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INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE ET EN AUTOMATIQUE

*A Distributed Algorithm for Fair and Efficient
User-Network Association in Multi-Technology
Wireless Networks*

Coucheney, Pierre and Touati, Corinne and Gaujal, Bruno

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A Distributed Algorithm for Fair and Efficient User-Network Association in Multi-Technology Wireless Networks

Coucheney, Pierre and Touati, Corinne and Gaujal, Bruno

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Abstract: Recent mobile equipment (as well as the norm IEEE 802.21) now offers the possibility for users to switch from one technology to another (vertical handover). This allows flexibility in resource assignments and, consequently, increases the potential throughput allocated to each user.

In this paper, we design a fully distributed algorithm based on trial and error mechanisms that exploits the benefits of vertical handover to find fair and efficient assignment schemes. On the one hand, mobiles gradually update the fraction of data packets they send to each network based on a value called *repercussion utility* they receive from the stations. On the other hand, network stations compute and send repercussion utilities to each mobile that represent the impact each mobile has on the cell throughput.

This repercussion utility function is closely related to the concept of marginal cost in the pricing literature. Both the station and the mobile algorithms are simple enough to be implemented in current standard equipment.

Based on tools from evolutionary games, potential games, replicator dynamics and stochastic approximations, we analytically show the convergence of the algorithm to solutions that are efficient and fair in terms of throughput. Moreover, we show that after convergence, each user is connected to a single network cell which avoids costly repeated vertical handovers.

* A study of allocation games has been included.

Several simple heuristics based on this algorithm are proposed to achieve fast convergence. Indeed, for implementation purposes, the number of iterations should remain in the order of a few tens. We finally provide extensive simulation of the algorithm in several scenarios.

Key-words: Distributed Algorithms, Hybrid Wireless Networks, Evolutionary Games, Potential Games, Replicator Dynamics, Vertical Handover, Fairness, Stochastic Approximation.

Un algorithme distribué pour une association utilisateur-réseau efficace et équitable dans les réseaux sans fils multi-technologiques

Résumé : Les équipements mobiles récents (tels que définis dans la norme IEEE 802.21) permettent aux usagers de basculer d'une technologie à l'autre (ce que l'on nomme "handover vertical"). Plus de souplesse est autorisée dans l'allocation des ressources et, par conséquent, cela augmente potentiellement les débits alloués aux usagers.

Dans cet article, nous concevons un algorithme distribué qui procède par tâtonnement pour obtenir une association utilisateur-réseau efficace et équitable, afin d'exploiter les bénéfices du "handover vertical". D'une part, les mobiles mettent à jour pas à pas la proportion de paquets de données qu'ils envoient sur chaque réseau à partir d'une valeur transmise par la station de base. D'autre part, les stations de base calculent et envoient cette valeur aux mobiles. Cette valeur, appelée "repercussion utility" représente l'impact que chaque mobile a sur le débit global du réseau.

Cette fonction d'utilité est à rapprocher de l'idée du coût marginal dans la littérature sur la tarification. Aussi bien l'algorithme de la station de base que celui du mobile sont suffisamment simples pour être implémentés dans les équipements standards actuels.

À partir de méthodes des jeux évolutionnaires, des jeux de potentiel, de la dynamique de réplication, et des approximations stochastiques, nous montrons de manière analytique la convergence de l'algorithme vers une solution efficace et équitable en terme de débit. De plus, nous montrons qu'une fois l'équilibre atteint, chaque utilisateur est connecté à un unique réseau ce qui permet de supprimer le coût du "handover vertical".

Plusieurs heuristiques reposant sur cet algorithme sont proposées afin d'obtenir une convergence rapide. En effet, pour des raisons d'ordre pratique, le nombre d'itérations doit demeurer de l'ordre de quelques dizaines. Nous comparons alors la qualité des solutions fournies dans divers scénarios.

Mots-clés : Algorithmes distribués, réseaux sans-fils hétérogènes, inter-connection de réseau, théorie des jeux évolutionnaires, jeux de potentiels, dynamique de réplication, handover vertical, équité, approximation stochastique.

1 Introduction

The overall wireless market is expected to be served by six or more major technologies (GSM, UMTS, HSDPA, WiFi, WiMAX, LTE). Each technology has its own advantages and disadvantages and none of them is expected to eliminate the rest. Moreover, radio access equipment is becoming more and more multi-standard, offering the possibility of connecting through two or more technologies concurrently, using the norm IEEE 802.21. Switching between networks using different technology is referred to as *vertical handover*. This is currently done in UMA, for instance, which gives an absolute priority to WiFi over UMTS whenever a WiFi connection is available. In this paper, in contrast, we address the problem of computing an efficient association by providing a distributed algorithm that can be fair to all users or efficient in terms of overall throughput. Here are the theoretical contributions of the paper.

- First, we propose a distributed algorithm with guaranteed convergence to a non-cooperative equilibrium. This algorithm is based on an iterative mechanism: at each time epoch the mobile nodes adapt the proportion of the traffic they send on each network, based on some values (called repercussion utilities in the following) they receive from the network. This work is in line with some recent work on learning of Nash equilibria (see, for instance, [1] [2]).
- Second, based on tools from potential games, we show that, by appropriately setting up the repercussion utilities, the resulting equilibria can be made efficient or fair.
- Last, we show that the obtained equilibrium is always pure: after convergence, each user is associated to a single technology.

To validate our results, we propose several practical implementations of the algorithm and assess their performance in the practical setting of a geographical area covered by a global WiMAX network overlapping with several local IEEE 802.11 (also called WiFi) cells. We suppose that each user can multi-home, that is to say split her traffic between her local WiFi network and the global WiMAX cell, in order to maximize her repercussion utility (to be defined later).

The integration of WiFi and UMTS or WiFi and WiMAX technologies has already received some attention in the past.

There is a family of papers looking for solutions using Markov or Semi-Markov Decision Processes [3, 4]. Based on Markovian assumptions upon the incoming traffic, these works provide with numerical solutions, so as to optimize some average or discounted reward over time. Yet, because of the complexity of the system at hand (the equations of the throughput in actual wireless systems are not linear, and not even convex), important simplifying assumptions need to be made, and the size of the state space quickly becomes prohibitive to study real systems. Moreover, these methods

require to precisely know the characteristics of the system (e.g. in terms of bandwidth achieved in all configurations, interference impact of one cell over the neighboring ones, rate of arrivals), data that are hardly available in practice.

Our approach is rather orthogonal as we seek algorithms that converge towards an efficient allocation, using real-time measurements rather than off-line data. Such an approach follows game theory frameworks. There has been recent work that, based on evolutionary games [5], provide with optimal equilibria. Evolutionary games [6, 7], or the closely-related population games, are based on Darwinian-like dynamics. The evolutionary game literature is now mature and includes several so-called population dynamics, which model the evolution of the number of individuals of each population as time goes by. In our context, a population can be seen as a set of individuals adopting the same strategy (that is to say choosing the same network cell in the system and adopting identical network parameters). Recent work [5] have shown that, considering the so-called *replicator dynamics*, an appropriate choice of the fitness function (that determines how well a population is adapted to its environment) leads to efficient equilibria. However they do not provide with algorithms that follow the replicator dynamics (and hence converge to the equilibria). Additionally they do not justify the use of evolutionary games. Indeed, such games assume a large number of individuals, each of them having a negligible impact on the environment and the fitness of others. This assumption is not satisfied here, where the number of active users in a given cell is on the order of a few tens. The arrival or departure of a single one of them hence significantly impacts the throughput allocated to others. As the number of players is limited, we are hence dealing with another kind of equilibria, namely the Nash Equilibria.

