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DY^{*}: A Modular Symbolic Verification Framework for Executable Cryptographic Protocol Code

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Abstract—We present **DY^{*}**, a new formal verification framework for the symbolic security analysis of cryptographic protocol code written in the **F^{*}** programming language. Unlike automated symbolic provers, our framework accounts for advanced protocol features like unbounded loops and mutable recursive data structures, as well as low-level implementation details like protocol state machines and message formats, which are often at the root of real-world attacks.

Our work extends a long line of research on using dependent type systems for this task, but takes a fundamentally new approach by explicitly modeling the global trace-based semantics within the framework, hence bridging the gap between trace-based and type-based protocol analyses. This approach enables us to uniformly, precisely, and soundly model, for the first time using dependent types, long-lived mutable protocol state, equational theories, fine-grained dynamic corruption, and trace-based security properties like forward secrecy and post-compromise security.

DY^{*} is built as a library of **F^{*}** modules that includes a model of low-level protocol execution, a Dolev-Yao symbolic attacker, and generic security abstractions and lemmas, all verified using **F^{*}**. The library exposes a high-level API that facilitates succinct security proofs for protocol code. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach through a detailed symbolic security analysis of the Signal protocol that is based on an interoperable implementation of the protocol from prior work, and is the first mechanized proof of Signal to account for forward and post-compromise security over an unbounded number of protocol rounds.

1. Introduction

Since the early authentication protocols of Needham and Schroeder [48] and the key exchange protocols of Diffie and Hellman [31], the design and analysis of cryptographic protocols has come a long way. Modern protocol standards like Transport Layer Security (TLS) support multiple authentication modes, key exchange mechanisms, and encryption schemes, yielding dozens of possible combinations [52]. Messaging protocols like Signal (used in WhatsApp) invoke five Diffie-Hellman exchanges before even sending the first message, seeking to protect messages against powerful adversaries who can dynamically

compromise phones and servers [46]. Protocols like these, with specifications that sometimes run to hundreds of pages, form the cornerstone of Internet security, and any flaw in their design or implementation could have a catastrophic effect. The comprehensive security analysis of such protocols requires automated tools.

Mechanized Cryptographic Protocol Analysis. The research community has developed several formal analysis techniques and (semi-)automated tools to verify cryptographic protocols (see [3, 19] for detailed surveys). Broadly, these methods can be divided into two categories. The first approach is to identify the cryptographic core of a protocol and to formally prove its (probabilistic) security based on precise *computational* assumptions on the underlying cryptographic primitives. However, building and maintaining computational proofs requires significant manual effort, and even with the aid of mechanized verification tools, it is infeasible to cover all protocol features and attack vectors for large protocols.

An alternative is to build comprehensive models of protocols and their threats, but to analyze them under simpler, stronger, *symbolic* assumptions on the cryptographic primitives. In this paper, we focus on the symbolic approach, but both methods are complementary and can be used side-by-side to get stronger assurances about protocol security (see, e.g., [11] and Section 6).

Automated Symbolic Protocol Analysis. The study of symbolic methods for protocol analysis was initiated by Needham and Schroeder [48] and formalized by Dolev and Yao [32]. The first high-profile success of this approach was Lowe’s attack and fix for the Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol (NS-PK) [45].

Symbolic analysis techniques have since evolved by leaps and bounds. Most notably, automated provers like ProVerif [20] and Tamarin [47] can quickly analyze all possible execution traces of protocols and find attacks like Lowe’s in a matter of seconds. Recent advances allow for the symbolic analysis of cryptographic primitives like Diffie-Hellman [42, 54] and XOR [33, 41] that require equational theories, of protocols that rely on mutable state [40], of Web-based security protocols like OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect that require new attacker models [34, 35], of stronger confidentiality and privacy properties




Figure 1. **Diffie-Hellman (DH) Ratchet**: a continuous key agreement protocol for long-running secure channels. Each participant regularly performs a unilateral Diffie-Hellman key exchange using a fresh ephemeral key (x_{n+1}) and the last-known public key of its peer (y^n), yielding a shared secret ($g^{x_{n+1} y^n}$) that is mixed with the previous session key (K_n) to obtain a new session key (K_{n+1}). Session keys are used to derive AEAD keys for message encryption. The DH Ratchet aims to provide forward secrecy for K_n (if later keys are compromised) and post-compromise security for K_{n+1} (if previous keys are compromised).

based on observational equivalences [6, 21, 22, 26, 27], and of fine-grained compromise scenarios like forward secrecy and post-compromise security [25, 38].

With these developments, symbolic analysis has become an important component of *real-world protocol* analysis. For example, Tamarin and ProVerif were used to analyze the TLS 1.3 protocol during its standardization [11, 29], verifying that it is invulnerable to the kinds of downgrade [1] and authentication attacks [12] that affected prior versions of TLS. Still, many limitations remain.

Composite Protocols Many protocols are structured as a sequence of sub-protocols. For example, the TLS protocol allows for multiple key exchange modes that can be composed in sequence, and some attacks only appear when we consider multiple sessions in a row [12]. Hence, a comprehensive symbolic analysis of large protocols like TLS must account for multiple protocol modes and rounds, which quickly becomes infeasible for analyzers like ProVerif and Tamarin that perform a *whole protocol analysis*. That is, they consider a complete model of a protocol and analyze it comprehensively for potential executions that may exhibit an attack. In order to find attacks, this approach works very well, needing minimal user intervention. However, as a proof method, this approach is not modular, so the time and memory required for fully analyzing the protocol can grow exponentially with the length of the protocol.

For instance, the symbolic analysis of TLS 1.3 in Tamarin requires 100GB of RAM and takes about one day to complete, and even achieving this mechanized proof requires several months of manual proof work to restructure the proof goals into smaller automatically-verifiable lemmas [29].

Unbounded Protocols The problem is even more acute for protocols that inherently have an unbounded recursive structure or manages recursive stateful data structures.

For example, consider the Diffie-Hellman (DH) ratcheting protocol depicted in Figure 1, which is inspired by the Signal Double Ratchet protocol [49]. The protocol starts with an established key K_0 shared by both parties. The initiator also knows the responder’s last known DH public key y^0 and uses it to generate a fresh DH secret $g^{x_1 y_0}$ and mixes it with K_0 to obtain a new session key K_1 (this is called a *ratcheting* step). Upon receiving g^{x_1} , the responder in turn invokes its own ratcheting step to generate $g^{x_1 y_1}$ and compute K_2 . This process continues in an unending loop over the lifetime of the messaging conversation (which can last months). Since each key K_{n+1} is recursively dependent on the previous key K_n , the analysis complexity grows with each round.

Analyzing such protocols for an arbitrary number of rounds requires induction. Tamarin supports some inductive reasoning by relying on user-supplied lemmas, a technique that has been used to analyze group key agreement [53], but the proof requires many manual proof steps and hence is no longer fully automated, and still does not offer the full flexibility of general-purpose proof frameworks like Coq [58] or F* [57]. Notably, Signal has not been mechanically analyzed for an arbitrary number of rounds before. The ProVerif analysis of the Signal protocol [38] was limited to two messages (three ratcheting rounds), at which point the analysis already took 29 hours. (With CryptoVerif, the analysis of Signal has to be limited to just one ratcheting round [38].)

Executable Protocol Code Even for protocols that can be analyzed with tools like Tamarin, there remains a significant gap between the high-level protocol *models* analyzed by the symbolic provers above and the low-level protocol details specified in the *standards* or the *implementations* deployed in practice.

For clarity and ease of verification, protocol models are often succinct; they focus on core protocol features and ignore rarely-used or obsolete protocol modes. So they can miss attacks that rely on features like export ciphersuites [1] or session renegotiation [12]. Protocol models also ignore details like message formats and parsing, error handling, and state machines, which are often a key source of protocol bugs [9]. All these features could potentially be precisely modeled in (say) ProVerif, either by hand or by extracting models from reference implementations [15, 38, 55], but the resulting model becomes so large that automated analysis may take hours or not even terminate [13, 38].

Finally, as protocol models get larger, it becomes harder to be confident that the models themselves are correct. Hence, having executable models or analyzing protocol implementations is even more attractive, since these models can then be systematically tested against expected protocol traces.

Dependent Type Systems for Protocol Code. A different line of work, starting with RCF [8], seeks to address the limitations of automated protocol verifiers using dependent type systems that support the modular verification of cryptographic protocol implementations. The main drawback is that building security proofs with these type systems requires manual intervention and hence is less automated than provers like ProVerif and Tamarin.

RCF [8] is a formal language for modeling cryptographic protocols as systems of concurrent communicating processes. Each *local* process represents a protocol endpoint; it runs a sequential program in an ML-like functional language and all extended with built-in libraries that model symbolic cryptography, random number generation, and networking. The runtime semantics of a full RCF system is defined (as a meta-theory on paper) in terms of *global traces* that interleave the execution of local processes, deliver messages sent from one process to another, and track the flow of randomly generated bytestrings. The attacker is treated as just another local process that runs in parallel with protocol code and can interact freely with other processes. The security goals of a cryptographic protocol written in RCF are stated in terms of *trace properties* that must hold in all reachable global traces of the protocol composed with an arbitrary attacker.

RCF is equipped with a dependent type system that can be used to individually verify each process and then to compose these local proofs to obtain verified guarantees for all reachable traces. The type system does not reason explicitly about global traces and so any property we need about the global trace, such as secrecy lemmas about random bytestrings, assumptions about cryptographic primitives, invariants about the attacker’s knowledge, or constraints on the order of protocol events, must be proved by hand (using the meta-theory of RCF) and then reflected as local assumptions (axioms, assumed facts, or type declarations) that the type system can use to verify the protocol code. Hence, the soundness of the verification approach relies both on the underlying type system [8] and on this library of external lemmas [14].

The F7 typechecker [8] implements the RCF type system for protocol code written in the F# programming language and has been used to analyze a number of protocols [8, 14]. Subsequent works have improved upon the RCF type system in various ways: adding union and intersection types [2], support for relational reasoning [4], and computational cryptographic models [36]. Even with these advances, using RCF-like type systems for symbolic protocol verification has several limitations:

External Lemmas As noted above, typecheckers like F7 do not explicitly model the global trace-based runtime semantics, and so rely on external security arguments that need to be proved by hand. This increases the risk of accidentally introducing unsoundness, especially in large protocols, and reduces confidence in the proofs.

Implicit Security Goals Another disadvantage of not modeling the global trace is that protocol security goals are written in terms of dependent types that need to be manually interpreted as trace properties. This makes it difficult to express and prove properties about dynamic compromise, such as forward secrecy and post-compromise security, which depend on the precise order of events in the global trace.

Equational Theories Prior works on symbolic protocol verification using RCF-like type systems do not model cryptographic primitives like Diffie-Hellman or XOR that require equational theories.

Mutable Protocol State Most variants of RCF have limited support for stateful code with mutable data structures and hence can not be easily applied to verify protocols that rely on such features.




Figure 2. **DY* Specification and Verification Framework.** The lowest layer encodes a symbolic model of cryptography, storage, networking, and attacker capabilities, in terms of an explicit global execution trace. The middle layer provides higher-level typed APIs with verified security abstractions and generic lemmas that facilitate protocol security proofs. For each protocol, the programmer writes code and security goals (the top layer) and verifies them to obtain a security theorem, or discovers a potential attack from a failed proof. The entire framework is written and mechanically verified using F*.

Due to these limitations, dependent type systems have lagged behind tools like ProVerif and Tamarin, and have never been used to symbolically verify (say) stateful Diffie-Hellman protocols like Signal with advanced security goals like post-compromise security.

Our Approach. The *goal of our work* is to build a mechanized symbolic verification framework that closes the gap between dependent types and dedicated provers like ProVerif and Tamarin, and by this, combines many of the mentioned benefits of both approaches.

We build a new framework, called DY* (as depicted in Figure 2), for the mechanized symbolic verification of protocol code written in F* [56, 57]. F* is a full-fledged programming language with a powerful dependent type system that supports user-defined effects for stateful code. The F* type-checker can prove that programs meet their specifications using a combination of SMT solving and interactive proofs. While F* has been used as a basis for computational protocol analysis (see Section 6), it has not been used for symbolic protocol analysis before this work.

