B29, B30, B31, B32, B1))

nCyc (zero, W) -> W
nCyc (succ (N), W) -> CYC (nCyc (N, W))

FIX1 (W) -> AND (OR (W, x02040801), xBFEF7FDF) % A = x02040801, C = xBFEF7FDF
FIX2 (W) -> AND (OR (W, x00804021), x7DFEFBFF) % B = x00804021, D = x7DFEFBFF

needAdjust (0) -> orBool (eqOctet (0, x00), eqOctet (0, xFF))

adjustCode (0) -> x1 if needAdjust (0) -><- true
adjustCode (0) -> x0 if needAdjust (0) -><- false

adjust (0, O') -> xorOctet (0, O') if needAdjust (0) -><- true
adjust (0, O') -> 0 if needAdjust (0) -><- false

PAT (buildBlock (O1, O2, O3, O4), buildBlock (O'1, O'2, O'3, O'4))
-> buildOctet (adjustCode (O1), adjustCode (O2),
                adjustCode (O3), adjustCode (O4),
                adjustCode (O'1), adjustCode (O'2),

```

```

adjustCode (0'3), adjustCode (0'4))

BYT (buildBlock (01, 02, 03, 04), buildBlock (0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4))
-> BYT' (01, 02, 03, 04, 0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4,
        PAT (buildBlock (01, 02, 03, 04), buildBlock (0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4)))

BYT' (01, 02, 03, 04, 0'1, 0'2, 0'3, 0'4, 0pat)
-> buildPair (buildBlock (adjust (01, rightOctet7 (0pat)),
                          adjust (02, rightOctet6 (0pat)),
                          adjust (03, rightOctet5 (0pat)),
                          adjust (04, rightOctet4 (0pat))),
             buildBlock (adjust (0'1, rightOctet3 (0pat)),
                          adjust (0'2, rightOctet2 (0pat)),
                          adjust (0'3, rightOctet1 (0pat)),
                          adjust (0'4, 0pat)))

ADDC (W, W') -> ADDC' (addBlockSum (W, W'))

ADDC' (buildBlockSum (x0, W)) -> buildPair (x00000000, W)
ADDC' (buildBlockSum (x1, W)) -> buildPair (x00000001, W)

```

If needed, the four conditional rules could be eliminated by introducing two auxiliary functions `adjustCode'` and `adjust'` and modifying the definitions of `adjustCode` and `adjust` as follows:

```

OPNS
adjustCode' : Bool -> Bit
adjust' : Octet Octet Bool -> Octet
RULES
adjustCode (0) -> adjustCode' (needAdjust (0))

adjustCode' (true) -> x1
adjustCode' (false) -> x0

adjust (0, 0') -> adjust' (0, 0', needAdjust (0))

adjust (0, 0', true) -> xorOctet (0, 0')
adjust (0, 0', false) -> 0

```

B.15 Definitions (2) of MAA-specific cryptographic functions

We now define a second set of functions, namely the “multiplicative” functions used for MAA computations. The three principal operations are `MUL1`, `MUL2`, and `MUL2A`; the other ones are auxiliary functions.

```

OPNS
MUL1 : Block Block -> Block
MUL1XY : Pair -> Block
MUL1UL : Block Block -> Block
MUL1SC : Pair -> Block
MUL2 : Block Block -> Block
MUL2XY : Pair -> Block
MUL2UL : Block Block -> Block
MUL2DEL : Pair Block -> Block

```

```

MUL2FL : Block Block -> Block
MUL2SC : Pair -> Block
MUL2A  : Block Block -> Block
MUL2AXY : Pair -> Block
MUL2AUL : Block Block -> Block
MUL2ADL : Block Block -> Block
MUL2ASC : Pair -> Block
VARS
W W' Wcarry : Block
RULES
MUL1 (W, W') -> MUL1XY (MUL (W, W'))
MUL1XY (buildPair (W, W')) -> MUL1UL (W, W')
MUL1UL (W, W') -> MUL1SC (ADDC (W, W'))
MUL1SC (buildPair (Wcarry, W)) -> ADD (W, Wcarry)

MUL2 (W, W') -> MUL2XY (MUL (W, W'))
MUL2XY (buildPair (W, W')) -> MUL2UL (W, W')
MUL2UL (W, W') -> MUL2DEL (ADDC (W, W), W')
MUL2DEL (buildPair (Wcarry, W), W') -> MUL2FL (ADD (W, ADD (Wcarry, Wcarry)), W')
MUL2FL (W, W') -> MUL2SC (ADDC (W, W'))
MUL2SC (buildPair (Wcarry, W)) -> ADD (W, ADD (Wcarry, Wcarry))