The third trend of this article concerns Nash equilibria learning mechanisms. In the context of load balancing, a few algorithms (see, for instance [1, 2]) have been shown to converge to Nash Equilibria. Interestingly enough, it has been pointed out that this class of algorithms has similar behavior and convergence properties as replicator dynamics in evolutionary game theory. It is to be noted that the main weakness of these algorithms is that they may converge to *mixed* strategy Nash equilibria, that is to say to equilibria where each user randomly picks up a decision at each time epoch. Such equilibria are unfortunately not interesting in our case, as they amount to perpetual handover between networks.

Finally, there is a growing interest in measuring or analyzing the efficiency of Nash Equilibria. The most famous concept is certainly the “price of anarchy” [8]. Let us also mention the more recent SDF (Selfish Degradation Factor) [9]. We will show in the following that the Nash Equilibria our algorithm converges to are locally optimal with respect to these two criteria. In addition, it has interesting fairness properties. Indeed, we show how our algorithm can be tuned so as to converge to α -fair points (defined

in cooperative game theory, see [10]), for arbitrary value of the parameter α . This wide family of fairness criteria includes in particular the well-known max-min fairness and proportional fairness and can be generalized so as to cover the Nash Bargaining Solution point [11].

In the present paper, we hence propose to make use of the previous works in evolutionary games on heterogeneous network, with additional fairness considerations, while proposing methods based on works on Nash learning algorithms that can be implemented on future mobile equipments. In addition, our work present a novel result which is that our algorithm converges to *pure* (as opposed to mixed) equilibria, preventing undesired repeated handovers between stations.

2 Framework and Model

In this section, we present the model and the objective of this work while introducing the notations used throughout the paper.

2.1 Interconnection of Heterogeneous wireless networks

We consider a set \mathcal{N} of mobiles, such as mobile n can connect to a set of network cells, that can be of various technologies (WiFi, WiMAX, UMTS, LTE...). The set of cells that users¹ can connect to, depends on their geographical location, wireless equipment and operator subscription.

2.2 User throughput and cell load

By *throughput*, we refer to the rate of useful information available for a user, in a given network, sometimes also called *goodput* in the literature.

The throughput obtained by an individual on a network depend on both her own parameters and the ones of others. These parameters include geographical position (interference and attenuation level) as well as wireless card settings (coding schemes, TCP version, to cite a few). In previous papers [3, 4], the authors discretize the cells of networks into *zones* of identical throughput (see Fig 1). This means that users in the same zone will receive the same throughput. Here, we can consider that each user is in its own zone². The set of users connected to a network is called the *load* of the network.

More formally, we suppose that each user has a set of network cells she can connect to denoted by \mathcal{I}_n . An action s_n for user n is the choice of a cell $i \in \mathcal{I}_n$. Then, we denote by s the vector of users actions $s = (s_n)_{n \in \mathcal{N}}$, and call it an *allocation* of mobiles to networks.

¹In the following we use the term *users* and *mobiles* interchangeably.

²unlike in the cited papers, we are not constrained by the size of the system that is increasing with the number of zones.




Figure 1: An heterogeneous wireless system consisting of a single MAN (Metropolitan Area Network, e.g. WiMAX) cell and a set of partly overlapping LAN (Local Area Networks, e.g. WiFi) hot-spots (in grey). As user B (in zone 1) is closer to the WiMAX antenna, it can use a more efficient coding scheme than A (in zone 2) (for instance QAM 16 instead of QPSK). Zones are represented with a dash line, as opposed to cells, with full lines.

Then, for each allocation s , the *load* of network i is denoted by $\ell^i(s) \in \{0; 1\}^N$, and is such that $\ell_n^i(s) = 1$ if user n takes action i , 0 otherwise. The throughput $u_n(\ell^i(s))$ of user n taking action i is a function depending only of the vector of load of cell i . With these notations, the throughput received by n when she takes decision s_n is $u_n(\ell^{s_n}(s))$.

2.3 Pure versus mixed strategies

As opposed to multi-homing between WiFi systems (see [12, 5]), multi-homing between different technologies (e.g. WiFi and WiMAX) induces several complications: the different technologies may have different delays, have different packet sizes or coding systems,... and re-constructing the messages sent by the mobiles may be hazardous. Hence, while each user can freely switch between the networks cells she has access to, we aim at algorithms that converge - after a transitional state - to equilibria in which each user uses a single network (so as to avoid the cumbersome handover procedure). These are called *pure strategy equilibria* (see Section 3.4).

Yet, during the convergence phase, each mobile is using *mixed strategies*³. Then, the experienced throughput needs to be considered in terms

³The formal definition is given in Section 3.4.

of expectations. In this case, q_n is a vector of probabilities where $q_{n,i}$ is the probability for mobile n chooses cell $i \in \mathcal{I}_n$. The global strategy set is the matrix $q = (q_n)_{n \in \mathcal{N}}$, while the choice $S_n(q)$ is now a random variable such that $\mathbb{P}(S_n(q) = i) = q_{n,i}$. It follows that the expected throughput received by user n is $\mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell^{S_n(q)}(S(q)))]$, where $S(q) = (S_n(q))_{n \in \mathcal{N}}$.

2.4 Efficiency and Fairness

In our approach, we consider elastic or data traffic. Then, the Quality-of-Service (QoS) experienced by each mobile user is its experienced throughput. We are hence interested in seeking equilibria that are optimal (in the sense of Pareto) in terms of throughput. Such equilibria is a strategy q such that one cannot find another strategy q' that increases the expected throughput of a user without decreasing that of another one: $\forall q' \neq q, \exists n \in \mathcal{N}$ s.t. $\mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell^{S_n(q')} (S(q')))] > \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell^{S_n(q)} (S(q)))] \Rightarrow \exists m \in \mathcal{N}, \mathbb{E}[u_m(\ell^{S_m(q')} (S(q')))] < \mathbb{E}[u_m(\ell^{S_m(q)} (S(q)))]$.

We design a fully distributed algorithm that converges to points which are not only Pareto optimal but also α -fair. The class of α -fair points [10], achieves

$$\max_q \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} \mathbb{E}[G_\alpha(u_n(\ell^{S_n(q)}(S(q))))] \text{ with } G_\alpha(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{x^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha}. \quad (1)$$

In the case of pure strategies, for each mobile n such that $S_n = i$, $\mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell^i(S))] = u_n(\ell^i(s))$. So, we aim at building an algorithm that converges to an allocation s^* that reaches

$$\max_s \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} G_\alpha(u_n(\ell^i(s))).$$

When $\alpha = 0$, the corresponding solution is a social optimum. When α tends to one, the solution is a proportional fair point (or Nash Bargaining Solution) and when α tends to infinity, it converges to a max-min fair point. The parameter α hence allows flexibility in choosing between fully efficient versus fair allocation, while ensuring Pareto optimality.

Finally, it is well-known that selfish behavior in the use of resources (networks) may lead to inefficient use, in case of congestion for example. To circumvent this, we introduce some repercussion utility functions that are notified to users. Thus, instead of competing for throughput, we consider an algorithm reflecting a non-cooperative game between users that compete formaximizing their repercussion utility. We will give an explicit closed-form of the repercussion utility function in Section 3.2. As in the throughput case, the repercussion utility on a cell only depends on the load on that cell. We denote by $r_n(\ell^{S_n}(s))$ the repercussion utility received by user n (as for the throughput, the repercussion utility received by that user also depends on

the choices of the other mobiles of the system, as reflected in the allocation vector s). In the case of mixed strategies, the expected repercussion utility is $\mathbb{E}[r_n(\ell^{S_n}(S))]$. The study of such games is given in the next section.