To encode a symbolic cryptographic model within F*, we follow a radically different approach compared to prior work like F7. We explicitly model the global runtime semantics in terms of a mutable (append-only) global trace that tracks the interleaved distributed execution of an arbitrary number of protocol sessions. Hence, any property we need about the global trace, such as the attacker’s knowledge, secrecy lemmas about random bytestrings, assumptions about cryptographic primitives, or constraints on the order of protocol events, can be formulated in a natural way and *proven sound within our framework*, without relying on external assumptions or manual proofs. Unlike previous approaches based on dependent types, the explicit treatment of global traces also allows us to express and prove security properties involving features like (long-lived) mutable state, dynamic compromise, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security. Finally, we extend this model to account for *equational theories*, which we then use to verify Diffie-Hellman-based protocols.

In F*, we have a full-fledged functional programming language at our disposal, so *protocols can be modeled in*

detail, including implementation features like session state storage that are usually left out in other approaches like ProVerif or Tamarin. Our protocol models are *executable*, and hence, testable using (say) test vectors from protocol specifications. This helps us to avoid creating faulty models, and also allows us to implement and test attacks.

With F^* 's powerful dependent type system and expressive proof environment, we are able to use *induction-based proofs* to model and verify *unbounded and recursive protocols with complex data structures*. Our approach is *modular*: we structure the DY^* library and protocol code as independent modules with clean interfaces, and verify each module independently. As a result, verification time grows roughly linearly with code size, and we can build reusable libraries of generic protocol patterns and security lemmas that can be verified once and for all.

Contributions. Our main contribution is the design and implementation of DY^* , realized as a library of 9 verified F^* modules (see Figure 8) that together provide a domain-specific framework for modeling, executing and symbolically verifying security protocols. These modules essentially form two layers (see Figure 2). The lower layer, the symbolic runtime model (described in Section 2), provides libraries for symbolic cryptography, storage, and networking, implemented in terms of a global trace. It also models adversarial behavior by implementing an API for use by the (Dolev-Yao) symbolic attacker.

In principle, protocols can directly be implemented and verified on top of this layer. However, to ease verification and allow for succinct protocol proofs, DY^* provides another layer, the labeled security library (described in Section 3), which factors out common protocol patterns, reusable security abstractions and invariants, and generic security lemmas that are proved sound once and for all with respect to the low-level trace-based semantics. The labeled layer provides a high-level API that imposes a security-oriented coding discipline using secrecy labels, authentication predicates, and usage constraints for key material. Obeying this discipline enables succinct protocol security proofs (see Section 5 for a detailed evaluation).

To illustrate our framework, we present the first symbolic analysis of the Signal protocol (in Section 4) that accounts for an unbounded number of ratcheting rounds. Our executable protocol model is based on an interoperable implementation of the protocol taken from prior work [51]. This analysis also offers the first type-based formulation and proof of post-compromise security for any protocol.

DY^* is designed to be used by others; all the code and proofs for the framework are developed and documented in an open source repository, and can be used by other programmers to verify their own protocol code [10].

2. The DY^* Symbolic Runtime Model

The DY^* framework is meant to model a distributed system that consists of *principals* executing protocol code and exchanging messages over an *untrusted network* which is under the control of a *Dolev-Yao adversary*.

A central component of our model is the *global (execution) trace*. Among others, it records the history of the states of all principals at any time throughout the run of a system. A principal's state may contain arbitrary

information. For example, it can contain long-lived keys, such as the principal's public and private keys. Also, principals may be involved in an unbounded number of sessions at the same time. Hence, a principal's state also contains the current session state in all of its sessions

At each step in a protocol, a principal first retrieves its current state from the global trace, possibly reads a message from the network, performs its computation, sends messages back to the network, and at the end of the invocation saves its new state in the global trace.

The global trace records all messages sent on the network by principals. It also records the nonces generated by principals and documents whether principals or their sessions (even versions of sessions, see below) are corrupted by the adversary, who can corrupt principals dynamically in a fine-grained way.

The trace determines the attacker's knowledge at any point in a run: the attacker knows all messages sent on the network thus far as well as the state of corrupted principals or corrupted sessions of principals. This knowledge in turn determines which messages the attacker can send to (sessions of) principals. An attacker can only construct and send messages it can derive from its knowledge. In particular, it cannot simply guess secrets.

Modeling the global trace allows us to explicitly define and reason about the attacker's knowledge and dynamic compromise within the proof framework in a sound way. In previous dependently-typed approaches, this was not possible, and the programmer had to rely on manual arguments and weaker security guarantees.

The global trace also allows us to naturally and explicitly express security properties, such as secrecy properties and authentication/integrity properties, involving features like (long-lived) mutable state, dynamic compromise, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security that require reasoning about the adversary's knowledge and the precise order of events in the global trace. In order to prove such properties, we would typically formulate global invariants over the global trace which the code of every principals should preserve. The invariants should be strong enough to then imply the security properties we care about.

2.1. Encoding the Symbolic Runtime in F^*

Next, we describe how the main components of our symbolic runtime model are encoded in F^* .

An Explicit Global Trace. Formally, a global trace is defined as an array of certain entries in DY^* :

```
noeq type entry =
| RandGen: b:bytes → l:label → u:usage → entry
| SetState: p:principal → v:versions → s:sessions → entry
| Message: s:principal → r:principal → m:bytes → entry
| Event: p:principal → (string * list bytes) → entry
| Corrupt: p:principal → session_id:nat → version:nat → entry
type trace = array entry
```

Each entry records one of five protocol actions. A record `RandGen b l u` indicates that a fresh random bytestring `b` annotated with some metadata `l` and `u` has been generated, where `l` and `u` are used in the labeling layer (see Section 3). Similarly, `SetState`, `Message`, and `Event` record that a principal updated its internal state, sent a message on the network, or recorded a protocol event. We use protocol

events to annotate a trace to ease analysis. For example, a protocol event can be used to indicate that a new protocol session with a certain set of principals has been started or completed.

Each `SetState` entry stores a principal state grouped in so-called *sessions*, each annotated with a *version* identifier. Sessions can store long-term keys, such as a principal’s public and private keys, but also, as the name suggests, the principal’s states of arbitrary many ongoing protocol sessions. This partitioning is used by the entry `Corrupt p session_id version` that states that the attacker has obtained a specific version of a session (`session_id`) stored at principal `p`. This is a particularly fine-grained notion of compromise: it allows an attacker to dynamically compromise both long-term keys and specific ephemeral protocol states. By this type of corruption, we can model that only a subset of data stored in a principal’s state leaks to the adversary, allowing us, for instance, to analyze forward secrecy and post-compromise security. The attacker, however, is not restricted by this model as he can corrupt as many versions and sessions as it likes.

In our `DY*` implementation, we define one global variable that holds an append-only trace: each principal can add new entries at the end of the trace, but it cannot remove or modify existing entries. The length of the trace monotonically increases and hence can be used as a global symbolic timestamp.

The symbolic runtime layer provides (honest) principals with an API of basic functions, where underneath some of them read from and extend the trace; dishonest principals/the adversary can manipulate the trace in arbitrary ways subject to certain constraints (see later). For example, to generate a nonce principals would call the function `gen` which adds a `RandGen` entry to the trace and returns a fresh random bytearray; the function `set_state` adds a `SetState` entry while `get_last_state` reads the last `SetState` entry stored by a principal; `send` adds a `Message` entry to the trace, while `receive_i` reads the `Message` entry at a particular trace index, with the latter typically provided by the adversary to determine which message the principal is supposed to receive from the network. There are also functions to construct and parse messages (see later).

Global Trace Invariants. When verifying/type-checking the (stateful) code of a principal, we want to guarantee that we are in the context of a “reasonable” trace, i.e., not a trace that is completely arbitrary, but follows some generic rules. The symbolic runtime layer therefore contains a generic trace invariant to ensure basic constraints on traces. By so-called attacker-typability (explained later), we ensure that the invariant is sound in the sense that it does not overly restrict the adversary. The generic trace invariant is parameterized so that it can be enriched for proving desired security properties of a protocol, as discussed later.

An Algebraic Model of Crypto. The symbolic runtime layer defines an abstract type of bytestrings called `bytes` along with a series of conversion and cryptographic functions for constructing and parsing bytestrings. It also defines a type `principal` (alias for `string`) to represent the names of protocol participants (e.g. `"alice"`).

To model security assumptions on the cryptographic primitives, we define `bytes` as an algebraic datatype with multiple constructors, similar to the modeling style of [14]:

```

type literal =
| String of string | ByteSeq of seq FStar.UInt8.t | Nat of nat
type bytes =
| Literal: lit:literal → bytes
| Concat: b1:bytes → b2:bytes → bytes
| Rand: index:nat → l:label → u:usage → bytes
| PK: secret:bytes → bytes
| PKEnc: pub_key:bytes → msg:bytes → bytes
| DH_PK: priv_key: bytes → bytes
| DH: priv_key: bytes → pub_key:bytes → bytes
| ...

```

The type `literal` defines constants like strings, natural numbers, and concrete bytearrays that are treated as opaque. The constructor `Literal` models the conversion of a literal to a bytearray; in concrete code, this conversion may use some encoding functions (e.g. UTF-8). Similarly, `Concat` models the concatenation of bytestrings. The constructor `Rand` represents a fresh random value that was generated at some index in the global trace with metadata `l` and `u` (see also Section 3).

Each cryptographic primitive is modeled in terms of constructors and functions that use pattern matching to break down bytestrings. For example, the constructor `PK` models the conversion of a private decryption key to a public encryption key, and `PKEnc` models public key encryption. These are used to define the three functions that define public-key encryption:

```

let pk dk = PK dk
let pke_enc ek msg = PKEnc ek msg
let pke_dec dk ctx = match ctx with
| PKEnc (PK dk') msg →
  if dk = dk' then Success msg
  else Error "decryption_failed"
| _ → Error "decryption_failed"

```

The functions `pk` and `pke_enc` simply call the symbolic constructors, while `pke_dec` uses pattern matching to look inside a symbolic ciphertext and checks if the decryption key matches the encryption key before returning the plaintext. We similarly define models for AEAD encryption, signatures, hashing, and MACs.

Note that the algebraic definition of the `bytes` type is only visible within the symbolic crypto library; it is kept abstract from the protocol code, which can only use this type via functions like `string_to_bytes`, `gen`, etc.

Encoding Equational Theories. For Diffie-Hellman, we define two constructors (`DH_PK`, `DH`) and associated functions: `dh_pub` generates the public key (g^y) from a private key, and `dh` computes a shared secret (g^{xy}), from a private key (x) and public key (g^y). To capture the mathematical properties of exponentiation, we need to define additional equations between bytes. There are many symbolic equational theories for Diffie-Hellman that have been considered in prior work (see [28] for more discussion.) Here, we encode the “standard” equation that is used in ProVerif, and has been used in prior analyses of protocols like Signal [11] and TLS 1.3 [11]. The rule says that $(g^x)^y$ is equal to $(g^y)^x$, as reflected in the `dh_shared_secret_lemma`:

```

val dh_shared_secret_lemma: x:bytes → y:bytes →
  Lemma ((dh x (dh_pub y)) == (dh y (dh_pub x)))

```

By choosing a set of equations for a particular primitive, we are symbolically modeling the concrete computational semantics of the underlying cryptographic algorithm

at a particular level of precision. For protocols (like those in this paper) that rely on standard Diffie-Hellman operations over a large prime-order group, the equation above is enough to capture most known attacks, but for protocols that rely on other operations like addition and multiplication over exponents, we may need to add further equational rules to capture other potential attacks [44].

In our framework, we can use the full flexibility of F^* to add any number of equational rules (for DH, XOR, etc.) The main cost is that we need to prove that the encoding of the equational theory is an equivalence (reflexive, symmetric and transitive) and that it is respected by all the functions and predicates in our symbolic model and in the protocol code, which can be a tedious verification task.

Sometimes, we can encode an equational rule in a way that eases these equivalence and preservation proofs. For the Diffie-Hellman equation above, we define a total order le_bytes over the `bytes` type, and use it to ensure that the constructor application $DH\ x\ (dh_pub\ y)$ always has x less than y . If inputs are given in the other order (e.g. $dh\ y\ (dh_pub\ x)$) we reorder them to maintain the invariant. This encoding allows us to prove that the function defining the equational theory coincides with logical equality ($==$) in F^* and hence is a congruence.

Modeling Adversarial Behavior. We model an active network attacker, in the tradition of Dolev and Yao [32], who can intercept, modify, and block all messages sent on the network, can compromise any session state, and can call any cryptographic function (using messages it already knows), and can schedule any part of a protocol, i.e., functions that model the behavior of honest parties (see below). By using these capabilities, the attacker can grow its knowledge as the global trace is extended and it can try to break the protocol’s security goals.

