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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2018

Preliminary investigations for better monitoring. Learning in repeated insurance audits

Résumé

Audit mechanisms frequently take place in the context of repeated relationships between auditor and auditee. This paper focuses attention on the insurance fraud problem in a setting where insurers repeatedly verify claims satisfied by service providers (e.g., affiliated car repairers or members of managed care networks). We highlight a learning bias that leads insurers to over-audit service providers at the beginning of their relationship. The paper builds a bridge between the literature on optimal audit in insurance and the exploitation/exploration trade-off in multi-armed bandit problems.
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Dates et versions

hal-01713420 , version 1 (20-02-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01713420 , version 1

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Reda Aboutajdine, Pierre Picard. Preliminary investigations for better monitoring. Learning in repeated insurance audits. 2018. ⟨hal-01713420⟩
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