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Private votes on untrusted platforms: models, attacks and provable scheme

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Sergiu Bursuc
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Steve Kremer

Abstract

Modern e-voting systems deploy cryptographic protocols on a complex infrastructure involving different computing platforms and agents. It is crucial to have appropriate specification and evaluation methods to perform rigorous analysis of such systems, taking into account the corruption and computational capabilities of a potential attacker. In particular, the platform used for voting may be corrupted, e.g. infected by malware, and we need to ensure privacy and integrity of votes even in that case. We propose a new definition of vote privacy, formalized as a computational indistinguishability game, that allows to take into account such refined attacker models; we show that the definition captures both known and novel attacks against several voting schemes; and we propose a scheme that is provably secure in this setting. We moreover formalize and machine-check the proof in the EasyCrypt theorem prover.
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Dates and versions

hal-02099434 , version 1 (15-04-2019)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02099434 , version 1

Cite

Sergiu Bursuc, Constantin-Catalin Dragan, Steve Kremer. Private votes on untrusted platforms: models, attacks and provable scheme. EuroS&P 2019 - 4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Jun 2019, Stockholm, Sweden. ⟨hal-02099434⟩
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