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Conference Papers Year : 2018

Preferential Attachment as a Unique Equilibrium

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that the Preferential Attachment rule naturally emerges in the context of evolutionary network formation, as the unique Nash equilibrium of a simple social network game. In this game, each node aims at maximizing its degree in the future, representing its social capital in the "society" formed by the nodes and their connections. This result provides additional formal support to the commonly used Preferential Attachment model, initially designed to capture the "rich get richer" aphorism. In the process of establishing our result, we expose new connections between Preferential Attachment, random walks, and Young's Lattice.
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Dates and versions

hal-01964759 , version 1 (03-01-2019)

Identifiers

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Chen Avin, Avi Cohen, Pierre Fraigniaud, Zvi Lotker, David Peleg. Preferential Attachment as a Unique Equilibrium. World Wide Web Conference (WWW), 2018, Lyon, France. pp.559-568, ⟨10.1145/3178876.3186122⟩. ⟨hal-01964759⟩
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