Essential for an attacker’s behavior is its knowledge. The attacker’s knowledge at each index i in the global trace is logically characterized using a set of derivation rules defined as a recursive predicate (`attacker_can_derive i steps b`) that specifies whether the attacker can derive a bytestring b at index i within a certain number of derivation steps (see Appendix B). For example, the attacker can derive literals, can read any message sent on the network, and read previously compromised states in 0 steps. At each derivation step, it applies a cryptographic function to bytestrings it has already derived to obtain a new bytestring. Importantly, an attacker cannot guess a freshly generated random value (generated by some honest party); it can only learn a generated value by deriving it from network messages or compromised states.

The predicate `attacker_knows_at` says that an attacker knows a bytestring b at trace index i if he can derive b at i in some (finite, but unbounded) number of steps:

```
let attacker_knows_at (i:nat) (b:bytes) =
  ∃(steps:nat). attacker_can_derive steps i b
type pub_bytes (i:nat) = b:bytes{attacker_knows_at i b}
```

The type `pub_bytes i` represents bytestrings known to the attacker at index i . Of course, these values are also known to the attacker at all subsequent indexes $j > i$.

We further implement a (typed) API for the use of the attacker (e.g., to implement an actual attack) by wrapping each function in the symbolic runtime layer with a attacker-

friendly version that works for `pub_bytes`. For example, the attacker API for public key encryption is as follows:

```
val pke_enc: i:nat → enc_key:pub_bytes i →
  msg:pub_bytes i → pub_bytes i
val pke_dec: i:nat → dec_key:pub_bytes i → ctxt:pub_bytes i →
  result (pub_bytes i)
```

We typecheck our implementation of this attacker API to prove that as long as an attacker calls each function with derivable bytestrings, the function succeeds and returns derivable bytestrings. Furthermore, by showing that all the cryptographic and trace functions can be wrapped in this way, we demonstrate that the attacker has enough passive and active capabilities to construct and destruct all public bytestrings and to perform all the protocol actions (on behalf of a compromised principal) that an honest participant would be able to enact. This guarantee is sometimes called *attacker typability* for which we provide a machine-checked proof here using F^* .

Specifying Protocols. A protocol is written as a set of functions, each of which defines one protocol step performed by a principal. These functions can be called by the adversary in arbitrary order. The parameters of these functions allow the adversary to specify which session of the protocol is to be invoked and which message the principal is supposed to read from the network. In particular, we have no restrictions on the number of principals or sessions in a protocol run.

When called, a function parses the principal’s state as well as the network message into some semantically rich data type (we provide protocol-dependent parsing and serializing functions). Next, the function performs the computation of the respective protocol step, serializes its results (a new state for this principal and possibly new network messages), and places these results on the trace (by storing the new state and sending the network messages). Since with F^* we have a full-fledged functional programming language at our disposal, the functions can perform arbitrary computation and, in combination with global traces, easily deal with recursive, mutable, and long-lived state, unlike previous approaches.

We note that in principle, it is sufficient to have just one function for invoking a protocol since by reading the session state, the function can determine the current state of and stage of the protocol session. However, it is often more convenient to use several functions.

Symbolic Execution. For each protocol, we write a scheduler function which calls the above described protocol functions in the expected order. This scheduler essentially describes a run of the protocol and can be seen as a test case. We can then compile the scheduler together with the DY^* framework and the protocol implementation to OCaml and execute this code to print out a symbolic trace of a protocol run. This way, we can implement test cases, inspect symbolic runs, and check our model for errors, something not possible in tools like Tamarin and ProVerif. We can also implement and check known attacks for unfixed protocol code.

Security Properties. Having the global trace explicitly formulated in our framework, unlike previous type-based approaches, we can easily and naturally formulate and then prove security properties about the trace in terms




Figure 3. **Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol (NS-PK)**. An initiator I and responder R authenticate each other and establish a session key n_R using public key encryption. Each party initially knows its own private key (e.g. sk_I) and the public keys of all peers it is willing to communicate with (e.g. pk_R, pk_M). To start the protocol, I generates a fresh nonce n_I and encrypts it to R , along with I 's name. R generates its own nonce n_R and encrypts it back to I , along with n_I . When I receives and decrypts this response, it encrypts n_R back to R and believes that it talked to R since the response contained its nonce n_I . Similarly, R believes to have talked to I upon receiving n_R in the last message. We assume that all messages are tagged with MSG_1, MSG_2, MSG_3 , to prevent reflection and type-flaw attacks.

of F* lemmas. As already mentioned, this includes stating secrecy properties as well as integrity/authentication properties with a natural and fine-grained treatment of long-lived and mutual state, dynamic corruption as well as forward secrecy and post-compromise security. We provide concrete examples in Sections 2.2 and 4.

To prove such properties, we formulate appropriate trace invariants, show that honest programs satisfy these invariants (under arbitrary adversarial behavior), and then prove that these invariants imply the desired properties.

While trace-based security properties sketched above are expressive enough to state many classic protocol security goals, they however, do not capture stronger secrecy and privacy guarantees that can be expressed using program equivalence. In the future, we plan to extend our methodology to specify and verify properties written in terms of *diff-equivalence* [21].

2.2. Example: Implementing NS-PK with DY*

In this section, we demonstrate our methodology using the well-known Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol (NS-PK) [48] depicted in Figure 3. We begin by writing a detailed executable specification, or reference implementation, of NS-PK in F*, relying on DY*'s symbolic runtime layer. In Section 3, we lift this implementation to the labeled security layer to analyze its security.

Messages. Figure 4 depicts an algebraic datatype message that defines three constructors (Msg1, Msg2, Msg3), corresponding to the three messages in the NS-PK protocol. The function `serialize_message` uses a string-to-bytes conversion function and concatenation to encode each message unambiguously as bytes; `parse_message` does the inverse. The return type of `parse_message` is `result message` which means that it can either be of the form `Success m` for some `m` of type `message`, or it can be `Error s` with some error string `s`. We prove a lemma `part_message_correctness_lemma` (see Figure 4) that says that the parsing is correct, i.e. it correctly inverts serialization, which is an important functional requirement for protocol code.

```

type message =
| Msg1: i:principal → n_i: bytes → message
| Msg2: n_i: bytes → n_r: bytes → message
| Msg3: n_r: bytes → message
val serialize_message: message → bytes
val parse_message: bytes → result message
val parse_message_correctness_lemma: m:message →
  Lemma (parse_message (serialize_message m) == Success m)

```

```

type session_st =
| SecretKey: secret_key: bytes → session_st
| PublicKey: peer:principal → public_key:bytes → session_st
| ISentMsg1: r:principal → n_i:bytes → session_st
| RSentMsg2: i:principal → n_i:bytes → n_r:bytes → session_st
| ISentMsg3: r:principal → n_i:bytes → n_r:bytes → session_st
| RReceivedMsg3: i:principal → n_r:bytes → session_st
val serialize_session_st: session_st → bytes
val parse_session_st: bytes → result session_st

```

Figure 4. F* types for NS-PK messages and states

Session States. As mentioned in Section 2.1, a principal can use the storage API to save its long-term data items, such as private and public keys, and current states of all ongoing sessions as an array, denoted `sessions`, of (serialized) session states, which comes along with an array versions (called a version vector) that maps each session to a version number. Initially, all versions are 0. When a session state is updated, its version may optionally be incremented to indicate a new protocol phase.

In our NS-PK implementation, each session state has type `session_st` (Figure 4), denoting one of six forms: its own long-term private key (`SecretKey`), the name and public key for a peer (`PublicKey`), the initiator I and responder R 's intermediate protocol states (`ISentMsg1, RSentMsg2`), and their final protocol states (`ISentMsg3, RReceivedMsg3`). Each protocol state stores the (claimed) identity of the peer and further material, such as nonces, needed to continue the protocol session. Like with messages, we define a serialization and a parsing function for `session_st` and prove a correctness lemma.

Our model of protocol messages and state is more detailed than other formal analyses, such as those carried out in ProVerif and Tamarin, which typically ignore persistent state storage, and do not consider message or state serialization. However, these details are needed to implement protocols in practice, and a bug in serialization or parsing can easily break the protocol security goals. Our correctness lemmas prevent these kinds of bugs.

Initiator Code. The code for the NS-PK initiator is depicted in Figure 5 and is divided into two functions: the function `initiate` begins an NS-PK session and sends the first message, whereas `initiator_complete` processes the second message and sends the third message, completing the initiator's role.

The function `initiate` begins by calling `get_last_state` to retrieve the last state (i.e. `sessions`, `versions`, and `timestamp`s) stored by the principal `i`. It then calls `find_public_key` to search the `sessions` array for a `PublicKey` entry containing the responder `r` and its public key `pk_r`. Our DY* framework supports, by an appropriately defined F* monad, implicit error propagation: if a function call like `find_public_key` fails and returns an error, the whole function fails and returns the same error.


```

(* Initiate a new protocol session between send Msg1 *)
let initiate (i r : principal) =
  let pk_r = find_public_key r in
  let n_i = gen (Can_Read [P i; P r]) (PKE_Key "NS") in
  let msg1 = Msg1 i n_i in
  let s_msg1 = serialize_message msg1 in
  let c_msg1 = pke_enc pk_r s_msg1 in
  let st0 = ISentMsg1 r n_i in
  let s_st0 = serialize_session_st st0 in
  let sess_id = new_session_number i in
  new_session i sess_id 0 s_st0;
  log_event i "Initiated" [string_to_bytes r; n_i];
  send i r c_msg1;
  sess_id
(* Process Msg2 and send Msg3 to complete protocol session *)
let initiator_complete (i : principal) (session_id msg_id : nat) =
  let (ver_id,st) = get_session i session_id in
  match parse_session_st st with
  | Success (ISentMsg1 r n_i) →
    let (from,c_msg2) = receive_i i msg_id in
    let sk_i = find_private_key i in
    let pk_r = find_public_key r in
    (match pke_dec sk_i c_msg2 with
    | Success s_msg2 →
      (match parse_message s_msg2 with
      | Success (Msg2 n_i' n_r) →
        if n_i = n_i' then
          let s_msg3 = serialize_message (Msg3 n_r) in
          let c_msg3 = pke_enc pk_r s_msg3 in
          let new_st = ISentMsg3 r n_i n_r in
          let s_new_st = serialize_session_st new_st in
          log_event i "InitiatorDone" [string_to_bytes r; n_i; n_r];
          update_session i session_id ver_id s_new_st;
          send i r c_msg3
        else error "received_incorrect_n_i"
      | _ → error "did_not_receive_a_msg_2")
    | _ → error "decryption_failed")
  | _ → error "incorrect_session_state"

```

Figure 5. Initiator Code for NS-PK in F* using DY* libraries

Next, `initiate` calls `gen` to generate a fresh random bytestring `n_i`; `gen` takes three arguments with metadata that describe who generated the bytestring, who can read that value, and how `n_i` is intended to be used. This metadata will be later used for proofs in the labeling layer (see Section 3).

The `initiate` function then constructs the first message `msg1`, serializes it to bytes, and encrypts the result with the public key of `r` to obtain the ciphertext `c_msg1`. It creates a new session state `ISentMsg1 r n_i`, serializes it to obtain `s_st1`, extends the previous state of `i` with this new session (at version 0) and calls the `set_state` function to store the new state for `i`.

Finally, the initiator logs an event `Initiated` indicating that it has started a new protocol session before calling the networking function `send` to put the message `c_msg1` on the network; besides the message, `send` takes the identities of the sending and receiving principals, here `i` and `r`, respectively. The function `initiate` returns the index of the new session (length `sessions`), which is treated as a session handle and which the adversary or a scheduler can use to invoke and continue this session later on.

The code for `initiator_complete` is a bit more complicated; it is given a session handle `session_id` for an ongoing session, and a handle (`msg_id`) for a message that has been received over the network. The function retrieves its session state by calling `get_last_state`, receives the message by calling `receive_i`, decrypts the message with the initiator's

private key, verifies that the received nonce `n_i'` matches the nonce `n_i` in the stored state, and then constructs and encrypts `Msg3` for the responder. The function finishes by updating its session state to `ISentMsg3` (hence deleting the previous state), logging an event `InitiatorDone` indicating that its role in the protocol session is complete, and sending the third message to the responder.