MUL2A (W, W') -> MUL2AXY (MUL (W, W'))
MUL2AXY (buildPair (W, W')) -> MUL2AUL (W, W')
MUL2AUL (W, W') -> MUL2ADL (ADD (W, W), W')
MUL2ADL (W, W') -> MUL2ASC (ADDC (W, W'))
MUL2ASC (buildPair (Wcarry, W)) -> ADD (W, ADD (Wcarry, Wcarry))

```

B.16 Definitions (3) of MAA-specific cryptographic functions

We now define a third set of functions used for MAA computations.

```

OPNS
squareHalf : Half -> Block
Q : Octet -> Block
H4 : Block -> Block
H6 : Block -> Block
H8 : Block -> Block
H0 : Block -> Block
H5 : Block Octet -> Block
H7 : Block -> Block
H9 : Block -> Block
J1_2 : Block -> Block
J1_4 : Block -> Block
J1_6 : Block -> Block
J1_8 : Block -> Block
J2_2 : Block -> Block
J2_4 : Block -> Block
J2_6 : Block -> Block
J2_8 : Block -> Block
K1_2 : Block -> Block
K1_4 : Block -> Block

```

```

K1_5 : Block -> Block
K1_7 : Block -> Block
K1_9 : Block -> Block
K2_2 : Block -> Block
K2_4 : Block -> Block
K2_5 : Block -> Block
K2_7 : Block -> Block
K2_9 : Block -> Block
VARS
H : Half
O : Octet
W : Block
RULES
squareHalf (H) -> mulHalf (H, H)

Q (O) -> squareHalf (addHalf (buildHalf (x00, O), x0001))

J1_2 (W) -> MUL1 (W, W)
J1_4 (W) -> MUL1 (J1_2 (W), J1_2 (W))
J1_6 (W) -> MUL1 (J1_2 (W), J1_4 (W))
J1_8 (W) -> MUL1 (J1_2 (W), J1_6 (W))

J2_2 (W) -> MUL2 (W, W)
J2_4 (W) -> MUL2 (J2_2 (W), J2_2 (W))
J2_6 (W) -> MUL2 (J2_2 (W), J2_4 (W))
J2_8 (W) -> MUL2 (J2_2 (W), J2_6 (W))

K1_2 (W) -> MUL1 (W, W)
K1_4 (W) -> MUL1 (K1_2 (W), K1_2 (W))
K1_5 (W) -> MUL1 (W, K1_4 (W))
K1_7 (W) -> MUL1 (K1_2 (W), K1_5 (W))
K1_9 (W) -> MUL1 (K1_2 (W), K1_7 (W))

K2_2 (W) -> MUL2 (W, W)
K2_4 (W) -> MUL2 (K2_2 (W), K2_2 (W))
K2_5 (W) -> MUL2 (W, K2_4 (W))
K2_7 (W) -> MUL2 (K2_2 (W), K2_5 (W))
K2_9 (W) -> MUL2 (K2_2 (W), K2_7 (W))

H4 (W) -> XOR (J1_4 (W), J2_4 (W))
H6 (W) -> XOR (J1_6 (W), J2_6 (W))
H8 (W) -> XOR (J1_8 (W), J2_8 (W))

HO (W) -> XOR (K1_5 (W), K2_5 (W))
H5 (W, O) -> MUL2 (HO (W), Q (O))
H7 (W) -> XOR (K1_7 (W), K2_7 (W))
H9 (W) -> XOR (K1_9 (W), K2_9 (W))

```

B.17 Definitions (4) of MAA-specific cryptographic functions

We now define the higher-level functions that implement the MAA algorithm, namely the prelude, the inner loop, and the coda; the two principal functions are MAA (which computes the signature of a non-segmented message) and MAC (which splits a message into 1024-byte segments and computes the overall signature of this message by iterating on each segment, the 4-byte signature of each segment being prepended to the bytes of the next segment).

OPNS

```
preludeXY : Block Block -> Pair
preludeVW : Block Block -> Pair
preludeST : Block Block -> Pair
preludeXY' : Pair Octet -> Pair
preludeVW' : Pair -> Pair
preludeST' : Pair -> Pair
computeXY : Pair Pair Block -> Pair
computeXY' : Pair Block Block -> Pair
computeVW : Pair -> Pair
loop1 : Pair Pair Message -> Pair
loop2 : Pair Pair Message -> Pair
coda : Pair Pair Pair -> Block
MAA : Key Message -> Block
MAA' : Pair Pair Pair Message -> Block
MAC : Key Message -> Block
MACfirst : Key SegmentedMessage -> Block
MACnext : Key Block SegmentedMessage -> Block
```

VARs

