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Subversion-Zero-Knowledge SNARKs

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Abstract

Subversion zero knowledge for non-interactive proof systems demands that zero knowledge (ZK) be maintained even when the common reference string (CRS) is chosen maliciously. SNARKs are proof systems with succinct proofs, which are at the core of the cryptocurrency Zcash, whose anonymity relies on ZK-SNARKs; they are also used for ZK contingent payments in Bitcoin. We show that under a plausible hardness assumption, the most efficient SNARK schemes proposed in the literature, including the one underlying Zcash and contingent payments, satisfy subversion ZK or can be made to at very little cost. In particular, we prove subversion ZK of the original SNARKs by Gennaro et al. and the almost optimal construction by Groth; for the Pinocchio scheme implemented in libsnark we show that it suffices to add 4 group elements to the CRS. We also argue informally that Zcash is anonymous even if its parameters were set up maliciously.
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Dates and versions

hal-01869978 , version 1 (07-09-2018)

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Georg Fuchsbauer. Subversion-Zero-Knowledge SNARKs. PKC 2018 - 21st IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, Mar 2018, Rio de Jaineiro, Brazil. pp.315-347, ⟨10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_11⟩. ⟨hal-01869978⟩
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