Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation

Precise Dynamic Verification of Noninterference

Abstract : Confidentiality is maybe the most popular security property to be formally or informally verified. Noninterference is a baseline security policy to formalize confidentiality of secret information manipulated by a program. Many static analyses have been developed for the verification of noninterference. In contrast to those static analyses, this paper considers the run-time verification of the respect of confidentiality by a single execution of a program. It proposes a dynamic noninterference analysis for sequential programs based on a combination of dynamic and static analyses. The static analysis is used to analyze some unexecuted pieces of code in order to take into account all types of flows. The static analysis is sensitive to the current program state. This sensitivity allows the overall dynamic analysis to be more precise than previous work. The soundness of the overall dynamic noninterference analysis with regard to confidentiality breaches detection and correction is proved.
Complete list of metadata

Cited literature [18 references]  Display  Hide  Download
Contributor : Gurvan Le Guernic Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, July 18, 2008 - 3:53:13 PM
Last modification on : Friday, December 6, 2019 - 7:02:08 PM
Long-term archiving on: : Saturday, November 26, 2016 - 12:19:19 AM


Files produced by the author(s)


  • HAL Id : inria-00162609, version 3



Gurvan Le Guernic. Precise Dynamic Verification of Noninterference. [Research Report] 2008, pp.40. ⟨inria-00162609v3⟩



Record views


Files downloads