```
K : Key
O : Block
M : Message
P P' P1 P2 P3 : Pair
S : SegmentedMessage
W W' W1 W2 : Block
```

RULES

```
% functions implementing the MAA prelude

preludeXY (W1, W2) -> preludeXY' (BYT (W1, W2), PAT (W1, W2))
preludeVW (W1, W2) -> preludeVW' (BYT (W1, W2))
preludeST (W1, W2) -> preludeST' (BYT (W1, W2))

preludeXY' (buildPair (W, W'), O) -> BYT (H4 (W), H5 (W', O))
preludeVW' (buildPair (W, W')) -> BYT (H6 (W), H7 (W'))
preludeST' (buildPair (W, W')) -> BYT (H8 (W), H9 (W'))

% functions implementing the MAA inner loop

computeXY (P, P', W) -> computeXY' (P, W, XOR' (computeVW (P')))

computeXY' (buildPair (W1, W2), W, W')
-> buildPair (MUL1 (XOR (W1, W), FIX1 (ADD (XOR (W2, W), W'))),
             MUL2A (XOR (W2, W), FIX2 (ADD (XOR (W1, W), W'))))
```

```

computeVW (buildPair (W1, W2)) -> buildPair (CYC (W1), W2)

loop1 (P, P', unitMessage (W)) -> computeXY (P, P', W)
loop1 (P, P', consMessage (W, M)) -> loop1 (computeXY (P, P', W), computeVW (P'), M)

loop2 (P, P', unitMessage (W)) -> computeVW (P')
loop2 (P, P', consMessage (W, M)) -> loop2 (computeXY (P, P', W), computeVW (P'), M)

% function implementing the MAA coda

coda (P, P', buildPair (W, W'))
-> XOR' (computeXY (computeXY (P, P', W), computeVW (P'), W'))

% functions computing the MAA on non-segmented messages

MAA (buildKey (W1, W2), M)
-> MAA' (preludeXY (W1, W2), preludeVW (W1, W2), preludeST (W1, W2), M)

MAA' (P1, P2, P3, M) -> coda (loop1 (P1, P2, M), loop2 (P1, P2, M), P3)

% functions computing the MAC on segmented messages

MAC (K, M) -> MACfirst (K, splitSegment (M))

MACfirst (K, unitSegment (M)) -> MAA (K, M)
MACfirst (K, consSegment (M, S)) -> MACnext (K, MAA (K, M), S)

MACnext (K, W, unitSegment (M)) -> MAA (K, consMessage (W, M))
MACnext (K, W, consSegment (M, S)) -> MACnext (K, MAA (K, consMessage (W, M)), S)

```

B.18 Test vectors (1) for checking MAA computations

We now define a first set of test vectors for the MAA. The following expressions implement the checks listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3 of [2] and should all evaluate to true if the MAA functions are correctly implemented.

```

% test vectors for function MUL1 - cf. Table 1
eqBlock (MUL1 (x0000000F, x0000000E), x000000D2)
eqBlock (MUL1 (xFFFFFFFF0, x0000000E), xFFFFFF2D)
eqBlock (MUL1 (xFFFFFFFF0, xFFFFFFF1), x000000D2)

% test vectors for function MUL2 - cf. Table 1
eqBlock (MUL2 (x0000000F, x0000000E), x000000D2)
eqBlock (MUL2 (xFFFFFFFF0, x0000000E), xFFFFFF3A)
eqBlock (MUL2 (xFFFFFFFF0, xFFFFFFF1), x000000B6)

% test vectors for function MUL2A - cf. Table 1
eqBlock (MUL2A (x0000000F, x0000000E), x000000D2)
eqBlock (MUL2A (xFFFFFFFF0, x0000000E), xFFFFFF3A)
eqBlock (MUL2A (x7FFFFFFF0, xFFFFFFF1), x800000C2)
eqBlock (MUL2A (xFFFFFFFF0, x7FFFFFFF1), x000000C4)

```

```

% test vectors for function BYT - cf. Table 2
eqPair (BYT (x00000000, x00000000), buildPair (x0103070F, x1F3F7FFF))
eqPair (BYT (xFFFF00FF, xFFFFFFFF), buildPair (xFEFC07F0, xE0C08000))
eqPair (BYT (xAB00FFCD, xFFEF0001), buildPair (xAB01FCCD, xF2EF3501))

