Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
New interface
Conference papers

Cyber Security Modeling of Non-Critical Nuclear Power Plant Digital Instrumentation

Abstract : This chapter examines potential attack vectors that exist in a nuclear power plant and correlates the likelihood of an attack from each vector. The focus is on the boron monitoring system, which directly affects the reactivity in the core; cyber attacks on this system can lead to increased core wear, unsafe reactivity levels and poor power performance. A mockup model is developed using open-source software and hardware, which is tested to evaluate the potential of cyber attacks. A man-in-the-middle attack is implemented to demonstrate a cyber attack and its potential effects. Additionally, a redundancy-based cyber attack mitigation method is implemented using a hardware device that compares the input/output values of multiple programmable logic controllers. The approach for modeling general attack and defense steps is applicable to industrial control systems in the energy sector.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03364576
Contributor : Hal Ifip Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, October 4, 2021 - 5:50:04 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, November 3, 2021 - 7:05:58 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, January 5, 2022 - 7:08:14 PM

File

491841_1_En_5_Chapter.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Identifiers

Citation

Trevor Maclean, Robert Borrelli, Michael Haney. Cyber Security Modeling of Non-Critical Nuclear Power Plant Digital Instrumentation. 13th International Conference on Critical Infrastructure Protection (ICCIP), Mar 2019, Arlington, VA, United States. pp.87-100, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-34647-8_5⟩. ⟨hal-03364576⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

60

Files downloads

14