Belenios: a simple private and verifiable electronic voting system

Véronique Cortier 1 Pierrick Gaudry 2 Stephane Glondu 3
1 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
2 CARAMBA - Cryptology, arithmetic : algebraic methods for better algorithms
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - ALGO - Department of Algorithms, Computation, Image and Geometry
Abstract : We present the electronic voting protocol Belenios together with its associated voting platform. Belenios guarantees vote privacy and full verifiability, even against a compromised voting server. While the core of the voting protocol was already described and formally proved secure, we detail here the complete voting system from the setup to the tally and the recovery procedures. We comment on the use of Belenios in practice. In particular, we discuss the security choices made by election administrators w.r.t. the decryption key and the delegation of some setup tasks to the voting platform.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02066930
Contributor : Pierrick Gaudry <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 13, 2019 - 6:08:19 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, July 17, 2019 - 5:35:12 PM
Long-term archiving on : Friday, June 14, 2019 - 4:39:10 PM

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Véronique Cortier, Pierrick Gaudry, Stephane Glondu. Belenios: a simple private and verifiable electronic voting system. Foundations of Security, Protocols, and Equational Reasoning, 2019, Fredericksburg, Virgina, United States. pp.214-238, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-19052-1_14⟩. ⟨hal-02066930⟩

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