3 Allocation Games Related to Potential Games

This section is devoted to the formal study of allocation games. After defining what is an allocation game in Section 3.1, we introduce the repercussion utilities in Section 3.2 what leads to a new game that is characterized in Section 3.3. Finally, we show the useful property that this game is a potential game (Section 3.4).

3.1 Allocation Games

We consider a normal-form game $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{U})$ consisting of a set \mathcal{N} of players ($|\mathcal{N}| = N$), player n taking actions in a set $\mathcal{I}_n \subset \mathcal{S}$ ($|\mathcal{I}_n| = I_n$), where \mathcal{S} is the set of all actions. Let us denote by $s_n \in \mathcal{I}_n$ the action taken by player n , and $s = (s_n)_{n \in \mathcal{N}} \in \mathcal{I} = \bigotimes_{n=1}^N \mathcal{I}_n$. Then, $\mathcal{U} = (U_n)_{n \in \mathcal{N}}$ refers to the *utility* or *payoff* for each player: the payoff for player n is $U_n(s_1, \dots, s_n, \dots, s_N)$.

By definition, an *allocation game* is a game such that the payoff of a player when she takes action i only depends on the set of players who also take action i . One can interpret such a game as a set of users who share a common set of resources \mathcal{S} , and an action vector corresponds to an allocation of resources to users (hence the name of these games).

We define the *load* on action (or resource) i by $\ell^i(s) \in \{0; 1\}^N$ as a vector such that $\ell_n^i(s) = 1$ if player n take action i , 0 otherwise. When there is no ambiguity, we will simplify the notation and use $\ell = \ell^i(s)$. We denote by $\ell^{s_n}(s)$ the load on the action taken by player n , and we denote the payoff for player n by $u_n(\ell^{s_n}(s)) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} U_n(s_1, \dots, s_n, \dots, s_N)$.

Hence, allocations games are a wider class of games than *congestion games* where the payoff of each player depends on the *number* of players adopting the same strategy [13]. They represent systems where different users accessing a given resource may have a different impact.

3.2 Repercussion utilities

We build a companion game of the allocation game, denoted $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{R})$. The new player utilities, called *repercussion utilities* are built from the payoffs of the original game, according to the following definition:

Definition 1 (allocation game with repercussion utilities). *Let us consider the repercussion utility for player n to be:*

$$r_n(\ell^{s_n}(s)) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} u_n(\ell^{s_n}(s)) - \sum_{m \neq n: s_m = s_n} (u_m(\ell^{s_m}(s)) - e_n - u_m(\ell^{s_m}(s))),$$

where e_n denotes the vector whose entries are all 0 but the n^{th} one, which equals 1.

An allocation game with repercussion utilities is a game whose payoffs are repercussion utilities.

The utilities defined in this manner have a natural interpretation: it corresponds to the player's payoff ($u_n(\ell^{s_n}(s))$) minus the total increase in payoff for all users impacted by the presence of a given user on a given commodity ($\sum_{\substack{m \neq n: \\ s_m = s_n}} [u_m(\ell^{s_m}(s)) - e_n - u_m(\ell^{s_m}(s))]$). This is more obvious in the following equivalent formulation.

Remark 1. An equivalent formulation of the repercussion utilities is:

$$r_n(\ell^{s_n}(s)) = \sum_{m: \ell_m^{s_n} = 1} u_m(\ell^{s_n}(s)) - \sum_{m \neq n: \ell_m^{s_n}(s) = 1} u_m(\ell^{s_n}(s) - e_n).$$

3.3 Characterization of Allocation Games with Repercussion Utilities

We now give a characterization of a payoff that is a repercussion utility.

Proposition 1. An allocation game $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{R})$ is an allocation game with repercussion utilities if and only if $\forall \ell, \forall n, m \in \mathcal{N}$ s.t. $s_m = s_n$,

$$r_n(\ell) - r_n(\ell - e_m) = r_m(\ell) - r_m(\ell - e_n). \quad (2)$$

Proof. Suppose that r is a repercussion utility, then there exists a payoff u such that:

$$r_n(\ell) = \sum_{\ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell) - \sum_{k \neq n: \ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell - e_n).$$

Then, denote

$$A = \left(\sum_{\ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell - e_m) - \sum_{k \neq n: \ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell - e_n - e_m) \right).$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} r_n(\ell) - r_n(\ell - e_m) &= \sum_{\ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell) - \sum_{k \neq n: \ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell - e_n) - A \\ &= \sum_{\ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell) - \sum_{k \neq m: \ell_k = 1} u_k(\ell - e_m) - A \\ &= r_m(\ell) - r_m(\ell - e_n). \end{aligned}$$

Conversely, consider an allocation game $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{R})$ such that Eq. 2 is satisfied. Consider an action i and ℓ the vector of load on action i . Let $K \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} \ell_n$ is the number of players taking action i . Further, let $(a(k)), 1 \leq k \leq K$ be the subscripts of all players taking action i . If there are K such players, then $\ell = \sum_{k=1}^K e_{a(k)}$. Then, we claim that, for any permutation σ of $\{1, \dots, K\}$:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{K-1} r_{a(k+1)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(j)} \right) = \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} r_{a(\sigma(k+1))} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(\sigma(j))} \right). \quad (3)$$

Indeed, note that, from Eq. 2:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{a(k+1)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} e_{a(j)} \right) - r_{a(k+1)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(j)} \right) = \\ r_{a(k)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} e_{a(j)} \right) - r_{a(k)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} e_{a(j)} - e_{a(k+1)} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} r_{a(k)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} e_{a(j)} \right) + r_{a(k+1)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(j)} \right) = \\ r_{a(k+1)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} e_{a(j)} \right) + r_{a(k)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} e_{a(j)} - e_{a(k+1)} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Hence, for any k , the sum $\sum r_{a(k+1)} (\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(j)})$ remains unchanged if one swaps $a(k)$ and $a(k+1)$ (elementary transposition). Then, Eq. 3 results from the fact that any permutation σ can be decomposed in a finite number of elementary transpositions.

We now construct a payoff u as follow: for any n such that $\ell_n = 1$, let us define:

$$u_n(\ell) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} r_{a(k+1)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(j)} \right).$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{\ell_m=1} u_m(\ell) - \sum_{m \neq n: \ell_m=1} (u_m(\ell - e_n)) = \\ \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} r_{a(k+1)} \left(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(j)} \right) - \sum_{k=0}^{K-2} r_{b(k+1)} \left(\ell - e_n - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{b(j)} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Note that the sequence a is identical to sequence b with the additional element n . From Eq. 3, we can choose a permutation σ such that $a(\sigma(1)) = n$. Then:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{\ell_m=1} u_m(\ell) - \sum_{m \neq n: \ell_m=1} (u_m(\ell - e_n)) \\
&= \sum_{k=0}^{K-1} r_{a(\sigma(k+1))}(\ell - \sum_{j=1}^k e_{a(\sigma(j))}) - \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} r_{a(\sigma((k+1)))}(\ell - e_n - \sum_{j=2}^k e_{a(\sigma(j))}) \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} r_{a(\sigma(k+1))}(\ell - e_{a(\sigma(1))} - \sum_{j=2}^k e_{a(\sigma(j))}) + r_{a(\sigma(1))}(\ell) - \\
& \quad \sum_{k=1}^{K-1} r_{a(\sigma((k+1)))}(\ell - e_n - \sum_{j=2}^k e_{a(\sigma(j))}) \\
&= r_n(\ell).
\end{aligned}$$

Hence $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{R})$ is the allocation game with repercussion utilities associated to the $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{U})$ allocation game. \square

From Prop. 1, we conclude that allocation games with repercussion utilities are a special subset of allocation games. The results presented in the following are hence valid for any allocation game such that Eq. 2 is satisfied.