Responder Code. The code for the responder (included in [10]) is the dual of the initiator; it consists of two functions, `respond` and `respond_complete`, that store session states (`RSentMsg2`, `RReceivedMsg3`), and log events (`Responded`, `ResponderDone`) each with three parameters [`string_to_bytes i;n_i;n_r`].

Implementing Lowe's Attack on NS-PK. Using the attacker API and the protocol API (the above mentioned protocol functions for NS-PK), we can implement potential attacks on the NS-PK protocol as F* programs and symbolically execute them on the protocol code. In particular, we implement Lowe's man-in-the-middle attack on NS-PK [45]. Lowe's attack is based on mixing two sessions: (1) Alice as initiator (intentionally) talking to the attacker (as responder) and (2) the attacker pretending to be Alice (as initiator) talking to Bob (see Figure 9 in Appendix A). We symbolically execute the attack and it succeeds, resulting in a symbolic trace with 22 entries, at the end of which the attacker is able to learn the nonce `n_r`, which was meant to be known only to `I` and `R`.

Lowe proposes a simple fix to NS-PK that adds `R`'s identity to `Msg2` and requires `I` to check this identity. We implement this fix and retry the attack code, which now fails as expected. The failure of a single attack however is not a formal proof of security. So the next step is to formalize and prove the security for the fixed Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) protocol.

Security Properties. For the NSL protocol, we are particularly interested in the secrecy of the nonce `n_r` as well as authentication goals that link logged events. We here sketch how such properties can be expressed in DY*.

To express the secrecy of the nonce `n_r` used in NSL, we ask whether it is possible for the attacker to interact with an initiator `I` and responder `R` in a way that it can eventually learn `n_r`, without compromising the long-term keys or the stored session states of `I` or `R`. We state this in DY* by the following lemma, which says that if the `n_r` value logged by `i` in an initiator event `InitiatorDone r n_r` is known to the adversary at `test_idx`, then either `i` or `r` must have been compromised before `test_idx`.

```

let n_r_secretary_condition_at_i =
  ∀test_idx ev_idx i r n_i n_r. (ev_idx ≤ test_idx ∧
    entry_at ev_idx (Event i ("InitiatorDone",
      [string_to_bytes r; n_i; n_r])) ∧
    attacker_knows_at test_idx n_r) ⇒
  (∃ comp_idx v s. comp_idx ≤ test_idx ∧
    (entry_at comp_idx (Corrupt i v s) ∨
    entry_at comp_idx (Corrupt r v s)))

```

We can write a similar lemma to express the secrecy goal for a `n_r` value stored in a responder's state.

The compromise condition in our secrecy invariant above is relatively broad: it gives no guarantees if *any* session of `i` or `r` is compromised. This is because any adversary who compromises the long-term keys of `i` or `r` can decrypt `n_r` from the second or third message (NSL does

not provide forward secrecy) and similarly the attacker can learn n_r by compromising the protocol states in which n_r is stored. For other protocols, however, it is possible to state secrecy goals with tighter compromise conditions (see Section 4).

In addition to secrecy, we also state authentication goals as properties of the trace that link logged events. For NSL, responder authentication at an initiator i states that if i logs an event `InitiatorDone` with parameters r , n_i , and n_r , then there must be a prior event `Responded` logged by r with matching parameters i , n_i , and n_r , *unless* one of i or r has been compromised. A similar property states initiator authentication at r .

In the next section, we will see how we can prove these properties using the labeled layer of DY^* .

Comparison with Other Approaches. In 340 lines of F^* code, we have formally specified the NS-PK protocol at an unprecedented level of detail. The core protocol code is quite short (less than 100 lines of code); the remainder accounts for low-level implementation details like message formats, the protocol state machine, long-term storage for public keys, and session storage for intermediate states. Furthermore, our code is executable and hence serves as a reference implementation of NS-PK. Our security properties systematically allow for any stored state to be compromised, including intermediate states like `ISentMsg1`.

For comparison, formal models of NS-PK are included with both the ProVerif [20] and Tamarin [47] distributions. These models are written in about 110 lines in domain-specific protocol specification languages, but they do not account for message parsing, session state, or key compromise, and are not executable or testable. A model of key or state compromise can be added manually to each model in about 10-20 lines but precisely modeling session state would take significantly more work.

The size of our specification and the effort written to write it is comparable to other prior work on verifying symbolic protocol implementations. Models of the Otway-Rees protocol, which has a similar level of complexity to NS-PK takes 148 lines of $F\#$ code in [15], and 234 lines in [14], but neither of these implementations account for session storage and state compromise. Adding these features would expand these implementations to roughly the same size as ours. In summary, it is possible to write more succinct formal models of NS-PK that ignore low-level implementation details, but ours is the first to account for all these details and can still be written succinctly with little modeling effort.

3. The DY^* Labeled Security Library

One may try to directly prove in the symbolic runtime layer that the global traces generated by a protocol (in parallel with an attacker) satisfy a certain security property or preserve a certain trace invariant. For example, in NSL, we would need to prove that the secrecy invariant for n_r is preserved by all four functions in the protocol API. However, in order to prove this invariant, it becomes necessary to strengthen it to include secrecy conditions for n_i and the private keys of i and r . Establishing this extended invariant across all the functions of the protocol APIs may be laborious, even with the help of F^* 's dependent type checker.

Instead, we prove security properties about the low-level global traces with the help of a higher security abstraction layer, the labeled security library (or labeled layer for short), to facilitate proofs and obtain more succinct proofs (see Figure 2). The labeled layer factors out generic security abstractions and invariants, which we mechanically prove sound in F^* w.r.t. our lower-level trace-based runtime semantics; a once and for all effort.

At the heart of our methodology is a security-oriented coding discipline for protocol code written in terms of secrecy labels and usage constraints. Labels allow us to proactively track knowledge of secrets. Whenever some secret is generated (e.g., a nonce), we annotate this secret with a label that states who is allowed to know this secret. To enforce that the labeling always holds true, we add a global trace invariant that describes a *valid* trace. For example, in a valid trace, messages sent to the network must always be publishable (according to their labeling) and principals only store terms in their states that they are allowed to know.

Usage constraints complement labeling: We annotate key material with a usage, for example: a key may only be used for signing but not for encryption (which rules out decryption oracles). Moreover, the annotation can also express that a key may only be used for cryptographic operations with certain payloads, e.g., that some key is only ever used to sign specific messages. This allows us to (by local type checking) even reason about the behavior of other honest principals.

We refine the types of each function on the symbolic runtime layer to help preserve labeling and usage constraints, including the valid trace invariant. For example, the messages passed to the `send` function are required to be publishable according to the labeling. By this, it is guaranteed that messages put on the network are publishable, as postulated by the valid trace invariant. In turn, this means that protocol code which only uses the labeled library and type checks correctly, obeys labeling and thus is automatically proven to never reveal terms that are labeled to be kept secret to an adversary.

This rich set of invariants and properties allows us to state and prove generic and common security properties, so that they do not have to be re-done time and time again. As mentioned, this approach is mechanically verified based on the low-level trace-based runtime semantics in DY^* itself, without resorting to an external, manual meta theory. We emphasize that, as also mechanically verified, all of these invariants do not restrict adversarial behavior. In particular, all actions of the Dolev-Yao adversary (running on the lower layer) preserve the higher-level valid trace invariant.

We now present key elements of the labeled layer in more detail before illustrating this layer with our running example, the NSL protocol.

Secrecy Labels and Usage Constraints. A secrecy label (see Figure 6 for syntax) indicates which sessions of which principals are allowed to read a bytestring: a label is either `Public`, scoped to a list of session state identifiers (`Can_Read [id1;id2;...]`), a `Meet` (intersection) of labels, or a `Join` (union) of labels. A session state identifier can refer to a principal and all of its sessions (`P p`), to a specific session s of p (`S p s`), or even to a specific version v of that session (`V p s v`). Usages describe how a bytestring may be used: it

```

type timestamp = nat
type principal = string
type st_id =
| P: principal → st_id
| S: principal → session:nat → st_id
| V: principal → session:nat → version:nat → st_id
type label =
| Public: label
| Can_Read: list st_id → label
| Meet: label → label → label
| Join: label → label → label
val can_flow: timestamp → label → label → pred
type usage = | Nonce : string → usage | Guid : string → usage
| PKE_Key : string → usage | AEAD_Key : string → usage
| SIG_Key : string → usage | MAC_Key : string → usage
| KDF_Key : string → usage | DH_Key : string → usage

```

```

val has_label: i:nat → b:bytes → l:label → pred
val has_usage: i:nat → b:bytes → u:usage → pred
type lbytes (i:nat) (l:label) = b:bytes{has_label i b l}
let lbytes_can_flow_to (i:nat) (b:bytes) (l:label) =
  ∃ l'. has_label i b l' ∧ can_flow i l' l
type msg (i:nat) (l:label) = b:bytes{lbytes_can_flow_to i b l}
let is_publishable (i:nat) (b:bytes) = lbytes_can_flow_to i b Public
type secret (i:nat) (l:label) (u:usage) =
  b:bytes{has_label i b l ∧ has_usage i b u}

```

Figure 6. Secrecy labels, usage constraints, and labeling predicates

may be a secret Nonce, an unique identifier (Guid), or a key for public key encryption, AEAD encryption, signatures, MACs, key derivation functions or Diffie-Hellman. Each of the usages takes a string argument that is used to distinguish the different types of keys (e.g., a PKE long-term key `PKE_Key "id"` is different from an ephemeral PKE key `PKE_Key "one-time"`) and to define the usage of derived secrets.

The predicates `has_label` and `has_usage` define a set of inductive rules that assign labels and usages to bytestrings. For example, a bytestring containing a literal (Literal `l`) is given the label `Public` with no specific usage, whereas a generated random value (`Rand idx l u`) has the label `l` and usage `u`. In this manner, these predicates define labeling and usage rules for all constructors of the bytes datatype. Not all bytestrings are well-labeled, but well-labeled bytestrings have a unique label and usage. The type `lbytes i l` refers to a bytestring with label `l` at timestamp `i`, and `secret i l u` refers to a secret bytestring having label `l` with usage `u` at timestamp `i`.

The labeling rules rely on a predicate `can_flow`, which specifies when a bytestring with label `l1` can flow into a function that expects a bytestring with label `l2`. This predicate is reflexive and transitive, and it allows data to flow from less restrictive labels to more restrictive labels. For example, a secret nonce with label `Can_Read [P i; P r]` can only be encrypted under a key with a label that can flow to (e.g. `Can_Read [P i]`).

The type `msg i l` refers to bytestrings whose labels can flow to `l` at timestamp `i`. The predicate `is_publishable` holds for bytestrings that can flow to `Public` (and hence can safely be sent over the network.)

Labeled Crypto API. The core of the labeled layer is a labeled crypto API that provides labeled wrappers for all the crypto functions on the symbolic runtime layer and internally enforces labeling and usage rules.

For example, the labeled version of `string_to_bytes` always returns a `lbytes i Public`; `concat` takes two inputs of type `msg i l` and also returns a `msg i l`; `split` does the reverse.

The labeled types of the crypto functions are more subtle; the public key encryption functions are declared as follows:

```

type private_dec_key (i:nat) (l:label) (s:string) =
  b:bytes{has_label i b l ∧ has_usage i b (PKE_Key s)}
type public_enc_key (i:nat) (l:label) (s:string) =
  b:bytes{∃ (sk:private_dec_key i l s). b == pk sk}
val pk: #:i:nat → #l:label → #s:string →
  private_dec_key i l s → public_enc_key i l s
val pke_pred: #:i:nat → #l:label → msg i l → pred
val pke_enc: #:i:nat → #l:label → #s:string →
  public_enc_key i l s →
  m:msg i l {pke_pred m} → msg i Public
val pke_dec: #:i:nat → #l:label → #s:string →
  private_dec_key i l s → msg i Public →
  result (m:msg i l {is_publishable i m ∨ pke_pred m})

```

The type `private_dec_key` refers to private decryption keys with a label `l`, whereas `public_enc_key` refers to bytestrings obtained by applying the `pk` function to a `private_dec_key`. Each function takes *implicit* arguments `#i`, `#l` and `#s` indicating the trace index, the label of the private decryption key and the string to identify the type of `PKE_Key`. When calling the function, these arguments can be omitted if they are obvious from the context.

The encryption function `pke_enc` enforces two constraints. First, it requires that the input message `m` can flow to the label `l` of the private decryption key. This means that we cannot encrypt a more-secret message with a public encryption key whose private key is less-secret; a labeling constraint that is necessary to guarantee message secrecy. Second, it requires that the input message `m` must satisfy a protocol-specific usage predicate `pke_pred i l msg`. Each protocol defines this predicate to specify the kinds of messages it is willing to encrypt with a key of type `public_enc_key i l s`. If these two constraints are met, `pke_enc` returns a `Public` ciphertext that can be safely sent over the public network.

