Discussion of Fairness and Implementability in Stackelberg Security Games

Víctor Bucarey 1, 2 Martine Labbé 2, 1
2 INOCS - Integrated Optimization with Complex Structure
ULB - Université Libre de Bruxelles [Bruxelles], Inria Lille - Nord Europe, CRIStAL - Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Signal et Automatique de Lille (CRIStAL) - UMR 9189
Abstract : In this article we discuss the impact of fairness constraints in Stackelberg Security Games. Fairness constraints can be used to avoid discrimination at the moment of implementing police patrolling. We present two ways of modelling fairness constraints, one with a detailed description of the population and the other with labels. We discuss the implementability of these constraints. In the case that the constraints are not implementable we present models to retrieve pure strategies in a way that they are the closest in average to the set of fairness constraints.
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Contributor : Martine Labbé <>
Submitted on : Monday, August 19, 2019 - 7:17:10 AM
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  • HAL Id : hal-02267147, version 1



Víctor Bucarey, Martine Labbé. Discussion of Fairness and Implementability in Stackelberg Security Games. GameSec 2019 - 10th Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, Oct 2019, Stockholm, Sweden. ⟨hal-02267147⟩



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