Recovering short secret keys of RLCE encryption scheme in polynomial time - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Conference Papers Year :

Recovering short secret keys of RLCE encryption scheme in polynomial time

(1, 2) , (3) , (3)
1
2
3

Abstract

We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang's Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. This attack recovers the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author.

Dates and versions

hal-01959617 , version 1 (18-12-2018)

Identifiers

Cite

Alain Couvreur, Matthieu Lequesne, Jean-Pierre Tillich. Recovering short secret keys of RLCE encryption scheme in polynomial time. PQCrypto 2019 - International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, May 2019, Chongqing, China. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_8⟩. ⟨hal-01959617⟩
335 View
1 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More