Conversely, the decryption function `pke_dec` takes a private decryption key with label `l`, a public ciphertext, and returns a decrypted message of type `msg i l` with the additional guarantee that this message is either publishable (it may have come from the attacker) or it must satisfy `pke_pred` (it has been produced according to the constraints on `pke_enc`).

Each DH private key has the type `dh_priv_key i l s` indicating that it has a secrecy label `l` and that the *shared secret* generated from this private key should have the usage defined by the function `dh_secret_usage` that takes as parameter the string `s`. The corresponding public keys have type `dh_pub_key i l s`.

```

val dh_secret_usage: string → usage
val dh_pub: #:i:nat → #l:label → #s:string → dh_priv_key i l s →
  dh_pub_key i l s
val dh: #:i:nat → #l1:label → #l2:label → #s:string →
  dh_priv_key i l1 s → dh_pub_key i l2 s →
  b:bytes i (Join l1 l2){has_usage i b (dh_secret_usage s)}

```

The function `dh` takes a private key with type `dh_priv_key i l1 s` and a public key with type `dh_pub_key i l2 s` to compute a shared secret with label `Join l1 l2` and usage defined by `dh_secret_usage` given the string `s`. The label `Join l1 l2` means that the shared secret may be used in any

session covered by I_1 or I_2 . We define several other variants of dh function, including for cases where the peer’s public key is untrusted.

The types for the rest of the cryptographic API are similar (see Appendix C). In each construction, the arguments must satisfy some protocol-specific usage predicate (ae_{ad_pred} , sig_pred , ...), and in all encryption functions, we ask that messages must flow to the labels of the decryption keys.

As mentioned before, unlike previous approaches, we prove the soundness of the labeled API within F^* w.r.t. our low-level runtime semantics. This was impossible in previous type-based approaches due to the lack of a low-level runtime semantics within the frameworks themselves. We note that our soundness proof of course uses the F^* type system and verification framework. The soundness of F^* itself is outside the scope of our work.

Global Trace Invariants and Stateful API. As mentioned, we define a generic trace invariant $valid_trace$ that holds in all global traces generated by protocol code that follows the labeling rules. It enforces three properties: i) any message b that is sent on the network must satisfy $is_publishable$; ii) any state ($sessions$, $versions$) that is stored by an honest principal p at index i must satisfy the protocol-specific state invariant $state_inv\ i\ p\ versions\ sessions$; furthermore, for each session s , the session state $sessions.[s]$ must flow to the label $Can_Read\ [V\ p\ s\ versions.[s]]$; iii) any event e with parameters pl logged by principal p at index i must satisfy the protocol-specific predicate $event_pred\ i\ p\ e\ pl$.

We then define labeled wrappers for all the stateful functions in the symbolic runtime layer: gen , set_state , get_state , etc. and extend their pre-conditions and post-conditions to ensure that they preserve the $valid_trace$ invariant. We also prove that all functions in the attacker API preserve $valid_trace$, and hence, we obtain that all reachable global protocol traces satisfy this invariant.

Generic Security Lemmas. Given the $valid_trace$ invariant, we obtain many security lemmas for free (as mentioned before, proven in the framework itself). For example, we prove that $valid_trace$ implies that a nonce that is labeled with Can_Read readers can only be known to the adversary if one of the session states included in readers is compromised. This lemma is encapsulated in a stateful function that can be called by protocol code to establish a protocol specific secrecy goal:

```
val secrecy_lemma: b:bytes → readers:list st_id → DY unit
  (requires (λ t0 → valid_trace t0 ∧
             has_label (len t0) b (Can_Read readers)))
  (ensures (λ t0 _t1 → t0 == t1 ∧
              (attacker_knows_at (len t0) b ⇒
               contains_compromised_st_id readers)))
```

Similarly, the $valid_trace$ invariant relates each logged event to a protocol specific $event_pred$ precondition, which a protocol can instantiate to obtain its own authentication goal. In NSL, we use $event_pred$ to specify initiator and responder authentication: the initiator code is allowed to log $InitiatorDone$ only if we can prove that either a matching $Responded$ has been logged previously or one of the two principals is compromised.

Example: Symbolic Security Theorems for NSL. We continue our example from Section 2.2 and illustrate how

the security of NSL can be proven using the labeled security API. To prove the NSL security goals, we first need to port our NSL implementation to use the labeled API instead of the symbolic runtime layer.

The first step is to annotate all the keys and nonces used in the protocol with labels and usages. (We already did this in our example code in Section 2.) In particular, the private key of each principal p is given the type $private_dec_key\ i\ (Can_Read\ [P\ p])\ "NSL"$, and the public key has the corresponding $public_enc_key$ type; the two nonces n_i and n_r are given labels $Can_Read\ [P\ i;\ P\ r]$, indicating their intended secrecy. We define a protocol state invariant $state_inv$ that specifies the labels of all bytestrings stored in the session state. We then typecheck the code against the labeled API to prove that it obeys all the labeling and usage rules. Finally, we can call the generic secrecy lemma provided before for n_r to obtain our secrecy goal: if n_r is known to the attacker, then one of the two principals i or r must be compromised.

To prove authentication, we define the $event_pred$ to specify the order in which the four protocol events ($Initiated$, $Responded$, $InitiatorDone$, $ResponderDone$) may be logged in each session, and how their parameters must be related. We also need to define pke_pred to constrain what bytestrings may be encrypted by i and r . We then typecheck the code to prove that each event and public-key encryption satisfies these predicates. Finally, we obtain initiator and responder authentication as a corollary of the $valid_trace$ invariant.

The proof effort consists of specifying the event predicate and state invariant and typechecking the full protocol implementation, adding type annotations and lemmas where needed. Choosing these definitions and annotations requires some insight into the proof, but getting them wrong cannot affect soundness: an incorrect lemma will not be provable, and an incorrect predicate or annotation will not be allow us to prove the protocol security goals.

Comparison with Other Approaches. In total, we add about 188 lines of proof-related code to verify NSL. In contrast, tools like ProVerif and Tamarin can automatically verify the core NSL protocol for trace properties like secrecy and authentication with no additional annotations. Furthermore, verification with F^* takes roughly 0.5 minutes, whereas ProVerif can verify the protocol in a few seconds. However, as we add more low-level protocol details, verification time with tools like ProVerif grows exponentially. For example, a comparably-sized ProVerif model of Otway-Rees generated from an F# implementation takes over 8 minutes to analyze [15]. Hence, for symbolically analyzing small protocols like NSL, automated provers require significantly less effort, but as protocols get larger or detailed, the benefits of modular verification methods like ours become more pronounced.

The proof effort required in DY^* is significantly lower than the overhead in prior analyses based on dependent typechecking. For example, the F7 typechecker requires 255 lines of annotations to verify Otway-Rees, an overhead of over 100% on top of the protocol specification [14]. Furthermore, as we shall see in our Signal case study, our framework is able to model fine-grained compromise and stateful protocol implementations, which are out of the reach of these prior works.

4. Verifying the Signal Messaging Protocol

Despite their popularity, Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocols have traditionally been a challenging target for protocol verification. A precise model of DH requires an equational theory which can complicate proofs. Furthermore, DH protocols usually seek to provide advanced guarantees like forward secrecy that require reasoning about fine-grained dynamic compromise. Using DY^* , we are able to mechanically verify, for the first time using dependent types, sophisticated DH protocols for strong security properties. Appendix D discusses our verification of a simple authenticated DH protocol.

The Signal protocol, used in popular messaging applications like WhatsApp and Skype, is notable for its sophisticated use of DH computations to obtain strong security guarantees against adversaries who can compromise both short-term and long-term secrets. Its innovative multi-round (or *ratcheted*) protocol design has inspired a line of work on new security definitions and proof techniques for properties like *post compromise security* [7, 24, 25, 37, 50]. Signal has also been analyzed with mechanized provers, both in the symbolic and the computational model, but these analyses had to severely restrict the protocol to tame its verification complexity [38]. Prior to this work, modular verification techniques like dependent types have not been used to analyze Signal.

Our verification target is an interoperable implementation of Signal in F^* developed in prior work [51]. This implementation was verified for correctness against a purely functional protocol specification (also in F^*), but the security of this protocol specification was not verified in F^* . We close this gap by extending this specification code to a full DY^* protocol model and proving that it achieves the secrecy and authentication goals of Signal, even for an unbounded number of rounds. We refer the reader to [51] and the F^* source code for the full implementation details. Here, we will focus on how we model and verify the novel features of Signal.

X3DH: Initial Key Exchange. Each messaging conversation in Signal begins with the X3DH protocol depicted in Figure 7, which performs four DH operations involving two keys known to the initiator—a long-term identity key k_i and an ephemeral key e_i —and three keys known to the responder—a long-term identity key k_r , a medium-term signed pre-key s_r , and a one-time pre-key o_j . (The one-time key is optional, but for simplicity we will assume it is always present.) The results of all four DH operations are fed into a key derivation function to obtain a *root key* K_0 , which is then used to derive message encryption keys.

Each of the DH keys in X3DH serves a different purpose. The identity keys (k_i, k_r) are used to authenticate the two parties. The signed pre-key (s_r) is changed regularly and protects against the compromise of the responder’s identity key (k_r). The one-time pre-key (o_r^j) and ephemeral key (e_i) are specific to a single X3DH session and are deleted immediately after K_0 is generated, in order to provide forward secrecy for K_0 even if all other keys are subsequently compromised. In combination, the X3DH protocol seeks to provide defense-in-depth for K_0 against various combinations of key compromise. We show next how we can formalize and prove the precise secrecy goal for K_0 in our model.




Figure 7. **Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman (X3DH)**: a one-message key agreement protocol for asynchronous messaging. Initially, the initiator and responder know each others’ long-term identity public keys (g_i^k, g_r^k). The initiator downloads (from an untrusted server) a prekey bundle for the responder containing a signed DH public key g^{s_r} and (optional) one-time public-key $g^{o_r^j}$. It then generates an ephemeral key e_i and executes 4 DH operations mixing e_i, k_i with s_r, o_r^j , and k_r , resulting in an authenticated key K_0 shared between the two parties, which is used to derive a message key to protect the first message (MSG_0) to the responder. The protocol aims to provide authenticity and forward secrecy for K_0 , even if some of the DH keys it depends on are compromised.

Stating (Forward) Secrecy for X3DH. We place each DH private key in its own session. By this, the attacker can selectively compromise individual DH keys. We then define trace invariants expressing the secrecy goals of K_0 from the viewpoint of the initiator and responder. Since the two participants have asymmetric knowledge about each other’s keys, they obtain quite different guarantees.

At an initiator i , the secrecy goal for X3DH states that if we complete an X3DH session sid_i with a responder r to obtain K_0 , then this key remains secret unless either the corresponding initiator session (sid_i) is compromised or some (long-term) session at the responder r is compromised. Hence, the initiator obtains only a weak forward secrecy guarantee: compromising the long-term keys of i does not affect the secrecy of K_0 , but compromising any long-term key of r may reveal K_0 .

The secrecy goal at the responder is stronger: if r completes an X3DH session sid_r with an initiator i at trace index t , the resulting K_0 remains secret unless either one of the initiator or responder’s long-term sessions were compromised before t , or one of the X3DH sessions (sid_i, sid_r) is compromised. In other words, compromising the long-term keys of i or r after the session does not affect the secrecy of K_0 at r ; the attacker also needs to compromise the short-term keys in sid_i and sid_r , which are typically deleted once the protocol is complete.

Proving (Forward) Secrecy for X3DH. Our proof for both these secrecy invariants relies on the labeling rules for DH and KDF. The identity keys k_i and k_r are labeled $\text{Can_Read [P } i]$ and $\text{Can_Read [P } r]$, and the signed pre-key s_r is labeled $\text{Can_Read [P } r]$. Each one-time pre-key o_r^j is given labeled $\text{Can_Read [V } r \ sid_r \ 0]$ and so can only be stored in session sid_r at version 0. When the X3DH message is received, this key is deleted and the version of the session sid_r is incremented to 1. Similarly, the ephemeral key e_i is labeled $\text{Can_Read [V } i \ sid_i \ 0]$ and the version of this session jumps to 1 at the end of the protocol.

