Incentive-Based Robust Reputation Mechanism for P2P Services

Emmanuelle Anceaume 1 Aina Ravoaja 1
1 ADEPT - Algorithms for Dynamic Dependable Systems
IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, INRIA Rennes
Abstract : In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation mechanism for peer-to-peer services. The mechanism we propose achieves high robustness against malicious peers (from individual or collusive ones) and provides incentive for participation. We show that the quality of the reputation value of trustworthy and participating peers is always better than the one of cheating and non participating ones. Finally we formally prove that, even when a high fraction of peers of the system exhibits a collusive behavior, a correct peer can still compute an accurate reputation mechanism towards a server, at the expense of a reasonable convergence time.
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Rapport
[Research Report] PI 1816, 2006, pp.18
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Soumis le : jeudi 21 décembre 2006 - 12:53:25
Dernière modification le : mercredi 11 avril 2018 - 02:00:11
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  • HAL Id : inria-00121609, version 1

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Emmanuelle Anceaume, Aina Ravoaja. Incentive-Based Robust Reputation Mechanism for P2P Services. [Research Report] PI 1816, 2006, pp.18. 〈inria-00121609〉

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