LoRaWAN is a long range, low energy and low throughput network technology used to provide connectivity to all kind of devices. Encryption ensure the confidentiality of the conveyed data but do not protects metadata, including the DevAddress which is the device identifier allocated by the LoRa network. Because of the long range of the radio signals and the open nature of the wireless medium, this metadata can be easily collected and can leak potentially sensitive information about a system communicating through LoRa. In addition to the DevAddress, a device is also identified by a DevEUI, a globally unique and permanent identifier. As opposed to the DevAddress, the DevEUIis a static identifier and it can generally be linked to the device manufacturer or the device type. The DevEUI is thus a source of additional information that could be combined with the traffic metadata to gain additional knowledge on a device. However, on the wireless link the DevEUIis only exposed during the join procedure and is never directly associated with other identifiers, and in particular not with the DevAddress. In this documente, focus on this problem and present a method to link a DevEUI to a DevAddress and thus to the associated metadata. Our method relies on the time correlation between messages exchanged during the device activation and registration on the LoRa network. The proposed method is tested on two sets of LoRa traces: a real-world dataset and a synthetic one. The corresponding simulation results shows that a significant fraction of the DevEUI can be matched to a DevAddress. Finally we discuss a number of measures that could be adopted to reduce the efficiency of the presented address linking attack.