When a session’s version is incremented, old keys (e_i, o_r^k) that were associated with previous versions can no longer be stored in this (or any other) session. Hence, by labeling ephemeral keys with specific versions, we ensure that they are discarded at the end of the protocol run.

By applying the labeling rules for DH and KDF, we obtain a label of the following form for K_0 :

```
Meet (Join (Can_Read [P i]) (Can_Read [P r]))
(Meet (Join (Can_Read [V i sid_i 0]) (Can_Read [P r]))
(Meet (Join (Can_Read [V i sid_i 0]) (Can_Read [P r]))
(Join (Can_Read [V i sid_i 0]) (Can_Read [V r sid_r 0])))
```

However, this is the *ideal* label of K_0 when both parties know the labels of all keys. In the presence of an active adversary however, each participant only has an incomplete view of the labels of its peer’s public keys.

In the initiator code, for example, we prove that K_0 has a label $_l_0$ such that:

```
can_flow  $\_l_0$  (Can_Read [V i sid_i 0])  $\wedge$ 
can_flow (Join (Can_Read [V i sid_i 0]) (Can_Read [P r]))  $\_l_0$ 
```

In other words, K_0 can be stored at version 0 in session sid_i and it is at least as secret as the label $\text{Join (Can_Read [V i sid_i 0]) (Can_Read [P r])}$. Given this labeling, and applying the labeled secrecy lemma for K_0 , we obtain the above-stated secrecy goal for the initiator.

The proof for the responder’s secrecy goal is a bit more complicated: in addition to labeling, it also relies on the AEAD encryption of the X3DH message to authenticate the initiator’s ephemeral key, and hence to establish a stronger security invariant for K_0 . We note that most of the complexity of the protocol reasoning is succinctly represented by the labels given to different keys and the usage predicate for authenticated encryption. Verifying that each function respects the labels and usage predicates is relatively straightforward; most of the difficulty of using DH has already been abstracted away (in a provably sound way) once and for all at the labeling layer.

DH Ratchet: Key Updates. The *root key* K_0 generated by X3DH is only the first in a tree of keys derived over the lifetime of a Signal session.

The DH ratchet (depicted in Figure 1) is executed whenever one of the parties receives a new ephemeral DH key y from its peer. The receiver generates a fresh DH key x , computes g^{xy} and mixes it with the old root key to obtain a new root key. This protocol can be executed indefinitely, resulting in a sequence of root keys K_0, K_1, K_2, \dots , where each root key K_n is deleted as soon as its successor K_{n+1} has been generated. The goal of this update mechanism is to protect long-running messaging sessions against state compromise. We expect to provide secrecy guarantees for a root key K_{n+1} even when other root keys are compromised.

Signal also includes a second ratcheting mechanism called the KDF ratchet for deriving messaging keys from root keys. We do not detail this mechanism further in this paper, although it is implemented in our Signal model. We only observe that from each root key K_n , the protocol derives an AEAD key that is used to authenticate the next ephemeral key (x_{n+1}). In other words, the root key K_n is used to authenticate the key material K_{n+1} .

Post Compromise Security for DH Ratchet. Our implementation of X3DH establishes an initial root key K_0 and

stores it in an initiator session sid_i and responder session sid_r and sets both sessions to version 0. The code for DH Ratchet reuses these sessions; at each ratcheting step it computes and stores a new ephemeral key and root key, and increments the session version by 1.

The secrecy goal for root keys is defined as a recursive trace invariant that relates the secrecy of K_{n+1} to that of K_n . Suppose a principal p has a Signal session (sid_p at version v) with a peer session ($sid_{p'}$ at version v') at p' , and suppose this session stores a root key K_{n+1} at time t . Then, the secrecy goal states that there must have been a prior time $t' < t$ when sid_p stored the previous root key K_n , and K_{n+1} remains secret unless either K_n was made public before t , or the current versions v and v' of sid_p and $sid_{p'}$ are compromised.

In other words, if an active attacker compromises K_n before we compute K_{n+1} , we get no guarantees for K_{n+1} . Otherwise, we get a strong versioned secrecy guarantee for K_{n+1} : compromising K_n later, or compromising any other session at p or p' , or even compromising earlier or later versions of sid_p or $sid_{p'}$ cannot affect the secrecy of K_{n+1} . This secrecy invariant is our formulation of both the forward secrecy and post compromise security guarantees provided by the DH ratchet protocol.

The proof of the root key secrecy for the DH Ratchet protocol is similar to the proof of X3DH. By relying on AEAD encryption, we prove that if K_n was not compromised before t , then the new remote DH key y_n must have a label $\text{Can_Read [V p' sid_{p'} v']}$. We can then prove that K_{n+1} is at least as secret as the label $\text{Join (Can_Read [V p sid_p v]) (Can_Read [V p' sid_{p'} v])}$. Finally, by applying the labeled secrecy lemma, we obtain the secrecy invariant for K_{n+1} .

We note that our proof establishes an invariant for any n and does not depend on the number of ratcheting rounds, although the first round is a special case and has to be handled differently. We are therefore able to prove the security of DH Ratchet for any number of rounds. In contrast, even verifying the security of three DH ratcheting steps starts hitting the limits of automated symbolic tools like ProVerif [38].

Our full implementation of Signal composes X3DH with both ratcheting protocols and has many other details not detailed in this section, including detailed message formats and an application API. Using the proof techniques discussed here, we modularly verify the code for X3DH and DH Ratchet and use their security guarantees to prove authenticity and secrecy goals for the stream of messages exchanged in a Signal conversation.

5. Evaluation

The effectiveness of a mechanized protocol analysis framework like DY^* can be measured along several axes: *expressiveness* (i.e. what protocols and security properties it can verify), *testability* (i.e. are the models correct), *verification time* (i.e. how long does the tool take to verify a protocol), and *human effort* (i.e. how much of the proof is automated). Figure 8 summarizes the verification results for the protocols considered in this paper. In this section, we discuss these results and compare them with prior work using dependent type systems like RCS, and with symbolic provers like ProVerif and Tamarin.

	Modules	FLoC	PLoC	Verif. Time	Primitives
Generic DY^*	9	1,536	1,344	≈ 3.2 min	-
NS-PK	4	439	-	(insecure)	PKE
NSL	5	340	188	≈ 0.5 min	PKE
ISO-DH	5	424	165	≈ 0.9 min	DH, Sig
ISO-KEM	4	426	100	≈ 0.7 min	PKE, Sig
Signal	8	836	719	≈ 1.5 min	DH, Sig, KDF, AEAD, MAC

Figure 8. **Verification results for our library and case studies.** We show the number of modules, functional lines of code (FLoC), proof-related and security property specification lines of code (PLoC), verification time using the F^* type checker, and the cryptographic primitives used in each case study. Note that for counting lines, we use a rough heuristic to automatically classify each line as functional code or proof-related/property code. The line count for functional code includes code to execute the protocol, e.g., the line count for NS-PK includes code for executing Lowe’s attack. ISO-DH is a classic authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol. ISO-KEM is a variant of ISO-DH that uses KEM instead of DH. Signal includes both X3DH and Double Ratchet sub-protocols. The verification times are measured on an off-the-shelf laptop (ThinkPad T470s, Intel Core i5-7300U, 24 GB RAM)

In terms of expressiveness, protocols like NSL and ISO-KEM can be analyzed by all prior frameworks, including symbolic provers and dependent type systems. Diffie-Hellman protocols like ISO-DH and Signal were, until this work, out of scope for RCF-like type systems since they do not support equational theories and cannot express the kinds of fine-grained compromise and forward/post-compromise secrecy guarantees we require in these protocols. Unbounded (looping) protocols like Signal, and protocols with mutable recursive data structures (e.g., ART [23]), are also out of scope for symbolic provers, without introducing artificial restrictions. For example, the only prior mechanized symbolic analysis of Signal was in ProVerif, and it had to be limited to two messages [38]. In contrast, we use the expressiveness of F^* along with the mechanized trace-based semantics of DY^* to model and verify Signal in full generality.

In terms of testability, all our models are executable, and so are prior models using dependent type systems, whereas models for symbolic provers are not.

In terms of verification time, proofs using dependent types, including ours, are modular and so verification time grows roughly linearly with protocol size. This is in contrast with symbolic provers, where the verification time can grow exponentially with the number of messages considered in protocols like Signal. For example, in the ProVerif proof of Signal, going from one message to two messages increases verification time from 1 hour to 29 hours.

In terms of human effort, DY^* requires more manual proof annotations than symbolic provers, but we use the modular structure of DY^* to factor out common proof patterns into reusable libraries that only need to be verified once and for all. The generic DY^* library is written in about 2,880 lines of F^* (including 1,344 lines of proof-related code). Implementing small examples like NSL and ISO-DH requires about 400 lines of F^* code, distributed in 5 modules, of which the protocol logic takes about 100 lines and the rest of the code implements message formats, session state, and debugging code. Verifying the security of these small protocols requires about 150 lines of proof, which amounts to a similar proof burden as prior symbolic analyses using dependent type systems (see, e.g., [14]).

Our largest case study is Signal, which is itself broken

up into modules implementing X3DH and Double Ratchet and shared modules for state management and messaging code, totalling 836 lines of code. Verifying this code requires 719 lines of proof annotations, most of which are for establishing the recursive trace invariants for the DH Ratchet. The proof overhead for Signal is higher than NSL, but this is primarily due to the complexity of the desired security properties, not due to the size of the protocol.

6. Related Work

We refer the reader to [3, 19] for comprehensive surveys of cryptographic protocol verification approaches. Here, we briefly discuss work closely related to DY^* .

Automated Symbolic Provers. A long line of research on symbolic protocol verification has yielded tools like ProVerif [20] and Tamarin [47] that can automatically verify protocols like NSL in a few seconds. These tools offer more automation than DY^* , but as discussed in Section 1, they offer limited support for modular analysis, looping protocols like Signal, recursive data structures, and executable models. Conversely, these tools can verify strong equivalence-based properties like indistinguishability, whereas DY^* currently only supports trace properties.

Dependent Types for Symbolic Analysis. Our work follows in the tradition of using dependent type systems like RCF to symbolically verify cryptographic protocol implementations [2, 4, 8, 14, 16, 17, 36, 57]. In comparison to these prior works, DY^* offers several improvements: fewer manual proofs, support for Diffie-Hellman protocols and mutable protocol state, and the ability to state and verify sophisticated trace properties like forward secrecy and post-compromise security.

Computational Provers. This paper focuses on symbolic verification, but several tools, such as EasyCrypt [5] and CryptVerif [18], have been developed for building game-based computational proofs for cryptographic constructions and protocols. There are also frameworks for cryptographically analyzing protocol implementations, like the CVJ framework [43]. In general, computational approaches offer stronger guarantees than symbolic frameworks like DY^* by relying on more realistic cryptographic assumptions. However, computational proofs require more manual effort and are not as automated as symbolic provers.

Dependent Types for Computational Analysis. Dependent type systems like F7 and F^* can also be used to help build computational proofs. Fournet et al. [36] show how to compose type-based protocol verification with manual cryptographic proofs to obtain computational security theorems. This methodology was used to verify a reference implementation of TLS 1.2 (called miTLS) using F7 [16, 17], and the record layer of TLS 1.3 using F^* [30]. However, the manual effort needed for protocol-specific cryptographic modeling and proofs can be significant, easily dominating the verification cost. For example, verifying the 3,600 line miTLS implementation requires 2,050 lines of type annotations for F7, as well as a large cryptographic proof that includes both manual arguments and a 3,000 line EasyCrypt proof [17]. This level of verification effort is probably only justified for multi-year case studies of important protocols like TLS.

7. Conclusion

We presented DY^* , the first framework for symbolic protocol verification that combines the benefits of previous type-based approaches for reasoning using dependent types in a functional programming language with the kind of low-level trace-based guarantees one gets from automated provers, like ProVerif and Tamarin. DY^* supports modular analysis of large composite protocols, inductive reasoning for unbounded protocols, and accounts for low-level implementation details, which is outside of the scope of automated tools like Tamarin and ProVerif.

At the same time, DY^* explicitly incorporates and models low-level global traces. This allows us to naturally state and prove trace-based properties, and to account for advanced features like mutable state, dynamic compromise, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security, which was not possible with previous type based approaches. Also, unlike these prior approaches, DY^* does not rely on manual proofs, neither for proving protocols secure nor for proving the soundness of security abstractions.