% test vectors for function PAT - cf. Table 2
eqOctet (PAT (x00000000, x00000000), xFF)
eqOctet (PAT (xFFFF00FF, xFFFFFFFF), xFF)
eqOctet (PAT (xAB00FFCD, xFFEF0001), x6A)

% test vectors for functions J1_i - cf. Table 3
eqBlock (J1_2 (x00000100), x00010000)
eqBlock (J1_4 (x00000100), x00000001)
eqBlock (J1_6 (x00000100), x00010000)
eqBlock (J1_8 (x00000100), x00000001)

% test vectors for functions J2_i - cf. Table 3
eqBlock (J2_2 (x00000100), x00010000)
eqBlock (J2_4 (x00000100), x00000002)
eqBlock (J2_6 (x00000100), x00020000)
eqBlock (J2_8 (x00000100), x00000004)

% test vectors for functions Hi - cf. Table 3
eqBlock (H4 (x00000100), x00000003)
eqBlock (H6 (x00000100), x00030000)
eqBlock (H8 (x00000100), x00000005)

% test vectors for functions K1_i - cf. Table 3
eqBlock (K1_2 (x00000080), x00004000)
eqBlock (K1_4 (x00000080), x10000000)
eqBlock (K1_5 (x00000080), x00000008)
eqBlock (K1_7 (x00000080), x00020000)
eqBlock (K1_9 (x00000080), x80000000)

% test vectors for functions K2_i - cf. Table 3
eqBlock (K2_2 (x00000080), x00004000)
eqBlock (K2_4 (x00000080), x10000000)
eqBlock (K2_5 (x00000080), x00000010)
eqBlock (K2_7 (x00000080), x00040000)
eqBlock (K2_9 (x00000080), x00000002)

% test vectors for functions Hi - cf. Table 3
eqBlock (H0 (x00000080), x00000018)
eqBlock (Q (x01), x00000004)
eqBlock (H5 (x00000080, x01), x00000060)
eqBlock (H7 (x00000080), x00060000)
eqBlock (H9 (x00000080), x80000002)

% test vectors for function PAT - cf. Table 3
eqOctet (PAT (x00000003, x00000060), xEE)
eqOctet (PAT (x00030000, x00060000), xBB)
eqOctet (PAT (x00000005, x80000002), xE6)

```



```

% test vectors for function BYT - inferred from Table 3
eqPair (BYT (x00000003, x00000060), buildPair (x01030703, x1D3B7760)) % (X0, Y0)
eqPair (BYT (x00030000, x00060000), buildPair (x0103050B, x17065DBB)) % (V0, W)
eqPair (BYT (x00000005, x80000002), buildPair (x01030705, x80397302)) % (S, T)

```

B.19 Test vectors (2) for checking MAA computations

We now define a second set of test vectors for the MAA, based upon Table 4 of [2]. The following expressions implement six groups of checks (three single-block messages and one three-block message). They should all evaluate to true if the main loop of MAA (as described page 10 of [2]) is correctly implemented.

```

% test vectors for the first single-block message
eqBlock (CYC (x00000003), x00000006) % V
eqBlock (XOR (x00000006, x00000003), x00000005) % E
eqBlock (XOR (x00000002, x00000005), x00000007) % X
eqBlock (XOR (x00000003, x00000005), x00000006) % Y
eqBlock (ADD (x00000005, x00000006), x0000000B) % F
eqBlock (ADD (x00000005, x00000007), x0000000C) % G
eqBlock (OR (x0000000B, x00000004), x0000000F) % F
eqBlock (OR (x0000000C, x00000001), x0000000D) % G
eqBlock (AND (x0000000F, xFFFFFFF7), x00000007) % F
eqBlock (AND (x0000000D, xFFFFFFFB), x00000009) % G
eqBlock (MUL1 (x00000007, x00000007), x00000031) % X
eqBlock (MUL2A (x00000006, x00000009), x00000036) % Y
eqBlock (XOR (x00000031, x00000036), x00000007) % Z