Example 1. *Let M be the payoff matrix of a two-player game. This amounts to saying that the first (resp. second) player chooses the line and the second chooses the column. The payoff for the first player is given by the first (resp. second) component.*

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} (a, A) & (b, B) \\ (c, C) & (d, D) \end{pmatrix}.$$

It follows from Proposition 1 that this is a game with repercussion utilities if and only if $a = A + b - C$ and $d = D + c - B$. Then, one can check the interesting property that there necessarily exists a pure Nash equilibrium (for instance (a, A) is a Nash equilibrium if $a \geq c$ and $A \geq B$).

3.4 Allocation Games with Repercussion Utilities are Potential Games

In this section, we show that, given an allocation game, the game with repercussion utilities (1) admits a potential function and (2) this potential equals the sum of the payoffs for all players in the initial game. This appealing property is exploited in the next section to show some strong results on the behavior of the well-known replicator dynamics on such games.

Consider an allocation $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{U})$ and its companion game $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{R})$. We first assume that players have *mixed* strategies. Hence a strategy for player

n is a vector of probability $q_n = (q_{n,i})_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n}$, where $q_{n,i}$ is the probability for player n to take action i (i.e. $q_{n,i} \geq 0$ and $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n} q_{n,i} = 1$). The strategy domain for player n is $\Delta_n \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{0 \leq q_{n,i} \leq 1, s.t. \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n} q_{n,i} = 1\}$. Then, the global domain⁴ is $\Delta = \bigotimes_{n=1}^N \Delta_n$ and a global strategy is $q \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (q_n)_{n \in \mathcal{N}}$. We say that q is a *pure strategy* if for any n and i , $q_{n,i}$ equals either 0 or 1.

We denote by S the random vector whose entries S_n are all independent and whose distribution is $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, \forall i \in \mathcal{I}_n, \mathbb{P}(S_n = i) = q_{n,i}$. The expected payoff for player n when she takes action i is $f_{n,i}(q) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{E}[r_n(\ell^i(S)) | S_n = i]$. Then, her mean payoff is $\bar{f}_n(q) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n} q_{n,i} f_{n,i}(q)$. We can notice that $f_{n,i}(q)$ only depends on $(q_{m,i})_{m \neq n}$ and it is a multi-linear function of $(q_{m,i})_{m \neq n}$.

The next theorem claims that the allocation game with repercussion utilities is a potential game. Potential games were first introduced in [14]. The notion was afterward extended to continuous set of players [15]. In our case, it refers to the fact that the expected payoff for each player derives from a potential function. More precisely, we show that $f_{n,i}(q) = \frac{\partial F}{\partial q_{n,i}}(q)$, where

$$F(q) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n} q_{n,i} \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell^i(S)) | S_n = i]. \quad (4)$$

It is interesting to notice the connection between $f_{n,i}(q)$ which is the expected repercussion utility, and $F(q)$ which refers to the sum of expected payoffs in the initial game. A strategy that increases the expected repercussion utility of a player, yields to a marginal increase of the potential.

Theorem 1. *The allocation game with repercussion utilities is a potential game, and its associated potential function is F , as defined in Eq. 4.*

Proof. Let us first differentiate function F :

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial q_{n,i}}(q) = \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell^i(S)) | S_n = i] + \sum_{m \neq n} q_{m,i} \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[u_m(\ell^i(S)) | S_m = i]}{\partial q_{n,i}}.$$

⁴Notice that Δ is a polyhedron.

In fact, it is clear that $\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[u_m(\ell^j(S)) | S_m = j]}{\partial q_{n,i}} = 0$ if $j \neq i$, and $\frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell^i(S)) | S_n = i]}{\partial q_{n,i}} = 0$. To simplify the notations, we omit the index i . Then,

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial F}{\partial q_n}(q) &= \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell(S)) | S_n = i] + \sum_{m \neq n} q_m \frac{\partial}{\partial q_n} \sum_{\ell} u_m(\ell) \mathbb{P}(\ell(S) = \ell | S_m = i) \\
&= \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell(S)) | S_n = i] + \\
&\quad \sum_{m \neq n} q_m \sum_{\ell} u_m(\ell) \left(\mathbb{P}(\ell(S) = \ell | S_m = i, S_n = i) - \mathbb{P}(\ell(S) = \ell | S_m = i, S_n \neq i) \right) \\
&= \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell(S)) | S_n = i] + \\
&\quad \sum_{m \neq n} \sum_{\ell} u_m(\ell) \left(\mathbb{P}(\ell(S) = \ell, S_m = i | S_n = i) - \mathbb{P}(\ell(S) = \ell + e_n, S_m = i | S_n = i) \right) \\
&= \mathbb{E}[u_n(\ell(S)) | S_n = i] - \sum_{m \neq n: S_m = S_n} \left(\mathbb{E}[u_m(\ell(S) - e_n) | S_n = i] - \mathbb{E}[u_m(\ell(S)) | S_n = i] \right) \\
&= \mathbb{E}[r_n(\ell(S)) | S_n = i] \\
&= f_{n,i}(q).
\end{aligned}$$

□

Remark 2. *By adding a large constant to all payoff u , the repercussion utilities become positive. Clearly, this has no impact on the relative potential of allocations. The Nash Equilibria of the allocation game are also conserved. In the following, we will assume that the repercussion utilities are positive.*

4 Replicator dynamics and algorithms

In this section, we show how to design a strategy update mechanism for all players in an allocation game with repercussion utilities that converges to pure Nash Equilibria. We will study in the next section (Section 4.4) their efficiency properties.

4.1 Replicator Dynamics.

We now consider that the player strategies vary over time, hence q depends on the time t : $q = q(t)$. The trajectories of the strategies are described below by a dynamics called *replicator dynamics*. We will see in section 4.2 that this dynamics can be seen as the limit of a learning mechanism.

Definition 2. *The replicator dynamics [6][7] is ($\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, i \in \mathcal{I}_n$):*

$$\frac{dq_{n,i}}{dt}(q) = q_{n,i} (f_{n,i}(q) - \bar{f}_n(q)). \quad (5)$$

We say that \hat{q} is a stationary point (or equilibrium point) if ($\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, i \in \mathcal{I}_n$):

$$\frac{dq_{n,i}}{dt}(\hat{q}) = 0.$$

In particular, \hat{q} is a stationary point implies $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, i \in \mathcal{I}_n, \hat{q}_{n,i} = 0$ or $f_{n,i}(\hat{q}) = \bar{f}_n(\hat{q})$.

Intuitively, this dynamics can be understood as an update mechanism where the probability for each player to choose actions whose expected pay-offs are above average will increase in time, while non profitable actions will gradually be abandoned.

Let us notice that the trajectories of the replicator dynamics remain inside the domain Δ . Also, from [15], the potential function F is a strict Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics, that means that the potential is strictly increasing along the trajectories outside the stationary points.

