The application of I-Voting for Estonian parliamentary elections of 2011, VoteID 2011, ser. LNCS, vol.7187, pp.208-223, 2012. ,
, iVote system -NSW Electoral Commission
CHVote system specification, 2017. ,
Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy, Journal of Computer Security, vol.21, issue.1, pp.89-148, 2013. ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/inria-00638556
Clash Attacks on the Verifiability of E-Voting Systems, 33rd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'12), pp.395-409, 2012. ,
Internet voting system, Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC'12), 2012. ,
Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System, ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'14), pp.703-715, 2014. ,
Electing a university president using open-audit voting: Analysis of real-world use of Helios, 2009 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE '09, 2009. ,
Scantegrity III: automatic trustworthy receipts, highlighting over/under votes, and full voter verifiability, 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE '11, 2011. ,
Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, vol.48, issue.9, pp.1646-1662, 2008. ,
STAR-Vote: A secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable voting system, Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE'13), 2013. ,
Civitas: Toward a secure voting system, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'08), pp.354-368, 2008. ,
Helios: Web-based open-audit voting, 17th USENIX Security Symposium (Usenix'08), pp.335-348, 2008. ,
sElect: A lightweight verifiable remote voting system, IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'16), pp.341-354, 2016. ,
Selene: Voting with transparent verifiability and coercion-mitigation, 1st Workshop on Secure Voting Systems (VOTING'16), pp.176-192, 2016. ,
DOI : 10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_12
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01242690
Neuchâtel's cast-asintended verification mechanism, 5th International Conference on E-Voting and Identity, pp.3-18, 2015. ,
DOI : 10.1007/978-3-319-22270-7_1
Alethea: A provably secure random sample voting protocol, 31st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'18), pp.283-297, 2018. ,
D-DEMOS: A distributed, end-to-end verifiable, internet voting system, 36th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2016, pp.711-720, 2016. ,
DEMOS-2: Scalable E2E verifiable elections without random oracles, ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'15), 2015. ,
Surevote: Technical overview, Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE '01), 2001. ,
BeleniosRF: A non-interactive receipt-free electronic voting scheme, 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'16) ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01377917
Signatures on randomizable ciphertexts, 14th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography, pp.403-422, 2011. ,
DOI : 10.1007/978-3-642-19379-8_25
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/inria-00542643
Modeling and verifying security protocols with the applied pi calculus and ProVerif, Foundations and Trends in Privacy and Security, vol.1, issue.1-2, pp.1-135, 2016. ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01423760
Cryptographically Verified Implementations for TLS, 15th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'08), pp.459-468, 2008. ,
DOI : 10.1145/1455770.1455828
A formal analysis of the Norwegian E-voting protocol, Journal of Computer Security, vol.25, issue.15777, pp.21-57, 2017. ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/inria-00636115
Symbolic and computational mechanized verification of the ARINC823 avionic protocols, 30th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF'17, pp.68-82, 2017. ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01575861
Typebased verification of electronic voting protocols, 4th Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'15), ser. LNCS, vol.9036, pp.303-323, 2015. ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01103545
Distributed ElGamal à la Pedersen -application to Helios, Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2013), 2013. ,
DOI : 10.1145/2517840.2517852
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00881076
Usable cryptographic qr codes, IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT 2018), 2018. ,
DOI : 10.1109/icit.2018.8352431
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols: A taster, Towards Trustworthy Elections -New Directions in Electronic Voting, ser. LNCS, vol.6000, pp.289-309, 2010. ,
Election verifiability for helios under weaker trust assumptions, 19th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'14), ser. LNCS, vol.8713, pp.327-344, 2014. ,
DOI : 10.1007/978-3-319-11212-1_19
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01011294
A formal analysis of the Neuchâtel e-voting protocol, 3rd IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroSP'18), 2018. ,
A comprehensive analysis of game-based ballot privacy definitions, 36th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P'15), pp.499-516, 2015. ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01206289
Automated analysis of Diffie-Hellman protocols and advanced security properties, 25th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2012, pp.78-94, 2012. ,
Voting: You can't have privacy without individual verifiability, 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'18), 2018. ,
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01900086
, new c vs : channel; new c vd : channel
, Registrar(id, c vs ) | VoterAudit A (id, c vs
,
,
,
, new c vs : channel; new c vd : channel
, Registrar(id, c vs ) | VoterAudit B (id, c vs
,
,
,
, V CHV (t)(v) = |{id ? CHV(t)|Voted(id, v) ? t}| ? |{id ? CHV(t)|?id , cred, b, l. Voted(id, v) ? t ? Voter
, Thus for all id ? CHV(t) such that Voter(id, cred, l) ? t for some cred, l, we know that l = H. Hence, by the recorded-as-intended property on credentials, V CHV (t)(v) ? |{id ? CHV(t)|?id , cred, b, l. Voter(id, cred, l) ? t ? Going-to-tally(id , cred, b) ? t ? valid(b) ? v = open(b)}| ? |{cred|?id ? CHV(t), By assumption, each voter is only registered once and CHV(t) ? HV(t)