Discrete Non Neterminism and Nash Equilibria for Strategy-Based Games

Abstract : Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium. Nash's approach to the problem for strategic games is probabilistic, \textit{i.e.} continuous, and static. CP and BR approaches for CP and BR games are discrete and dynamic. This paper proposes an approach that lies between those two different approaches: a discrete and static approach. multi strategic games are introduced as a formalism that is able to express both sequential and simultaneous decision-making, which promises a good modelling power. multi strategic games are a generalisation of strategic games and sequential graph games that still enjoys a Cartesian product structure, \textit{i.e.} where agent actually choose their strategies. A pre-fixed point result allows guaranteeing existence of discrete and non deterministic equilibria. On the one hand, these equilibria can be computed with polynomial (low) complexity. On the other hand, they are effective in terms of recommendation, as shown by a numerical example.
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[Research Report] 2007
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Contributeur : Stéphane Le Roux <>
Soumis le : lundi 10 décembre 2007 - 16:40:08
Dernière modification le : mardi 24 avril 2018 - 13:52:40
Document(s) archivé(s) le : lundi 12 avril 2010 - 06:48:20


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  • HAL Id : inria-00195397, version 1
  • ARXIV : 0712.1519



Stéphane Le Roux. Discrete Non Neterminism and Nash Equilibria for Strategy-Based Games. [Research Report] 2007. 〈inria-00195397〉



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