In this context, a closed set A is *Lyapunov stable* if, for every neighborhood B , there exists a neighborhood $B' \subset B$ such that the trajectories remain in B for any initial condition in B' . A is *asymptotically stable* if it is Lyapunov stable and is an attractor (i.e. there exists a neighborhood C such that all trajectories starting in C converge to A). The existence of a strict Lyapunov function yields the following:

Remark 3. *The accumulation points of the trajectories of the replicator dynamics are stationary points.*

Intuitively, the limit points (that are connected) of the same trajectory must have the same value for the Lyapunov function. But the set of limit points is invariant for the dynamics, hence the Lyapunov function is non-increasing on this set. The remark follows.

Proposition 2. *All the asymptotically stable sets of the replicator dynamics are faces of the domain. These faces are sets of equilibrium points for the replicator dynamics.*

Proof. We show that any set which is not a face of the domain is not an attractor. This results from a property discovered by E. Akin [16] which states that the replicator dynamics preserves a certain form of volume.

Let A be an asymptotically stable set of the replicator dynamics. Since the domain Δ is polyhedral, A is included in a face F_A of Δ . The support of the face $S(F_A)$ is the set of subscripts (n, i) such that there exists $q \in A$ with $q_{n,i} \neq 0$ or 1. The relative interior of the face is $Int(F_A) = \{q \in F(A) \text{ s.t. } \forall (n, i) \in S(F_A), 0 < q_{n,i} < 1\}$.

Furthermore, it should be clear that faces are invariant under the replicator dynamics. Hence on the face F_A , by using the transformation $v_{n,i} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \log\left(\frac{q_{n,i}}{q_{n,i_n}}\right), \forall q \in Int(F_A)$, one can see that

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial v_{n,i}} \frac{dv_{n,i}}{dt} = 0, \forall n \in \mathcal{N}, i \in \mathcal{I}.$$

Up to this transformation, the divergence of the vector field is null on F_A . Using Liouville's theorem [16], we infer that the transformed dynamics

preserves volume in $\text{Int}(F_A)$. This implies that the set of limit points of the trajectories in $\text{Int}(F_A)$ is $\text{Int}(F_A)$ itself. By the previous remark, $\text{Int}(F_A)$ is made of equilibrium points. By continuity of the vector field, all the points in face F_A are equilibria. Finally, since A is asymptotically stable, this means that $A = F_A$. \square

We say that $s = (s_n)_{n \in \mathcal{N}}$ is a *pure Nash Equilibrium* if $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, \forall s'_n \neq s_n, U_n(s_1 \dots s_n \dots s_N) \geq U_n(s_1 \dots s'_n \dots s_N)$.

Remark 4. Let q be a pure strategy. We denote by i_n the choice of player n such that $q_{n,i_n} = 1$. Then, a pure strategy q is a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to:

$$\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, \forall j \neq i_n, f_{i_n,n}(q) \geq f_{j,n}(q).$$

The following proposition comes from a classical result that says that the pure Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable points of the replicator dynamics.

Proposition 3. *If a stable face is reduced to a single point, then this of the replicator dynamics are pure Nash equilibria of the allocation game with repercussion utilities.*

Proof. Let \hat{q} be an asymptotically stable point. Then \hat{q} is a face of Δ by Proposition 2 (*i.e.* a 0-1 point), with, say $\hat{q}_{n,i} = 1$. Assume that \hat{q} is not a Nash equilibrium. Then, there exists $j \neq i$ such that $f_{j,n}(\hat{q}) \geq f_{i,n}(\hat{q})$. Now, consider a point $q' = \hat{q} + \epsilon e_{n,j} - \epsilon e_{n,i}$. Notice that $f_{n,i}(q') = f_{n,i}(\hat{q})$ since q' and \hat{q} only differ on components concerning user n . Then starting in q' , the replicator dynamics is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dq_{n,i}}{dt}(q') &= q'_{n,i}(f_{n,i}(q') - ((1 - \epsilon)f_{n,j}(q') + \epsilon f_{n,i}(q'))) \\ &= (1 - \epsilon)(f_{n,i}(\hat{q}) - ((1 - \epsilon)f_{n,j}(\hat{q}) + \epsilon f_{n,i}(\hat{q}))) \\ &= -\epsilon(1 - \epsilon)(f_{n,j}(\hat{q}) - f_{n,i}(\hat{q})) \\ &\leq 0, \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{and } \frac{dq_{n,j}}{dt}(q') = -\frac{dq_{n,i}}{dt}(q') \geq 0.$$

For all users $m \neq n, \forall u \in \mathcal{I}_m, q'_{m,u} \in \{0, 1\}$, then

$$\frac{dq_{m,k}}{dt}(q') = q'_{m,k} \left(f_{n,k}(q') - \sum_u q'_{m,u} f_{n,u}(q') \right) = 0.$$

Therefore starting from q' , the dynamics keeps moving in the direction $e_{n,j} - e_{n,i}$ (or stays still) and does not converge to \hat{q} . This contradicts the fact that \hat{q} is asymptotically stable. \square

Proposition 4. *Allocation games with repercussion utilities admit at least one pure Nash equilibrium.*

Proof. Allocation games with repercussion utilities admit a potential that is a Lyapunov function of their replicator dynamics. Since the domain Δ is compact, the Lyapunov function reaches its maximal value inside Δ . The argmax of the Lyapunov function form an asymptotically stable sets A of equilibrium points. By Proposition 2, these sets are faces of the domain (hence contain pure points). All points in A are Nash equilibrium points by using a similar argument as in Proposition 3. This concludes the proof. \square

4.2 A Stochastic Approximation of the Replicator Dynamics.

In this section, we present an algorithmic construction of the players' strategies that selects a pure Nash equilibrium for the game with repercussion utilities. A similar learning mechanism is proposed in [2]. We now assume a discrete time, in which at each epoch t , players take random decision $S_n(t)$ according to their strategy $q_n(t)$, and update their strategy profile according to their current payoff. We look at the following algorithm ($\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, i \in \mathcal{I}_n$):

$$q_{n,i}(t+1) = q_{n,i}(t) + \epsilon r_n(\ell^{S_n}(S)) (1_{S_n=i} - q_{n,i}(t)), \quad (6)$$

where $S_n = S_n(t)$, $\epsilon > 0$ is the constant step size of the algorithm, and $1_{S_n=i}$ is equal to 1 if $S_n = i$, and 0 otherwise. Recall that we assume that $r_n(\ell^{S_n}(S)) \geq 0$. Then, if ϵ is small enough, $q_{n,i}$ remains in the interval $[0; 1]$. Strategies are initialized with value $q(0) = q_0$. The step-size is chosen to be constant in order to have higher convergence speed than with decreasing step size.

One can notice that this algorithm is fully distributed, since for each player n , the only information needed is $r_n(\ell^{S_n}(S))$. Furthermore, at every iteration, each player only need the utility on one action (which is randomly chosen). In applicative context, this means that a player does not have to scan all the action before update her strategy, what would be costly.

