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A privacy attack on the Swiss Post e-voting system

Véronique Cortier 1 Alexandre Debant 1 Pierrick Gaudry 2 
1 PESTO - Proof techniques for security protocols
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
2 CARAMBA - Cryptology, arithmetic : algebraic methods for better algorithms
Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - ALGO - Department of Algorithms, Computation, Image and Geometry
Abstract : The SwissPost e-voting system is currently proposed under the scrutiny of the community, before being deployed in 2022 for political elections in several Swiss Cantons. We explain how real world constraints led to shortcomings that allowed a privacy attack to be mounted. More precisely, dishonest authorities can learn the vote of several voters of their choice, without being detected, even when the requested threshold of honest authorities act as prescribed.
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https://hal.inria.fr/hal-03446801
Contributor : Alexandre Debant Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, November 24, 2021 - 2:44:53 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 4, 2022 - 3:25:43 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, February 25, 2022 - 7:20:48 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-03446801, version 1

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Véronique Cortier, Alexandre Debant, Pierrick Gaudry. A privacy attack on the Swiss Post e-voting system. [Research Report] Université de Lorraine, CNRS, Inria, LORIA. 2021. ⟨hal-03446801⟩

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