Abstract : Physically Unclonable Functions are a promising tool to protect against counterfeiting attacks. Yet, as with any security system, it is important to embed them in a sound protocol, ensuring that no unexpected weakness is present in the “mortar” binding the components together. This paper proposes an anti-counterfeiting protocol that provably reduces to natural properties of its underlying components, namely an image-based Physical Function System bearing physical unclonability and an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. Experiments confirm the practical feasibility of our construction.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
Bart Decker; David W. Chadwick. 13th International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security (CMS), Sep 2012, Canterbury, United Kingdom. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-7394, pp.26-38, 2012, Communications and Multimedia Security. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-32805-3_3〉
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01540881
Contributeur : Hal Ifip
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Soumis le : vendredi 16 juin 2017 - 16:46:51
Dernière modification le : vendredi 16 juin 2017 - 16:48:58
Document(s) archivé(s) le : mercredi 10 janvier 2018 - 13:36:13
Saloomeh Shariati, François Koeune, François-Xavier Standaert. Security Analysis of Image-Based PUFs for Anti-counterfeiting. Bart Decker; David W. Chadwick. 13th International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security (CMS), Sep 2012, Canterbury, United Kingdom. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNCS-7394, pp.26-38, 2012, Communications and Multimedia Security. 〈10.1007/978-3-642-32805-3_3〉. 〈hal-01540881〉