Below, we provide some intuition on why the algorithm is characterized by a differential equation, and how it asymptotically follows the replicator dynamics (5). Note that we can re-write (6) as:

$$q_{n,i}(t+1) = q_{n,i}(t) + \epsilon b(q_{n,i}(t), S_n(t)).$$

Then, we can split b into its expected and martingale components:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{b}(q_{n,i}(t)) &= \mathbb{E}[b(q_{n,i}(t), S_n(t))] \\ \nu(t) &= b(q_{n,i}(t), S_n(t)) - \bar{b}(q_{n,i}(t)). \end{aligned}$$

Again, (6) can be re-written as:

$$\frac{q_{n,i}(t+1) - q_{n,i}(t)}{\epsilon} = \bar{b}(q_{n,i}(t)) + \nu(t).$$

As $\nu(t)$ is a random difference between the update and its expectation, then by application of a law of large numbers, for small ϵ , this difference goes to zero. Hence, the trajectory of $q_{n,i}(t)$ in discrete time converges to the trajectory in continuous time of the differential equation:

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dq_{n,i}}{dt} = \bar{b}(q_{n,i}), & \text{and} \\ q(0) = q_0. \end{cases}$$

Let us compute $\bar{b}(q_{n,i})$ (for ease of notations, we omit the dependence on time t):

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{b}(q_{n,i}) &= \mathbb{E}[b(q_{n,i}, S_n)] \\ &= q_{n,i}(1 - q_{n,i})f_{n,i}(q) - \sum_{j \neq i} q_{n,j}q_{n,i}f_{n,j}(q) \\ &= q_{n,i}(f_{n,i}(q) - \sum_{j \neq i} q_{n,j}f_{n,j}(q)) \\ &= q_{n,i}(f_{n,i}(q) - \bar{f}(q)). \end{aligned}$$

Then, $q_{n,i}(t)$ follows the replicator dynamics.

Consider a typical run of algorithm (6) over a system made of 10 users with 5 choices over 10 networks. The figure displays for one user, the probabilities of choosing each of the 5 possible choices. As user has 5 possible choices, at time epoch 0, each choice has probability 0.2. Then, as t grows, all the probabilities except one, tend to 0.




Figure 2: Convergence of the probability values for each of the 5 possible choices of one user.

4.3 Properties of the algorithm.

The algorithm is designed so as to follow the well-known replicator dynamics. Furthermore, the stochastic aspect of the algorithm provides some stability to the solution: whereas the deterministic solution of a replicator dynamics may converge to a saddle point, this cannot happen with the stochastic algorithm. The use of repercussion utilities provides a potential to the companion game and it is known that the potential is a Lyapunov function for the replicator dynamics, hence the potential is increasing along the trajectories. The following theorem aggregates the main results about the algorithm applied on repercussion utilities.

Theorem 2. *The algorithm (6) weakly converges to a set of pure points that are locally optimal for the potential function, and Nash equilibria of the allocation game with repercussion utilities.*

Proof. • The algorithm is a stochastic algorithm with constant step size. From Theorem 8.5.1 of Kushner and Yin [17], we infer that the algorithm weakly converges as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ to the limit points of the trajectories of an ode, which is, in our case, the replicator dynamics (5) (it is a particular case of the theorem in which conditions of the theorem hold: all variables are in a compact set and the dynamics is continuous). Furthermore, the set to which the sequence $q(t)$ converges is an asymptotically stable set of the replicator dynamics, because unstable equilibria are avoided (the noise verify condition of [18], Theorem 1). From Proposition 2, the only asymptotically stable sets of the dynamics are faces. Hence the algorithm converges to faces which are asymptotically stable.

- We now show that the dynamics in such a face (denoted by F) converges almost surely to a pure point. Let $\hat{q}(0) \in F$. Then, the trajectory $\hat{q}(t)$ following the algorithm stays in F . Furthermore:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}[\hat{q}_{n,i}(t+1)|\hat{q}(t)] \\ &= \hat{q}_{n,i}(t)(\hat{q}_{n,i}(t) + \epsilon f_{n,i}(\hat{q}(t))(1 - \hat{q}_{n,i}(t))) \\ & \quad + \sum_{j \neq i} \hat{q}_{n,j}(\hat{q}_{n,i}(t) - \epsilon f_{n,j}(\hat{q}(t))\hat{q}_{n,i}(t)) \\ &= \hat{q}_{n,i}(t) + \epsilon q_{n,i}(f_{n,i}(\hat{q}(t)) - \bar{f}_n(\hat{q}(t))). \end{aligned}$$

Since at a mixed stationary point $f_{n,i}(\hat{q}) = \bar{f}_n(\hat{q})$, then $\mathbb{E}[\hat{q}_n(t+1)|\hat{q}(t)] = \hat{q}_n(t)$. Hence the process $(\hat{q}_n(t))_t$ is a martingale, and is almost surely convergent. The process converges necessarily to a fixed point of the iteration $\hat{q}_{n,i}(t+1) = \hat{q}_{n,i}(t) + \epsilon r_n(\ell^{s_n}(s)) (1_{s_n=i} - \hat{q}_{n,i}(t))$, and the sole fixed points are pure points (since the step size ϵ is constant).

- Let $(q(t))_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ be the random process given by the algorithm. Suppose that it admits a closed set A of limit points that contains no pure points, such that $A \subset F$, where F is the smallest face of the domain Δ that contains A . Assume, for ease of notations that $F = \Delta \cap \{q : q_{n,i} = 0\}$. By Proposition 2, F is a face of Δ that is set of stationary points.

Denote by A^δ the δ -neighborhood of A . We suppose that δ is small enough to ensure that A^δ does not contain any pure point (this is possible since A is a closed set). Let \mathcal{A} the set of ω such that $\forall \omega \in \mathcal{A}, \forall \delta > 0, \forall T \in \mathbb{N}, \exists t > T$ s.t. $q(t) \in A^\delta$. We now show that the Lebesgue measure of \mathcal{A} , denoted $\mu(\mathcal{A})$, is null. Intuitively, as the algorithm goes near the face, the probability that it follows a martingale in the face is closed to 1, and then the trajectory will not approach the face.

Let $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ be the set of ω such that the martingale (in F) $\hat{q}(t)(\omega)$ converges to a pure point for every initial condition in F . The measure of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ is 1. Let $s(\omega) = \inf\{T : \forall \hat{q}(0) \in F, \forall t > T, \hat{q}(t)(\omega) \notin A^\delta\}$. $s(\omega)$ is the maximal time such that for every initial condition in F , the martingale is outside A^δ . Since F is compact, it follows that for all $\omega \in \hat{\mathcal{A}}$, $s(\omega)$ is finite. Let $\hat{\mathcal{A}}(T^+) \subset \hat{\mathcal{A}}$ (resp. $\hat{\mathcal{A}}(T^-)$) be the set of ω such that $s(\omega) > T$ (resp. $s(\omega) \leq T$). Then, $\mu(\hat{\mathcal{A}}(T^+)) \rightarrow 0$ when $T \rightarrow \infty$.