% test vectors for the second single-block message
eqBlock (CYC (x00000003), x00000006) % V
eqBlock (XOR (x00000006, x00000003), x00000005) % E
eqBlock (XOR (xFFFFFFFD, x00000001), xFFFFFFFC) % X
eqBlock (XOR (xFFFFFFFC, x00000001), xFFFFFFFD) % Y
eqBlock (ADD (x00000005, xFFFFFFFD), x00000002) % F
eqBlock (ADD (x00000005, xFFFFFFFC), x00000001) % G
eqBlock (OR (x00000002, x00000001), x00000003) % F
eqBlock (OR (x00000001, x00000004), x00000005) % G
eqBlock (AND (x00000003, xFFFFFFF9), x00000001) % F
eqBlock (AND (x00000005, xFFFFFFFC), x00000004) % G
eqBlock (MUL1 (xFFFFFFFC, x00000001), xFFFFFFFC) % X
eqBlock (MUL2A (xFFFFFFFD, x00000004), xFFFFFFFA) % Y
eqBlock (XOR (xFFFFFFFC, xFFFFFFFA), x00000006) % Z

% test vectors for the third single-block message
eqBlock (CYC (x00000007), x0000000E) % V
eqBlock (XOR (x0000000E, x00000007), x00000009) % E
eqBlock (XOR (xFFFFFFFD, x00000008), xFFFFFFF5) % X
eqBlock (XOR (xFFFFFFFC, x00000008), xFFFFFFF4) % Y
eqBlock (ADD (x00000009, xFFFFFFF4), xFFFFFFFD) % F
eqBlock (ADD (x00000009, xFFFFFFF5), xFFFFFFFE) % G
eqBlock (OR (xFFFFFFFD, x00000001), xFFFFFFFD) % F

```

```

eqBlock (OR (x00000002), xFFFFFFFE) % G
eqBlock (AND (x00000002), xFFFFFFFE) % F
eqBlock (AND (x00000002), x7FFFFFFD) % G
eqBlock (MUL1 (x00000005), xFFFFFFFC) % X
eqBlock (MUL2A (x00000004), x7FFFFFFC) % Y
eqBlock (XOR (x0000001E), x0000001E) % Z

% test vectors for three-block message: first block
eqBlock (CYC (x00000001), x00000002) % V
eqBlock (XOR (x00000002), x00000001) % E
eqBlock (XOR (x00000001), x00000000) % X
eqBlock (XOR (x00000002), x00000000) % Y
eqBlock (ADD (x00000003), x00000002) % F
eqBlock (ADD (x00000003), x00000001) % G
eqBlock (OR (x00000005), x00000002) % F
eqBlock (OR (x00000004), x00000001) % G
eqBlock (AND (x00000007), xFFFFFFFB) % F
eqBlock (AND (x00000005), xFFFFFFFB) % G
eqBlock (MUL1 (x00000001), x00000003) % X
eqBlock (MUL2A (x00000002), x00000001) % Y
eqBlock (XOR (x00000003), x00000002) % Z

% test vectors for the three-block message: second block
eqBlock (CYC (x00000002), x00000004) % V
eqBlock (XOR (x00000004), x00000001) % E
eqBlock (XOR (x00000003), x00000001) % X
eqBlock (XOR (x00000002), x00000001) % Y
eqBlock (ADD (x00000005), x00000003) % F
eqBlock (ADD (x00000005), x00000002) % G
eqBlock (OR (x00000008), x00000002) % F
eqBlock (OR (x00000007), x00000001) % G
eqBlock (AND (x0000000A), xFFFFFFFB) % F
eqBlock (AND (x00000007), xFFFFFFFB) % G
eqBlock (MUL1 (x00000002), x0000000A) % X
eqBlock (MUL2A (x00000003), x00000003) % Y
eqBlock (XOR (x00000014), x00000009) % Z

% test vectors for three-block message: third block
eqBlock (CYC (x00000004), x00000008) % V
eqBlock (XOR (x00000008), x00000001) % E
eqBlock (XOR (x00000014), x00000002) % X
eqBlock (XOR (x00000009), x00000002) % Y
eqBlock (ADD (x00000009), x0000000B) % F
eqBlock (ADD (x00000009), x00000016) % G
eqBlock (OR (x00000014), x00000002) % F
eqBlock (OR (x0000001F), x00000001) % G
eqBlock (AND (x00000016), xFFFFFFFB) % F
eqBlock (AND (x0000001F), xFFFFFFFB) % G
eqBlock (MUL1 (x00000016), x00000012) % X
eqBlock (MUL2A (x0000000B), x0000001B) % Y
eqBlock (XOR (x00000018C), x000000129) % Z

```

We complete the above tests with additional test vectors taken from [10, Annex E.3.3], which only gives detailed values for the first block of the 84-block test message.