Due to our treatment of equational theories, DY^* is also the first symbolic verification framework based on dependent types that can state and reason about Diffie-Hellman protocols and their intricate properties, as illustrated by our ISO-DH and Signal case studies. By virtue of the inductive reasoning supported by F^* , we are also the first to provide a mechanized symbolic security proof of Signal for an unbounded number of protocol rounds. Furthermore, our analysis is based on an interoperable implementation of Signal. We believe that these kinds of verification results would not have been achievable with previous approaches.

The protocol code written for DY^* closely resembles real-world protocol implementations. We are working on building a concrete low-level library, based on the $HACL^*$ verified crypto library [59], that can be used as a drop-in replacement for our symbolic runtime model to obtain interoperable protocol code. We plan to use this strategy to build verified reference implementations of sophisticated protocols like TLS 1.3 in future work.

DY^* still has many limitations. Proofs in DY^* are in a symbolic model, and hence are less precise than analyses based on computational cryptographic assumptions. We do not consider attacks outside our model, like timing side-channels. Finally, we only verify trace-based properties, and do not support equivalence-based security goals for confidentiality and privacy. We plan to improve on all these limitations in future work and apply DY^* to the verification of more sophisticated protocols and their implementations.

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


Figure 9. Lowe’s attack on the NS-PK protocol.

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Appendix A.

Lowe’s Attack on the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol

Figure 9 illustrates Lowe’s man-in-the-middle attack on the NS-PK protocol [45]. The attack relies on mixing two sessions: (1) an honest initiator I (intentionally) connects to the attacker M (as responder), and (2) the attacker M pretending to be I (as initiator) talking to a responder R .

Lowe’s attack works because the second message (Msg2) of NS-PK (Figure 3) does not indicate the name of the responder, which allows a malicious R to forward a Msg2 it received from some honest R' . A natural fix is to add R ’s identity to the second message, and for I to check this identity before sending Msg3.

Appendix B.

Dolev-Yao Attacker Model

We model a network attacker who can read all Message events from the global trace and read any session state that has been Corrupt. The attacker can also generate his own random values, call any function in the crypto API to construct and destruct bytestrings, and inject (unauthenticated) messages from any sender to any receiver. Hence, the attacker’s knowledge and capability monotonically grows as the global trace is extended, as it learns more messages, compromises more states, and generates more random bytes.

Modeling Attacker Knowledge. To model the attacker’s knowledge at a certain trace index i , we define a recursive predicate `attacker_can_derive` that specifies all the ways in which a attacker can derive a bytestring b by applying

```

let rec attacker_can_derive (steps:nat) (i:nat) (b:bytes) =
  if steps = 0 then
    (* Attacker knows all literals b *)
    (∃ (!:literal). b == literal_to_bytes l) ∨
    (* Attacker can read all messages b sent on the network *)
    (∃ x y j. j < i ∧ entry_at j (Message x y b)) ∨
    (* Attacker can read corrupted session states b *)
    (∃ j p vv st k sid. j < i ∧ k < i ∧ sid < len vv ∧
      b == st.[sid] ∧ entry_at j (SetState p vv st) ∧
      entry_at k (Corrupt p sid vv.[sid]))
  else (* Attacker can derive b in fewer steps *)
    (attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by concatenating bytes *)
    (∃ (b1 b2:bytes). b == concat b1 b2 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by splitting concatenated bytes *)
    (∃ (b1 b2 b3:bytes). split b1 == Success (b2,b3) ∧
      (b == b2 ∨ b == b3) ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by AEAD encryption (with AD) *)
    (∃ (b1 b2 b3:bytes).
      b == aead_enc b1 b2 b3 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b3) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by AEAD decryption *)
    (∃ (b1 b2 b3:bytes).
      Success b == aead_dec b1 b2 b3 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b3) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by MACing *)
    (∃ (b1 b2:bytes). b == mac b1 b2 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by hashing *)
    (∃ b1. b == hash b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1) ∨
    (* Attacker can get public key b from private key *)
    (∃ (priv:bytes).
      (b == pk priv ∨ b == vk priv ∨ b == dh_pub priv) ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i priv) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by public key encryption *)
    (∃ (b1 b2:bytes). b == pke_enc b1 b2 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by public key decryption *)
    (∃ (b1 b2:bytes). pke_dec b1 b2 == Success b ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by signing *)
    (∃ (b1 b2:bytes). b == sign b1 b2 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2) ∨
    (* Attacker can get b by a Diffie-Hellman computation *)
    (∃ (b1 b2:bytes). b == dh b1 b2 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b1 ∧
      attacker_can_derive (steps - 1) i b2)

```

Figure 10. Derivation rules for the Dolev-Yao Attacker

a certain number of derivation steps, where each derivation step corresponds to calling some crypto function using bytestrings that the attacker has already derived (Figure 10).

The predicate `attacker_knows_at` says that an attacker knows a bytestring `b` at trace index `i` if it can derive `b` at `i` in some (finite, but unbounded) number of derivation steps:

```

let attacker_knows_at (i:nat) (b:bytes) =
  ∃(steps:nat). attacker_can_derive steps i b
type pub_bytes (i:nat) = b:bytes{attacker_knows_at i b}

```

Hence, the `attacker_knows_at` predicate provides a *logical* characterization of an attacker’s *passive* capabilities. The type abbreviation `pub_bytes i` represents bytestrings that are known to the attacker at index `i`. Of course, these values are also known by the attacker at all subsequent indexes `j > i`.

We then define an API for the attacker that represents its *active* capabilities. This API includes all the functions in the low-level crypto API, except that all inputs and outputs are restricted to public bytestrings, and all the stateful functions of the low-level API (`gen`, `send`, etc.) except that these functions can only be called on behalf of compromised principals. In particular, the attacker can call `gen` to generate fresh public values, `send` to inject public messages, `receive_i` to read any sent message, `compromise` for any version of any principal’s session state, and `query_state_i` to read a compromised state.

For example, the `query_state_i` function can be called at trace index `i`, to read a specific version of a session that was stored by a principal `p` at trace index `j < i`, as long as this session state was compromised by the attacker at some index `k < i`:

```

val query_state_i: i:nat → j:nat → k:nat →
  p:principal → session:nat → version:nat →
  DY (pub_bytes i)
  (requires (λ t0 → j < i ∧ k < i ∧ i = len t0 ∧
    entry_at k (Corrupt p session version)))
  (ensures (λ t0 r t1 → match r with
    | Error _ → t0 == t1
    | Success b → t0 == t1 ∧
      (∃ vv st. entry_at j (SetState p vv st) ∧
        session < len vv ∧ len vv = len st ∧
        version = vv.[session] ∧ b == st.[session])))

```

The function returns `pub_bytes i` indicating that the value must be logically derivable by the attacker at index `i`. Indeed, for each function in the attacker API, we prove (by typechecking in F^*) that its symbolic implementation does not give the attacker any bytestring that it would not be able to derive using just the rules in the `attacker_knows_at` predicate.

We typecheck our implementation of the full attacker API against the low-level crypto and trace APIs, to obtain a soundness guarantee that is sometimes called *attacker typability*: it shows that the attacker has enough passive and active capabilities to construct and destruct all public bytestrings and to perform all the protocol actions (on behalf of a compromised principal) that an honest participant would be able to enact.

Appendix C. Labeled Security API

To enable security proofs for crypto protocol code, we define a higher-level API that constrains and tracks the flow of secret and authenticated data as it passes through session storage, cryptographic operations, and the untrusted network. In particular, we use *secrecy labels* to annotate and track the secrecy of bytestrings, *usage predicates* to constrain the use of cryptographic keys, and *trace invariants* for security properties.

The labeled security API can be seen as a coding discipline for well-behaved protocol code. Of course, protocols (and attackers) are free to directly use the low-level crypto and trace APIs, but by obeying the constraints imposed by

the labeled API, the protocol can obtain strong trace-based secrecy and authentication guarantees with succinct proofs.

Secrecy Labels and Data Flow. The type label represents a secrecy annotation that can be applied to a bytestring:

```
type timestamp = nat
type principal = string
type st_id =
| P: principal → st_id
| S: principal → session:nat → st_id
| V: principal → session:nat → version:nat → st_id
type label =
| Public: label
| Can_Read: list st_id → label
| Meet: label → label → label
| Join: label → label → label
val can_flow: timestamp → label → label → pred
```

The label `Public` applies to bytestrings that are meant to be public, whereas `Can_Read [id1;id2;id3;...]` is used to label bytestrings that are secrets shared by a list of principals, denoted by session state identifiers or `st_ids` (`id1;id2;id3;...`). An `st_id` may specify a principal (`P p`), and optionally a specific session of the principal (`S p s`), and optionally a specific version of that session (`V p s v`). For example in our protocols, we use the label `Can_Read [P "alice"]` for long term keys belonging to `alice`. They can be stored in any session belonging to `alice` and never have to be deleted. Conversely, we use the label `Can_Read [V "alice"s v]` for an ephemeral key that can only be stored in version `v` of session `s` of `alice`; once the session `s` is deleted or its version grows beyond `v+1`, the secret can no longer be stored and must be discarded.

The functions `meet` and `join` represent the intersection and union of labels. The predicate `can_flow` specifies under what conditions a bytestring with label `l1` can flow into a function that expects a bytestring with label `l2` at timestamp `i`. Informally, data is allowed to flow from less-secret labels to more-secret labels. We formally define `can_flow` as a recursive predicate, and prove that it is reflexive, transitive, and obeys several important rules:

- `Public` can flow to any label `l`;
- `Can_Read [s1;s2;s3;...]` can flow to `Public` if one of the sessions identified by `s1;s2;s3;...` is compromised;
- `Can_Read sl1` can flow to `Can_Read sl2` if the `st_ids` in `sl2` are a subset of those in `sl1`;
- `Join l1 l2` can flow to `l1` and to `l2`;
- `l1` and `l2` can both flow to `Meet l1 l2`.

Hence, the `can_flow` predicate can be seen as a way of tracking explicit information flow using label annotations.

Constraining Cryptographic Usage. The type `usage` is used as an annotation to describe how a bytestring should be used by well-behaved protocol code:

```
type usage = | Nonce : string → usage | Guid : string → usage
| PKE_Key : string → usage | AEAD_Key : string → usage
| SIG_Key : string → usage | MAC_Key : string → usage
| KDF_Key : string → usage | DH_Key : string → usage
```

For example, a bytestring may be used as a secret `Nonce`, as a globally unique identifier (`Guid`), as a key or nonce for public key encryption (`PKE_Key`) or AEAD encryption (`AEAD_Key`) or signatures (`SIG_Key`), as a key for MACing (`MAC_Key`), or as a key used for key derivation (`KDF_Key`), or as a Diffie-Hellman (`DH`) private key (`DH_Key`) that can in turn be used to compute a `DH` secret. The string

parameter to the `usage` is used to distinguish usages of keys, and to derive the usage of shared secrets like a `DH` secret. All bytestrings, by default, can be used as payloads.

Labeling Rules for Bytestrings. We define two predicates, `has_label` and `has_usage`, that assign a unique label and an optional unique usage to each bytestring.

```
val has_label: i:nat → b:bytes → l:label → pred
val has_usage: i:nat → b:bytes → u:usage → pred
```

For example, any bytestring that is obtained from a literal using `literal_to_bytes` is given the label `Public` and has no specific usage (can be used only as payloads), while a fresh random value generated by calling `gen l u` is given the label `l` and usage `u`. Not all bytestrings are well-labeled; for example, it is forbidden to use a bytestring with a `SIG_Key` usage as an `AEAD_Key`.

```
type lbytes (i:nat) (l:label) = b:bytes{has_label i b l}
let lbytes_can_flow_to (i:nat) (b:bytes) (l:label) =
  ∃ l'. has_label i b l' ∧ can_flow i l' l
type msg (i:nat) (l:label) = b:bytes{lbytes_can_flow_to i b l}
let is_publishable (i:nat) (b:bytes) = lbytes_can_flow_to i b Public
type secret (i:nat) (l:label) (u:usage) =
  b:bytes{has_label i b l ∧ has_usage i b u}
```

We define refinement type abbreviations for different classes of bytestrings: the type `lbytes i l` refers to bytestrings which have label `l` at timestamp `i`. The type `msg i l` refers to a bytestring whose label can flow to the label `l` at timestamp `i`. Intuitively, a value of type `msg i l` can be safely used in any function that expects a bytestring with label `l`. The predicate `is_publishable` holds for bytestrings whose labels can flow to `Public`; intuitively these values can be safely revealed to the attacker.