- Let $\delta = \frac{\nu}{k}$, where $\nu > 0$ and $k \in \mathbb{N}^*$. If a trajectory $q(t)(\omega)$ is such that there exists T with $q_{n,i}(T)(\omega) < \frac{\nu}{k}$, then there exists a duration T_k such that $\forall t \in [T - T_k; T]$, $q_{n,i}(t)(\omega) < \nu$, where $r \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \max_n \max_s r_n(\ell^{s_n}(s))$. We now show that $T_k \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \min(T, -\frac{\ln(k)}{\ln(1 - \epsilon r)})$. Indeed, $q_{n,i}(t+1) \geq q_{n,i}(t) - \epsilon r q_{n,i}(t)$. Then $q_{n,i}(T) \geq q_{n,i}(T - T_k)(1 - \epsilon r)^{T_k}$. It follows $q_{n,i}(T - T_k) \leq q_{n,i}(T)(1 - \epsilon r)^{-T_k} \leq \frac{\nu}{k}(1 - \epsilon r)^{-T_k} = \nu$.
- Let $p(\nu, T_k)$ be the probability that $q(t)(\omega)$, at distance less than $\delta = \frac{\nu}{k}$ of F at time t_0 , does not follow the martingale $\hat{q}(t)(\omega)$ defined by $\hat{q}(t_0)(\omega) = \text{proj}_F(q(t_0)(\omega))$, during time T_k (hence $q(t_0 + T_k)(\omega)$ can be inside A^δ). Then:

$$\forall k \in \mathbb{N}, \mu(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mu(\hat{\mathcal{A}}(T_k^+)) + p(\nu, T_k)\mu(\hat{\mathcal{A}}(T_k^-)).$$

Indeed, let $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\omega \in \mathcal{A}$. There is T with $q_{n,i}(T)(\omega) \leq \frac{\nu}{k}$. For simplicity, suppose that $T = T_k$. Then, either $\omega \in \hat{\mathcal{A}}(T_k^+)$, either $\omega \in \hat{\mathcal{A}}(T_k^-)$, either the complementary set in \mathcal{A} whose measure is 0. If $\omega \in \hat{\mathcal{A}}(T_k^-)$, then $q(T)(\omega) \in A^\delta$ with probability $p(\nu, T_k)$.

We now show that, by taking an appropriate $\nu = \nu(k)$, then $p(\nu(k), T_k) \rightarrow 0$, when $k \rightarrow \infty$. This, and the fact that $\mu(\hat{\mathcal{A}}(T_k^+)) \rightarrow 0$ when $k \rightarrow \infty$ implies that $\mu(\mathcal{A}) = 0$.

- Suppose $\omega \in \hat{\mathcal{A}}(T^-)$: let us define $d_t = d(q(t), \hat{q}(t))$ the distance between the interior trajectory, and the martingale trajectory at time t . Then, one can check that, under ω , $d_{t+1} \leq d_t(1 + \epsilon r)$, with probability at least $1 - p(d_t)$ with $p(d_t) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} d_t \sum_{n=1}^N I_n$. Let $K \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{n=1}^N I_n$. Indeed the vector of actions $s(q)$ is the same as $s(\hat{q})$ as long as ω picks the same choice for all players. The contrary happens with probability $\sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^{I_n} |\sum_{k=1}^i q_{n,k}(t) - \hat{q}_{n,k}(t)|$. See Figure 3 for an illustration of this. Then, the lower bound follows from the inequality $|\sum_{k=1}^i q_{n,k}(t) - \hat{q}_{n,k}(t)| < d_t$.




Figure 3: The thick line shows the measure of the set of all ω corresponding to the same choices for player 1 (with 3 choices).

Since $d_0 < \nu$, then $d_{T_k} > \nu(1 + \epsilon r)^{T_k}$ with probability less than $p(\nu, T_k)$ where $p(\nu, T_k) = 1 - \prod_{t=0}^{T_k} (1 - p(d_t)) \leq 1 - \prod_{t=0}^{T_k} (1 - K\nu(1 + \epsilon r)^t)$. Take $\nu = \frac{(1 + \epsilon r)^{-2T_k}}{K}$. When $k \rightarrow \infty$, d_{T_k} goes to 0, and $p(\nu, T_k)$ goes to 0. Hence, $q(t)(\omega)$ does not follow $\hat{q}(t)(\omega)$ for $t = 0$ to $t = T_k$ with probability $p(\nu, T_k)$, and then can be inside A^δ .

- Finally, the fact that the pure point attained is a Nash equilibrium follows from Proposition 3. □

One can notice that the convergence of the algorithm to a pure point relies on the fact that the step size ϵ is constant. If it were decreasing, the algorithm would converge to an equilibrium point in a stable face, that need not be pure.

The combination of both algorithm (6) and repercussion utilities provides an iterative method to select a pure allocation which is stable, and locally optimal. This can be viewed as a *selection algorithm*.

4.4 Global Maximum vs Local Maximum for the Selection Algorithm.

In the previous section, we showed that the algorithm converges to a local maximum of the potential function. This induces that if there is only one local maximum, the algorithm attains the global maximum. This arises for instance if the potential function is concave. Without the uniqueness of the local maximum, there is no guaranty of convergence to the global maximum. Hence, assume there are multiple local maxima (that are pure points), which is common when the payoffs are random. Each of them is an attractor for the replicator dynamics. In this section, we investigate the following question: does the initial point of the algorithm belongs to the basin of attraction of the global maximum?

Since every player has no preference at the beginning of the algorithm, we assume that initially, $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, i \in \mathcal{I}_n, q_{n,i}(0) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{I}_n|}$. In the following subsection we show that in the case of two players, both having two choices, $q(0)$ is in the basin of attraction of the global maximum. Then, in Subsections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, we give counter examples to show that the result does not extend to the general case of more than two players or more than two choices.

4.4.1 Case of two players and two choices

Proposition 5. *In a two players, two actions allocation game with repercussion utilities, the initial point of the algorithm is in the basin of attraction of the global maximum.*

Proof. Both players 1 and 2 can either take action a or b . We denote by x the probability for player 1 to choose a , and by y the probability for 2 to choose a . We denote by $K = (k_{i,j})_{i,j \in \{0,1\}}$ the matrix such that $k_{i,j} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} F(i,j)$, where $F(x,y)$ is the potential function⁵. Then, the dynamics (5) can be rewritten:

$$\begin{cases} \frac{dx}{dt} = x(1-x)(k_{0,1} - k_{0,0} + Ky) \\ \frac{dy}{dt} = y(1-y)(k_{1,0} - k_{0,0} + Kx), \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

where $K = k_{1,1} + k_{0,0} - k_{0,1} - k_{1,0}$. Note that in a two-player two-action game, there are at most two local maxima. Suppose that in the considered game, there are two local maxima. They are necessarily attained either at points $(0,0)$ and $(1,1)$ or at points $(0,1)$ and $(1,0)$. Without loss of generality, we can assume the former case. Hence, $k_{0,0}$ and $k_{1,1}$ are local maxima, and $k_{1,1} > k_{0,0} + \gamma$, where $\gamma > 0$.

⁵Actually, here, the derivative of the potential is equal to the projection of the expected payoffs on the set Δ_n .

We now define set E and function V as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} V(x, y) &= |1 - x| + |1 - y|, \\ E &= \{(x, y) : x + y > 1, 0 < x, y < 1\}. \end{aligned}$$

(V is actually the distance of (x, y) to the point $(1, 1)$ for the 1-norm.) We next show that V is a Lyapunov function for the dynamics on the open set E . To prove this, it is sufficient to show that

$$L(x, y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{\partial V}{\partial x}(x, y) \frac{dx}{dt} + \frac{\partial V}{\partial y}(x, y) \frac{dy}{dt} < 0.$$

First, note that $\forall (x, y) \in E$, $V(x, y) = 2 - x - y$. Hence, from Eq. 7,

$$L(x, y) = -x(1 - x)(k_{0,1} - k_{0,0} + Ky) - y(1 - y)(k_{1,0} - k_{0,0} + Kx).$$

Let also be D the open segment $\{(x, y) : x + y = 1, 0 < x, y < 1\}$. Trivially,

$$\forall (x, y) \in D, L(x, y = 1 - x) = -x(1 - x)(k_{1,1} - k_{0,0}) < 0. \quad (8)$$

Let us finally consider the segment

$$S(x_0) = \{(x, y) : x + y \geq 1, x = x_0, 0 \leq y \leq 1\}.$$

Figure 4 summarizes the different notations introduced.