```
% test vectors for block x0A202020 with key (J = xE6A12F07, K = x9D15C437)
eqBlock (CYC (xC4EB1AEB), x89D635D7)           % V
eqBlock (XOR (x89D635D7, xF6A09667), x7F76A3B0) % E
eqBlock (XOR (x21D869BA, x0A202020), x2BF8499A) % X
eqBlock (XOR (x7792F9D4, x0A202020), x7DB2D9F4) % Y
eqBlock (ADD (x7F76A3B0, x7DB2D9F4), xFD297DA4) % F
eqBlock (ADD (x7F76A3B0, x2BF8499A), xAB6EED4A) % G
eqBlock (OR (xFD297DA4, x02040801), xFF2D7DA5) % F
eqBlock (OR (xAB6EED4A, x00804021), xABEEED6B) % G
eqBlock (AND (xFF2D7DA5, xBFEF7FDF), xBF2D7D85) % F
eqBlock (AND (xABEEED6B, x7DFEFBFF), x29EEE96B) % G
eqBlock (MUL1 (x2BF8499A, xBF2D7D85), x0AD67E20) % X
eqBlock (MUL2A (x7DB2D9F4, x29EEE96B), x30261492) % Y
```

B.20 Test vectors (3) for checking MAA computations

We now define a third set of test vectors for the MAA, based upon Table 5 of [2]. The following expressions implement four groups of checks, with two different keys and two different messages. They should all evaluate to true if the MAA signature is correctly computed.

```
% test vectors of the first column of Table 5
% key (J = x00FF00FF, K = x00000000), message (M1 = x55555555, M2 = xAAAAAAAA)

eqOctet (PAT (x00FF00FF, x00000000), xFF)           % P
eqPair (preludeXY (x00FF00FF, x00000000),
        buildPair (x4A645A01, x50DEC930))           % (X0, Y0)
eqPair (preludeVW (x00FF00FF, x00000000),
        buildPair (x5CCA3239, xFECCAA6E))           % (V0, W)
eqPair (preludeST (x00FF00FF, x00000000),
        buildPair (x51EDE9C7, x24B66FB5))           % (S, T)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x4A645A01, x50DEC930), x55555555,
        XOR (nCYC (n1, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)),
        buildPair (x48B204D6, x5834A585))           % 1st iteration
        % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x48B204D6, x5834A585), xAAAAAAAA,
        XOR (nCYC (n2, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)),
        buildPair (x4F998E01, xBE9F0917))           % 2nd iteration
        % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x4F998E01, xBE9F0917), x51EDE9C7,
        XOR (nCYC (n3, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)),
        buildPair (x344925FC, xDB9102B0))           % coda: use of S
        % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x344925FC, xDB9102B0), x24B66FB5,
        XOR (nCYC (n4, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)),
        buildPair (x277B4B25, xD636250D))           % coda: use of T
        % (X, Y)

eqBlock (XOR (x277B4B25, xD636250D), xF14D6E28)     % Z (i.e., MAA)

% test vectors of the second column of Table 5
% key (J = x00FF00FF, K = x00000000), message (M1 = x55555555, M2 = xAAAAAAAA)
```

```

eqOctet (PAT (x00FF00FF, x00000000), xFF) % P
eqPair (preludeXY (x00FF00FF, x00000000),
        buildPair (x4A645A01, x50DEC930)) % (X0, Y0)
eqPair (preludeVW (x00FF00FF, x00000000),
        buildPair (x5CCA3239, xFECCAA6E)) % (V0, W)
eqPair (preludeST (x00FF00FF, x00000000),
        buildPair (x51EDE9C7, x24B66FB5)) % (S, T)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x4A645A01, x50DEC930), xAAAAAAAA,
        XOR (nCyc (n1, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)), % 1st iteration
        buildPair (x6AEBACF8, x9DB15CF6)) % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x6AEBACF8, x9DB15CF6), x55555555,
        XOR (nCyc (n2, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)), % 2nd iteration
        buildPair (x270EEDAF, xB8142629)) % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x270EEDAF, xB8142629), x51EDE9C7,
        XOR (nCyc (n3, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)), % coda: use of S
        buildPair (x29907CD8, xBA92DB12)) % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x29907CD8, xBA92DB12), x24B66FB5,
        XOR (nCyc (n4, x5CCA3239), xFECCAA6E)), % coda: use of T
        buildPair (x28EAD8B3, x81D10CA3)) % (X, Y)

eqBlock (XOR (x28EAD8B3, x81D10CA3), xA93BD410) % Z (i.e., MAA)

