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Universal Designated Verifier Signatures Without Random Oracles or Non-Black Box Assumptions

Fabien Laguillaumie 1 Benoît Libert 2 Jean-Jacques Quisquater 2
1 TANC - Algorithmic number theory for cryptology
Inria Saclay - Ile de France, LIX - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau]
Abstract : Universal designated verifier signatures (UDVS) were introduced in 2003 by Steinfeld et al. to allow signature holders to monitor the verification of a given signature in the sense that any plain signature can be publicly turned into a signature which is only verifiable by some specific designated verifier. Privacy issues, like non-dissemination of digital certificates, are the main motivations to study such primitives. In this paper, we propose two fairly efficient UDVS schemes which are secure (in terms of unforgeability and anonymity) in the standard model (i.e. without random oracles). Their security relies on algorithmic assumptions which are much more classical than assumptions involved in the two only known UDVS schemes in standard model to date. The latter schemes, put forth by Zhang et al. in 2005 and Vergnaud in 2006, rely on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and the strange-looking knowledge of exponent assumption (KEA). Our schemes are obtained from Waters's signature and they do not need the KEA assumption. They are also the first random oracle-free constructions with the anonymity property.
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Contributor : Fabien Laguillaumie <>
Submitted on : Friday, June 16, 2006 - 1:00:40 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 5, 2020 - 6:27:46 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Monday, April 5, 2010 - 10:55:50 PM


  • HAL Id : inria-00080396, version 1



Fabien Laguillaumie, Benoît Libert, Jean-Jacques Quisquater. Universal Designated Verifier Signatures Without Random Oracles or Non-Black Box Assumptions. Fifth Conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks, Sep 2006, Maiori/Italie. ⟨inria-00080396⟩



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