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Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-complete

Michaël Rusinowitch 1 Mathieu Turuani 1 
1 PROTHEO - Constraints, automatic deduction and software properties proofs
INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete in a Dolev-Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of polynomial size, provided that they are represented as dags.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, May 24, 2006 - 10:07:28 AM
Last modification on : Friday, February 4, 2022 - 3:33:14 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Sunday, April 4, 2010 - 11:10:20 PM


  • HAL Id : inria-00072492, version 1



Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is NP-complete. [Research Report] RR-4134, INRIA. 2001, pp.18. ⟨inria-00072492⟩



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