% test vectors of the third column of Table 5
% key (J = x55555555, K = x5A35D667), message (M1 = x00000000, M2 = xFFFFFFFF)

eqOctet (PAT (x55555555, x5A35D667), x00) % P
eqPair (preludeXY (x55555555, x5A35D667),
        buildPair (x34ACF886, x7397C9AE)) % (X0, Y0)
eqPair (preludeVW (x55555555, x5A35D667),
        buildPair (x7201F4DC, x2829040B)) % (V0, W)
eqPair (preludeST (x55555555, x5A35D667),
        buildPair (x9E2E7B36, x13647149)) % (S, T)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x34ACF886, x7397C9AE), x00000000,
        XOR (nCyc (n1, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)), % 1st iteration
        buildPair (x2FD76FFB, x550D91CE)) % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x2FD76FFB, x550D91CE), xFFFFFFFF,
        XOR (nCyc (n2, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)), % 2nd iteration
        buildPair (xA70FC148, x1D10D8D3)) % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xA70FC148, x1D10D8D3), x9E2E7B36,
        XOR (nCyc (n3, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)), % coda: use of S
        buildPair (xB1CC1CC5, x29C1485F)) % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xB1CC1CC5, x29C1485F), x13647149,
        XOR (nCyc (n4, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)), % coda: use of T
        buildPair (x288FC786, x9115A558)) % (X, Y)

eqBlock (XOR (x288FC786, x9115A558), xB99A62DE) % Z (i.e., MAA)

% test vectors of the fourth column of Table 5
% key (J = x55555555, K = x5A35D667), message (M1 = xFFFFFFFF, M2 = x00000000)

```

```

eqOctet (PAT (x55555555, x5A35D667), x00) % P
eqPair (preludeXY (x55555555, x5A35D667),
        buildPair (x34ACF886, x7397C9AE)) % (X0, Y0)
eqPair (preludeVW (x55555555, x5A35D667),
        buildPair (x7201F4DC, x2829040B)) % (V0, W)
eqPair (preludeST (x55555555, x5A35D667),
        buildPair (x9E2E7B36, x13647149)) % (S, T)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x34ACF886, x7397C9AE), xFFFFFFF,
        XOR (nCyc (n1, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)),
        buildPair (x8DC8BBDE, xFE4E5BDD)) % 1st iteration
        % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x8DC8BBDE, xFE4E5BDD), x00000000,
        XOR (nCyc (n2, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)),
        buildPair (xCBC865BA, x0297AF6F)) % 2nd iteration
        % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xCBC865BA, x0297AF6F), x9E2E7B36,
        XOR (nCyc (n3, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)),
        buildPair (x3CF3A7D2, x160EE9B5)) % coda: use of S
        % (X, Y)
eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x3CF3A7D2, x160EE9B5), x13647149,
        XOR (nCyc (n4, x7201F4DC), x2829040B)),
        buildPair (xD0482465, x7050EC5E)) % coda: use of T
        % (X, Y)

eqBlock (XOR (xD0482465, x7050EC5E), xA018C83B) % Z (i.e., MAA)

```

We complete the above tests with additional test vectors taken from [10, Annex E.3.3], which gives prelude results computed for another key.

```

% key (J = xE6A12F07, K = x9D15C437)
eqPair (preludeXY (xE6A12F07, x9D15C437),
        buildPair (x21D869BA, x7792F9D4)) % (X0, Y0)
eqPair (preludeVW (xE6A12F07, x9D15C437),
        buildPair (xC4EB1AEB, xF6A09667)) % (V0, W)
eqPair (preludeST (xE6A12F07, x9D15C437),
        buildPair (x6D67E884, xA511987A)) % (S, T)

```

B.21 Test vectors (4) for checking MAA computations

We define a last set of test vectors for the MAA. The first one (a message of 20 blocks containing only zeros) was directly taken from Table 6 of [2].

