J. Arthur and . Pulos, 5 On this observation see The American Design Adventure, pp.1940-1975, 1988.

S. E. Reid, Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, Cold War Modern, pp.211-52, 2002.
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G. Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design, 2010.

S. Abercrombie and G. Nelson, the design of modern design Enclosed by Images, pp.163-164, 1995.

. Colomina, Enclosed by Images After He Left, Business Machines, vol.20, issue.42 10, p.15, 1959.

S. N. Khrushchev and N. Khrushchev, communicated with more Soviet citizens than any other American representative " 32 ; an ambassador whose trips contributed to the ultimate participation of the USSR in global treatises on the fair use of patented technologies. Ultimately, the designed portability of RAMAC's individual units enabled IBM's computers to circulate as both physical objects and imaginaries; or, as both tangible artifacts and powerful mythologies. However, unlike the self-service system of a cafeteria, the technology embedded in the RAMAC 305 was not one that could be easily replicated. 33 As an intricate piece of research and development, the RAMAC 305 could not be simply reverseengineered . In that respect, it was a technology that could only be truly transferred from the United States to the Soviet Union through commercial purchase contracts. And whatever technological breakthroughs the RAMAC 305 might have absorbed and represented were utterly secondary compared to its ability to feed the Cold War discourse of technological supremacy between the two superpowers, discourse that largely thrived on the myths constructed around objects of technology ? such as the Luna-2 satellite or the RAMAC 305 ? rather than their actual capabilities, 2001.

J. Schwoch, A Record of Some Kind in the History of International Communication, Global TV: New Media and the Cold War, pp.1946-69, 2009.

D. Minsk-22, Codes? Nyet. Computer? Da!, Think, pp.37-41, 1971.