Equivalence Properties by Typing in Cryptographic Branching Protocols - Inria - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies du numérique Accéder directement au contenu
Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2018

Equivalence Properties by Typing in Cryptographic Branching Protocols

Résumé

Recently, many tools have been proposed for automatically analysing, in symbolic models, equivalence of security protocols. Equivalence is a property needed to state privacy properties or game-based properties like strong secrecy. Tools for a bounded number of sessions can decide equivalence but typically suffer from efficiency issues. Tools for an unbounded number of sessions like Tamarin or ProVerif prove a stronger notion of equivalence (diff-equivalence) that does not properly handle protocols with else branches. Building upon a recent approach, we propose a type system for reasoning about branching protocols and dynamic keys. We prove our type system to entail equivalence , for all the standard primitives. Our type system has been implemented and shows a significant speedup compared to the tools for a bounded number of sessions, and compares similarly to ProVerif for an unbounded number of sessions. Moreover, we can also prove security of protocols that require a mix of bounded and unbounded number of sessions, which ProVerif cannot properly handle.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
post18(2).pdf (842.19 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)
Loading...

Dates et versions

hal-01900079 , version 1 (20-10-2018)

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : hal-01900079 , version 1

Citer

Véronique Cortier, Niklas Grimm, Joseph Lallemand, Matteo Maffei. Equivalence Properties by Typing in Cryptographic Branching Protocols. POST'18 - 7th International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust, Apr 2018, Thessaloniki, Greece. ⟨hal-01900079⟩
116 Consultations
64 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More