Recovering short secret keys of RLCE encryption scheme in polynomial time

Abstract : We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01959617
Contributor : Jean-Pierre Tillich <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, December 18, 2018 - 7:27:57 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, January 14, 2020 - 1:26:05 PM

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Alain Couvreur, Matthieu Lequesne, Jean-Pierre Tillich. Recovering short secret keys of RLCE encryption scheme in polynomial time. PQCrypto 2019 - International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, May 2019, Chongqing, China. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_8⟩. ⟨hal-01959617⟩

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