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Conference papers

The 5G-AKA Authentication Protocol Privacy

Abstract : We study the 5G-AKA authentication protocol described in the 5G mobile communication standards. This version of AKA tries to achieve a better privacy than the 3G and 4G versions through the use of asymmetric randomized encryption. Nonetheless, we show that except for the IMSI-catcher attack, all known attacks against 5G-AKA privacy still apply. Next, we modify the 5G-AKA protocol to prevent these attacks, while satisfying 5G-AKA efficiency constraints as much as possible. We then formally prove that our protocol is σunlinkable. This is a new security notion, which allows for a fine-grained quantification of a protocol privacy. Our security proof is carried out in the Bana-Comon indistinguishability logic. We also prove mutual authentication as a secondary result.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03155483
Contributor : Adrien Koutsos Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, March 1, 2021 - 8:31:54 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, February 3, 2022 - 11:16:18 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, May 30, 2021 - 8:37:24 PM

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Adrien Koutsos. The 5G-AKA Authentication Protocol Privacy. EuroS&P 2019 - IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, Jun 2019, Stockholm, Sweden. pp.464-479, ⟨10.1109/EuroSP.2019.00041⟩. ⟨hal-03155483⟩

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