A Cryptographic Model for Branching Time Security Properties -- the Case of Contract Signing Protocols.

Véronique Cortier 1 Ralf Kuesters 2 Bogdan Warinschi 3
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : Some cryptographic tasks, such as contract signing and other related tasks, need to ensure complex, branching time security properties. When defining such properties one needs to deal with subtle problems regarding the scheduling of non-deterministic decisions, the delivery of messages sent on resilient (non-adversarially controlled) channels, fair executions (executions where no party, both honest and dishonest, is unreasonably precluded to perform its actions), and defining strategies of adversaries against all possible non-deterministic choices of parties and arbitrary delivery of messages via resilient channels. These problems are typically not addressed in cryptographic models and these models therefore do not suffice to formalize branching time properties, such as those required of contract signing protocols. In this paper, we develop a cryptographic model that deals with all of the above problems. One central feature of our model is a general definition of fair scheduling which not only formalizes fair scheduling of resilient channels but also fair scheduling of actions of honest and dishonest principals. Based on this model and the notion of fair scheduling, we provide a definition of a prominent branching time property of contract signing protocols, namely balance, and give the first cryptographic proof that the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner two-party contract signing protocol is balanced.
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Conference papers
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00181601
Contributor : Véronique Cortier <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, October 24, 2007 - 10:29:34 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, March 5, 2019 - 9:30:10 AM

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  • HAL Id : inria-00181601, version 1

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Véronique Cortier, Ralf Kuesters, Bogdan Warinschi. A Cryptographic Model for Branching Time Security Properties -- the Case of Contract Signing Protocols.. 12th European Symposium On Research In Computer Security - ESORICS'07, Sep 2007, Dresden, Germany. pp.422-437. ⟨inria-00181601⟩

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