```

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x204E80A7, x077788A2), x00000000,
        XOR (nCyc (n1, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),
        buildPair (x303FF4AA, x1277A6D4)) % 1st iteration
        % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x303FF4AA, x1277A6D4), x00000000,
        XOR (nCyc (n2, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),
        buildPair (x55DD063F, x4C49AAE0)) % 2nd iteration
        % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x55DD063F, x4C49AAE0), x00000000,
        XOR (nCyc (n3, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),
        buildPair (x51AF3C1D, x5BC02502)) % 3rd iteration
        % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x51AF3C1D, x5BC02502), x00000000,

```

```

XOR (nCYC (n4, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),          % 4th iteration
buildPair (xA44AAAC0, x63C70DBA))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xA44AAAC0, x63C70DBA), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n5, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),          % 5th iteration
buildPair (x4D53901A, x2E80AC30))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x4D53901A, x2E80AC30), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n6, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),          % 6th iteration
buildPair (x5F38EEF1, x2A6091AE))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x5F38EEF1, x2A6091AE), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n7, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),          % 7th iteration
buildPair (xF0239DD5, x3DD81AC6))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xF0239DD5, x3DD81AC6), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n8, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),          % 8th iteration
buildPair (xEB35B97F, x9372CDC6))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xEB35B97F, x9372CDC6), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n9, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),          % 9th iteration
buildPair (x4DA124A1, xC6B1317E))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x4DA124A1, xC6B1317E), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n10, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 10th iteration
buildPair (x7F839576, x74B39176))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x7F839576, x74B39176), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n11, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 11th iteration
buildPair (x11A9D254, xD78634BC))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x11A9D254, xD78634BC), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n12, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 12th iteration
buildPair (xD8804CA5, xFDC1A8BA))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xD8804CA5, xFDC1A8BA), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n13, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 13th iteration
buildPair (x3F6F7248, x11AC46B8))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x3F6F7248, x11AC46B8), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n14, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 14th iteration
buildPair (xACBC13DD, x33D5A466))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xACBC13DD, x33D5A466), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n15, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 15th iteration
buildPair (x4CE933E1, xC21A1846))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x4CE933E1, xC21A1846), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n16, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 16th iteration
buildPair (xC1ED90DD, xCD959B46))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xC1ED90DD, xCD959B46), x00000000,

```

```

XOR (nCYC (n17, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),           % 17th iteration
buildPair (x3CD54DEB, x613F8E2A))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x3CD54DEB, x613F8E2A), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n18, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 18th iteration
buildPair (xBBA57835, x07C72EAA))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xBBA57835, x07C72EAA), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n19, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 19th iteration
buildPair (xD7843FDC, x6AD6E8A4))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (xD7843FDC, x6AD6E8A4), x00000000,
XOR (nCYC (n20, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % 20th iteration
buildPair (x5EBA06C2, x91896CFA))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x5EBA06C2, x91896CFA), x76232E5F,
XOR (nCYC (n21, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % coda: use of S
buildPair (x1D9C9655, x98D1CC75))                % (X, Y)

eqPair (computeXY' (buildPair (x1D9C9655, x98D1CC75), x4FB1138A,
XOR (nCYC (n22, x17A808FD), xFEA1D334)),         % coda: use of T
buildPair (x7BC180AB, xA0B87B77))                % (X, Y)

eqBlock (MAC (buildKey (x80018001, x80018000),
makeMessage (n20, x00000000, x00000000)), xDB79FBDC)

```

We believe that the test vector above is not sufficient to detect implementation mistakes arising from byte permutations (e.g., endianness issues) or incorrect segmentation of messages longer than 1024 bytes (i.e., 256 blocks). To address these issues, we added three supplementary test vectors that operate on messages of 16, 256, and 4100 blocks containing bit patterns not preserved by permutations.

```

eqBlock (MAC (buildKey (x80018001, x80018000),
makeMessage (n16, x00000000, x07050301)), x8CE37709)

eqBlock (MAC (buildKey (x80018001, x80018000),
makeMessage (n256, x00000000, x07050301)), x717153D5)

eqBlock (MAC (buildKey (x80018001, x80018000),
makeMessage (n4100, x00000000, x07050301)), x7783C51D)

```

B.22 Possible variants

The REC specification given in the present Annex could be enhanced in two directions that diverge from the modelling choices originally done in [15] and could be given as exercises to students:

- At present, the `Prelude` function is called several times when computing the MAC value for a given message; precisely, this function is called for every 256-block segment of the message. This is neither useful nor efficient. Propose a modification of the REC specification to ensure that the `Prelude` function is called only once per message.
- Before computing the MAC value for a given message, the REC specification converts this message into a segmented message by calling the `splitSegment` function. Actually, such a prelim-

inary duplication of message contents is not mandatory and could be avoided. Propose a modification of the REC specification in which the `SegmentedMessage` sort and all the definitions of Section B.13 are removed, so that the MAC value is directly computed using a one-pass traversal of the message list, from its head to its tail, still taking the MAA “mode of operation” into account.