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An Automated Formal Process for Detecting Fault Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries and Case Study on PRESENT

Thomas Given-Wilson 1 Nisrine Jafri 1 Jean-Louis Lanet 1 Axel Legay 1
1 TAMIS - Threat Analysis and Mitigation for Information Security
Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique , IRISA-D4 - LANGAGE ET GÉNIE LOGICIEL
Abstract : Recently fault injection has increasingly been used both to attack software applications, and to test system robustness. Detecting fault injection vulnerabilities has been approached with a variety of different but limited methods. This paper proposes a general process without these limitations that uses model checking to detect fault injection vulnerabilities in binaries. The efficacy of this process is demonstrated by detecting vulnerabilities in the PRESENT binary.
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Submitted on : Monday, November 6, 2017 - 9:21:24 AM
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Thomas Given-Wilson, Nisrine Jafri, Jean-Louis Lanet, Axel Legay. An Automated Formal Process for Detecting Fault Injection Vulnerabilities in Binaries and Case Study on PRESENT. 2017 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ICESS, Aug 2017, Sydney, Australia. pp.293 - 300, ⟨10.1109/Trustcom/BigDataSE/ICESS.2017.250⟩. ⟨hal-01629098⟩

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