HAL will be down for maintenance from Friday, June 10 at 4pm through Monday, June 13 at 9am. More information
Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions, composed keys is NP-complete.

Michaël Rusinowitch 1 Mathieu Turuani 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), Inria Nancy - Grand Est, LORIA - FM - Department of Formal Methods
Abstract : We investigate the complexity of the protocol insecurity problem for a finite number of sessions (fixed number of interleaved runs). We show that this problem is NP-complete with respect to a Dolev–Yao model of intruders. The result does not assume a limit on the size of messages and supports non-atomic symmetric encryption keys. We also prove that in order to build an attack with a fixed number of sessions the intruder needs only to forge messages of linear size, provided that they are represented as dags.
Keywords : Verification Security Protocols Rewriting Complexity
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00103985
Contributor : Mathieu Turuani Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, October 5, 2006 - 3:49:25 PM
Last modification on : Friday, January 21, 2022 - 3:08:33 AM

Links full text

openaccess

Identifiers

Collections

INRIA | CNRS | UNIV-FCOMTE | INRIA2 | UNIV-BM | FEMTO-ST | UNIV-BM-THESE | LORIA | UNIV-LORRAINE | LORIA-FM

Citation

Michaël Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions, composed keys is NP-complete.. Theoretical Computer Science, Elsevier, 2003, Theoretical Computer Science, 1-3 (299), pp.451-475. ⟨10.1016/S0304-3975(02)00490-5⟩. ⟨inria-00103985⟩

Export

BibTeX TEI DC DCterms EndNote Datacite

Share

Metrics

Record views

123

 

Contact                    Legal Notice                    Personal Data