We also define abbreviations corresponding to all the usages that bytestrings may have in our library. For example, types for public key encryption and decryption keys are defined as:

```
type private_dec_key (i:nat) (l:label) (s:string) =
  b:bytes{has_label i b l ∧ has_usage i b (PKE_Key s)}
type public_enc_key (i:nat) (l:label) (s:string) =
  b:bytes{∃ (sk:private_dec_key i l s). b == pk sk}
```

The type `public_enc_key i l s` refers to bytestrings that are obtained by applying the `pk` function to a value of type `private_dec_key i l s`, i.e. private decryption keys with label `l` and a string `s` identifying the usage at timestamp `i`.

Labeled Crypto API. We provide labeled versions of all the functions in the low-level crypto API; each function now has additional pre-conditions constraining the labels and usages of the inputs, but also provides more guarantees in its post-condition. Furthermore, for each function in the API, we provide lemmas guaranteeing that the bytestrings returned by the labeled versions are identical to those returned by the corresponding functions in the low-level crypto API.

We begin with `literal_to_bytes`, `concat`, and `split` functions:

```
val literal_to_bytes: #i:nat → literal → msg i Public
val bytes_to_literal: #i:nat → msg i Public → result literal
val concat: #i:nat → #l:label → msg i l → msg i l → msg i l
val split: #i:nat → #l:label → msg i l → result (msg i l * msg i l)
```

The result of `literal_to_bytes` is always a `Public` payload: it can be freely used in the construction of any bytestring but cannot be used as a key or a nonce. The function `concat`

takes two bytestrings that can both flow to a label l and returns a bytestring that also flows to l . The function `split` is the dual of `concat`; it splits a `msg` with label l into two.

The labeling rules for public key encryption are as follows:

```
val pk: #i:nat → #l:label → #s:string →
  private_dec_key i l s → public_enc_key i l s
val pke_pred: #i:nat → #l:label → msg i l → pred
val pke_enc: #i:nat → #l:label → #s:string →
  public_enc_key i l s →
  m:msg i l {pke_pred m} → msg i Public
val pke_dec: #i:nat → #l:label → #s:string →
  private_dec_key i l s → msg i Public →
  result (m:msg i l {is_publishable i m ∨ pke_pred m})
```

The function `pk` transforms a `private_dec_key` with label l and a string `s` identifying the type of `PKE_Key` usage at timestamp i to the corresponding `public_enc_key`.

The encryption function `pke_enc` enforces two constraints. First, it requires that the input message `m` at timestamp i must flow to the label l of the private decryption key. This means that we cannot encrypt a more-secret message with a public encryption key whose private key is less-secret; a labeling constraint that is necessary to guarantee message secrecy. Second, it requires that the input message `m` must satisfy a usage predicate `pke_pred i l msg`. This usage predicate is protocol-specific; each protocol defines this predicate to specify the kinds of messages it is willing to encrypt with a key of type `public_enc_key i l s`. If these two conditions are satisfied, `pke_enc` returns a `Public` message that can safely be revealed on a public network.

Conversely, the decryption function `pke_dec` takes a private decryption key with label l at timestamp i , a public ciphertext, and returns a decrypted message of type `msg i l` with the additional guarantee that this message is either publishable (it may have come from the attacker) or it must satisfy `pke_pred` (i.e., it must have been produced using `pke_enc`).

The types for the rest of the cryptographic API are similar; in each construction, the message must satisfy some protocol-specific usage predicate, and for encryption functions, messages must flow to the labels of the decryption keys.

```
(* Labeled AEAD Encryption API *)
val aead_pred: #i:nat → #l:label → m:msg i l →
  ad:option (msg i Public) → pred
val aead_enc: #i:nat → #l:label → #s:string → aead_key i l s →
  m:msg i l → ad:option (msg i Public) {aead_pred m ad} →
  msg i Public
val aead_dec: #i:nat → #l:label → #s:string → aead_key i l s →
  msg i Public → ad:option (msg i Public) →
  result (m:msg i l {can_flow i l Public ∨ aead_pred m ad})

(* Labeled Signature API *)
val vk: #i:nat → #l:label → #s:string → sign_key i l s →
  verify_key i l s
val sign_pred: #i:nat → #ml:label → kl:label → msg i ml → pred
val sign: #i:nat → #kl:label → #ml:label → #s:string →
  sign_key i kl s → m:msg i ml {sign_pred kl m} →
  msg i ml
val verify: #i:nat → #kl:label → #ml:label → #s:string →
  verify_key i kl s → m:msg i ml → sig:msg i ml →
  b:bool {b ⇒ (can_flow i kl Public ∨ sign_pred kl m)}

(* Labeled Hash Function API *)
val hash: #i:nat → #l:label → m:msg i l → msg i l

(* Labeled MAC API *)
val mac_pred: #i:nat → #ml:label → kl:label → msg i ml → pred
val mac: #i:nat → #kl:label → #ml:label → #s:string →
  mac_key i kl s → m:msg i ml {mac_pred kl m} →
  msg i ml
```

Notably, while AEAD encryption produces a `msg Public` like public key encryption, the other functions in the API do not provide confidentiality. Functions like `mac`, `hash`, and `sign` preserve the label of the message input in the returned output. Finally, the labeled types for `dh` is as follows:

```
val dh_secret_usage: string → usage
val dh_pub: #i:nat → #l:label → #s:string → dh_priv_key i l s →
  dh_pub_key i l s
val dh: #i:nat → #l1:label → #l2:label → #s:string →
  dh_priv_key i l1 s → dh_pub_key i l2 s →
  b:lbytes i (Join l1 l2) {has_usage i b (dh_secret_usage s)}
```

The function `dh_pub` is similar to `pk`; it converts a private key to the corresponding public key. The function `dh` takes a DH private key with label $l1$ and a public key with label $l2$ and returns a bytestring with label `Join l1 l2`. Intuitively, if the private key belongs to one principal and the public key to another, then the shared secret is known to both. We also require that both DH keys must have the same usage `DH_Key s`, where `s` is the string identifying the usage of the shared secret given by the function `dh_secret_usage`.

Labeled Trace API and Valid Traces. If all honest principals use the labeled API, we can guarantee that all reachable global traces obey a strong security invariant called `valid_trace`:

```
let valid_trace (t:trace) = ∀ j e. j < len t ∧ entry_at j e ⇒
  (match e with
  | Message s r b → is_publishable j b
  | SetState p versions sessions →
    compromised_before j p ∨
    (state_inv j p versions sessions ∧
     (∀ s. s < len sessions ⇒ lbytes_can_flow_to j sessions.[s]
      (Can_Read [V p s versions.[s]])))
  | Event p (e, pl) →
    compromised_before j p ∨ event_pred j p e pl
  | _ → T)
```

The predicate `valid_trace` guarantees four properties:

- any message `b` that is sent on the network at timestamp i must be publishable (`is_publishable i b`);
- any message `b` that is sent over an authenticated channel from `s` to `r` at index i must satisfy the protocol-specific usage predicate `auth_message_pred i s r b`;
- any state `sessions` with version vector `versions` that is stored by principal `p` at index i must satisfy the protocol-specific state invariant `state_inv i p versions sessions`; furthermore, for each session `s`, the session state `sessions.[s]` stored at i must flow to the label `Can_Read [V p s versions.[s]]`;
- any event `e` with parameters `pl` logged by principal `p` at index i must satisfy the protocol-specific event usage predicate `event_pred i p e pl`.

In other words, unless the issuing principal is compromised, all events and authenticated messages must satisfy usage predicates that are defined by each protocol. Similarly, the state stored by each principal should satisfy a protocol-specific state invariant. In addition, the labeling conditions on network messages and stored state safely limits the flow of secrets to the public network and compromisable storage device.

The `valid_trace` predicate trivially holds at index 0 (for empty traces) and we define a labeled version of the stateful API that guarantees that this invariant is preserved by all stateful functions. For example, the labeled version of `gen` is as follows:

```

val gen: l:label → u:usage →
  DY (i:nat & secret i | u)
  (requires (λ t0 → valid_trace t0))
  (ensures (λ t0 r t1 → valid_trace t1 ∧
    (match r with
    | Error _ → t0 == t1
    | Success (li, vl) → len t1 = len t0 + 1 ∧
      entry_at (len t0) (RandGen v l u))))

```

The type of this function says that it has the DY effect, a special case of the F^* State monad that only considers a single mutable variable (the global trace). Its pre-condition says that when it is called, the initial trace t_0 should be valid. Its post-condition says that the final trace t_1 is valid, and if the function succeeds, then the trace has been appended with one entry of the form $\text{RandGen } v \mid u$. The return type $\text{secret } i \mid u$ says that the value returns a secret with the desired label and usage.

Secrecy and Authentication Guarantees. We verify the full labeled API, hence proving that it is sound with respect to the low-level APIs. Protocol code that is typechecked against the labeled API obtains some security lemmas for free. In particular, we prove, once and for all, that every labeled bytestring is secret as long as the principals in the label remain uncompromised. This guarantee is exposed through a stateful function called `secrecy_lemma`:

```

val secrecy_lemma: b:bytes → readers:list st_id → DY unit
  (requires (λ t0 → valid_trace t0 ∧
    has_label (len t0) b (Can_Read readers)))
  (ensures (λ t0 _t1 → t0 == _t1 ∧
    (attacker_knows_at (len t0) b ⇒
      contains_compromised_st_id readers)))

```

This function can be read as a challenge to the attacker: we ask the attacker to produce a bytestring b that was labeled with `Can_Read` readers and we prove that if the attacker can derive this bytestring in the current trace, then one of the sessions in readers must have been compromised in the past. In other words, the attacker cannot obtain a secret without explicitly compromising one of its intended readers.

In addition to this secrecy guarantee, our systematic treatment of usage predicates can be used to prove strong authentication guarantees. For example, signature verification and AEAD decryption provide post-conditions in terms of the usage predicates `sig_pred` and `aead_pred`, and we use these post-conditions to establish authentication invariants in protocol code. Furthermore, we use `event_pred` to encode protocol authentication goals as correspondence assertions between events logged by different protocol events.

Appendix D. Signed Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

In this section, we describe the verification of the signed Diffie-Hellman (ISO-DH) protocol depicted in Figure 11. Like in NSL, the initiator and responder exchange three messages and seek to authenticate each other and establish a session key. The code implementing these protocols has a similar structure to that of NSL, with one function for each step of the protocol at the initiator and




Figure 11. **Signed Diffie-Hellman Protocol (ISO-DH).** This protocol uses signatures for authentication and is sometimes called the ISO protocol [39]. We use message tags to avoid reflection and type confusion attacks.

responder. Here, we will focus only on the formal security analysis, leaving the reader to peruse the F^* code for the implementation details.

Authentication using Signatures. The authentication goals are defined in terms of protocol events and require that both parties must agree on all session parameters. For example, if a principal i completes the session with parameters (i, r, g_x, g_y, k) , then either the responder r is compromised, or it must have a session with matching parameters. The authentication guarantee provided by ISO-DH is stronger than NSL: each principal only relies on the honesty of the peer’s signature key, which means that, unlike NSL, ISO-DH is not vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI).

To prove our authentication goals, we rely on the guarantees provided by the labeled API for signatures. The signing key of each principal sk_p is given the label `Can_Read [P p]`, indicating that it is a session independent (long-term) secret known only to p . We then define the usage predicate `sign_pred` to prescribe the use of signatures in ISO-DH: only messages matching the formats of `MSG2` and `MSG3` can be signed, and their contents must correspond to the session parameters at the sender. We prove that this predicate holds at all calls to `sign`, and then use the post-condition of `verify` to prove the authentication trace invariant at both parties.

Forward Secrecy vs. Signature Key Compromise. Each ISO-DH protocol run results in two local sessions, s_i at i and s_r at r . The DH private key x is labeled as `Can_Read [S i s_i]`, indicating that it is bound to a specific session at i . Similarly, y is labeled as `Can_Read [S r s_r]`. The label of the shared secret is the `Join` of the two labels, indicating that an attacker can only learn it by compromising one of the two sessions (s_i or s_r).

Using these labels, we can establish a trace invariant that states a precise forward secrecy guarantee for ISO-DH: a session key k that was stored in a session s_i (or s_r) at some trace index idx , cannot be obtained by an adversary at some later trace index $idx' > idx$, unless the adversary has compromised one of the two sessions before idx' , or it has compromised the peer’s long-term signature key before idx . In particular, compromising long-term keys after idx , when the session is complete, does not affect session key secrecy.