Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification - Extended Version -

Thomas Genet 1 Francis Klay 2
1 Lande - Logiciel : ANalyse et DEveloppement
IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique
Abstract : On a case study, we present a new approach for verifying cryptographic protocols, based on rewriting and on tree automata techniques. Protocols are operationally described using Term Rewriting Systems and the initial set of communication requests is described by a tree automaton. Starting from these two representations, we automatically compute an over-approximation of the set of exchanged messages (also recognized by a tree automaton). Then, proving classical properties like confidentiality or authentication can be done by automatically showing that the intersection between the approximation and a set of prohibited behaviors is the empty set. Furthermore, this method enjoys a simple and powerful way to describe intruder work, the ability to consider an unbounded number of parties, an unbounded number of interleaved sessions, and a theoretical property ensuring safeness of the approximation.
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00072731
Contributor : Rapport de Recherche Inria <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, May 24, 2006 - 10:43:07 AM
Last modification on : Friday, November 16, 2018 - 1:21:57 AM
Long-term archiving on : Sunday, April 4, 2010 - 11:19:59 PM

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  • HAL Id : inria-00072731, version 1

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Thomas Genet, Francis Klay. Rewriting for Cryptographic Protocol Verification - Extended Version -. [Research Report] RR-3921, INRIA. 2000. ⟨inria-00072731⟩

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