Safely Composing Security Protocols

Véronique Cortier 1 Jérémie Delaitre 1 Stéphanie Delaune 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies, INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : Security protocols are small programs that are executed in hostile environments. Many results and tools have been developed to formally analyze the security of a protocol in the presence of active attackers that may block, intercept and send new messages. However even when a protocol has been proved secure, there is absolutely no guarantee if the protocol is executed in an environment where other protocols, possibly sharing some common identities and keys like public keys or long-term symmetric keys, are executed. In this paper, we show that security of protocols can be easily composed. More precisely, we show that whenever a protocol is secure, it remains secure even in an environment where arbitrary protocols are executed, provided each encryption contains some tag identifying each protocol, like e.g. the name of the protocol.
Type de document :
Communication dans un congrès
27th Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science - FSTTCS'07, Dec 2007, New Delhi, India. 2007
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00181591
Contributeur : Véronique Cortier <>
Soumis le : mercredi 24 octobre 2007 - 10:23:03
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:20:00

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  • HAL Id : inria-00181591, version 1

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Véronique Cortier, Jérémie Delaitre, Stéphanie Delaune. Safely Composing Security Protocols. 27th Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science - FSTTCS'07, Dec 2007, New Delhi, India. 2007. 〈inria-00181591〉

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