Forensic Analysis of a Siemens Programmable Logic Controller

Abstract : Programmable logic controllers are widely used in industrial control systems and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. As the potential of cyber attacks on programmable logic controllers increase, it is important to develop robust digital forensic techniques for investigating potential security incidents involving programmable logic controllers. This chapter focuses on the logging mechanism of a Siemens programmable logic controller, specifically the Siemens Total Integrated Automation Portal V13 program (Siemens TIA Portal, also called Siemens Step-7).
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
10th International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection (ICCIP), Mar 2016, Arlington, VA, United States. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, AICT-485, pp.117-130, 2016, Critical Infrastructure Protection X. 〈10.1007/978-3-319-48737-3_7〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

Littérature citée [10 références]  Voir  Masquer  Télécharger

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01614856
Contributeur : Hal Ifip <>
Soumis le : mercredi 11 octobre 2017 - 14:59:27
Dernière modification le : mercredi 11 octobre 2017 - 15:01:17

Fichier

 Accès restreint
Fichier visible le : 2019-01-01

Connectez-vous pour demander l'accès au fichier

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Paternité 4.0 International License

Identifiants

Citation

Raymond Chan, Kam-Pui Chow. Forensic Analysis of a Siemens Programmable Logic Controller. 10th International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection (ICCIP), Mar 2016, Arlington, VA, United States. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, AICT-485, pp.117-130, 2016, Critical Infrastructure Protection X. 〈10.1007/978-3-319-48737-3_7〉. 〈hal-01614856〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

12