Figure 4: Proof of Prop. 5: Summary of notations

Since $E \subset \bigcup_{0 < x < 1} S(x)$, it is sufficient to show the negativeness of L on $S(x)$ for all x . Let us denote by $L_x(y)$ the restriction of L on $S(x)$. From Eq. 8, we have $L_x(1 - x) < 0$. Furthermore, $L_x(y)$ is a quadratic function and its discriminant is $4(k_{1,0} - k_{0,0})(k_{1,1} - k_{0,1})$, hence is negative. So, for all x , $L_x(y)$ is negative (strictly). Finally, L is negative (strictly) in E and hence non-positive in a neighborhood of E .

Therefore, V is a Lyapunov function for the dynamics on a neighborhood of the open set E . More precisely, V is strictly decreasing on the trajectories

of the dynamics starting in the set E , hence they converge to the unique minimum of V which is the point $(1, 1)$. This applies to the initial point $(0.5, 0.5)$. \square

Figure 5 illustrates this result: consider a two player (numbered 1 and 2), two strategy (denoted by A and B) game. Let x (resp. y) be the probability for player 1 (resp. 2) to take action A . While two (local) maxima exist - namely $(1, 1)$ and $(0, 0)$ - the surface covered by the basin of attraction of the global optimum (which is $(1, 1)$ in this example) is greater than those of the other one. A by-product is that the dynamics starting in point $(0.5, 0.5)$ converges to the global optimum.




Figure 5: An example with 2 players with 2 choices each. There are 2 maxima. The point $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ is inside the attracting basin of the global maximum.

Unfortunately, this appealing result cannot be generalized to more players or more actions, as exemplified in the following subsections.

4.4.2 Extension to more than two players

Example 2. Let us consider a three player game : $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{U})$ with $\mathcal{N} = \{1, 2, 3\}$, $\mathcal{I} = \{A, B\}$, and $\mathcal{U} = (u_n(i, j, k))_{n \in \{1, 2, 3\}, i, j, k \in \{A, B\}}$, where i (resp. j), denotes the choice of player 1 (resp. 2). The matrix representation of (u_1, u_2, u_3) are given below:

$$(u_1, u_2, u_3)(i, j, 1) = \begin{pmatrix} (9, 6, 4) & (5, 5, 5) \\ (5, 8, 1) & (2, 4, 4) \end{pmatrix},$$

$$(u_1, u_2, u_3)(i, j, 2) = \begin{pmatrix} (7, 2, 8) & (5, 4, 7) \\ (6, 3, 3) & (10, 2, 8) \end{pmatrix}.$$

Note that this game has no pure strategies Nash equilibrium and a single mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, which is $(x, y, z) = (1/3, 5/6, 0)$. The corresponding value of the potential function is $87/6 = 14.5$.

The repercussion utility matrices are:

$$(r_1, r_2, r_3)(i, j, 1) = \begin{pmatrix} (10, 9, 10) & (6, 5, 5) \\ (5, 5, 6) & (1, 1, 4) \end{pmatrix},$$

$$(r_1, r_2, r_3)(i, j, 2) = \begin{pmatrix} (6, 4, 8) & (5, 3, 7) \\ (1, 3, 4) & (9, 11, 14) \end{pmatrix}.$$

This game has two pure Nash equilibria, that are $(x, y, z) = (1, 1, 1)$ and $(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0)$, corresponding to values of the potential function that are respectively 29 and 34.

Figure 6 shows that the trajectory starting at point $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ converges to the local maximum $(x, y, z) = (1, 1, 1)$ instead of the global maximum $(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 0)$. Note that the performance of the local maximum is way ahead that of the Nash Equilibrium in the original game.




Figure 6: Example with 3 players, with 2 choices each. The figure represents the dynamic trajectory starting from the point $(x, y, z)(0) = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$, with x (resp. y, z) the probability for player 1 (resp. 2, 3) to adopt action A . The dynamics converges to the point $(1, 1, 1)$ whereas the global maximum is $(0, 0, 0)$.

4.4.3 Extension to more than two choices

Example 3. Let us now consider the two player game $(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{U})$ with $\mathcal{N} = \{1, 2\}$, $\mathcal{I} = \{A, B, C\}$, $\mathcal{U} = (u_n(i, j))_{n \in \{1, 2\}, i \in \{A, B\}, j \in \{A, B, C\}}$. (Note that in this example, only the second player has three possible choices).

The payoff matrix is:

$$(u_1, u_2)(i, j) = \begin{pmatrix} (6, 3) & (-3, 11) & (-3, 10) \\ (0, 2) & (-1, 1) & (0, 10) \end{pmatrix}.$$

The companion game is:

$$(r_1, r_2)(i, j) = \begin{pmatrix} (7, 12) & (-3, 11) & (-3, 10) \\ (0, 2) & (-11, 0) & (0, 10) \end{pmatrix}.$$

The original game has one single pure Nash equilibria which is (B, C) resulting in the value 10 for the potential function and no mixed strategies equilibria exists.

The companion game has two pure Nash equilibria that are (A, A) and (B, C) , corresponding to values of the potential function of 9 and 10 respectively.

Denote x the probability for player 1 to choose action A and y_1 (resp. y_2) the probability for player 2 to choose action A (resp. B). Then, the global maximum of the potential function is 10, and is attained when $x = y_1 = y_2 = 0$. Figure 7 shows that the trajectory starting at point $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$ converges to the local maximum $(1, 1, 0)$, corresponding to Nash equilibrium (A, A) of the companion game, which is inefficient. Interestingly in this example, the unique Nash equilibrium of the original game corresponds to the global maximum of the game.




Figure 7: Example with 2 players. The first one has 2 choices and the second one has 3 choices. Here we display the 3-dimensional plot of y_1 vs x and y_2 vs x . The dynamics starting in $(1/2, 1/3, 1/3)$ converges to the point $(1, 1, 0)$ whereas the global maximum is $(0, 0, 0)$.

5 Numerical study

This section is devoted to implementation issues and shows the numerical tests that were performed so as to study several possible practical heuristics based on the algorithm.

First, notice that in the algorithm, users only need to know the repercussion utility on their current cell to compute their new strategy vector. Also, each base station only needs to know her own load to compute the repercussion utilities, hence allowing for a fully distributed algorithm.

During the execution of the algorithm, at each time slot (typically, frames are sent every 40 ms for video transmission), each user executes the algorithm independently, updates her probability vector, makes a choice according to her strategy and sends a packet to the corresponding base station. Meanwhile, each base station measures the throughputs of all mobiles connected to it and computes the corresponding repercussion utilities. Then, it sends to every user their individual repercussion utility.

Once a user reaches a pure strategy, she informs all the cells she has access to. Each cell waits for all users connected to her to converge before asking them to monitor their repercussion utility. From then on, any variation of the load is due to an arrival or departure in the cell. Hence, upon detection of a change of her repercussion utility, each user reruns the algorithm, starting with a new probability vector.

In the previous theoretical sections, convergence of the algorithm have been shown when the step size ϵ tends to 0. Here, we present several simple heuristics with different step size computation methods. While the convergence step should be small enough to ensure convergence, larger values are preferable to decrease the algorithm runtime. Hence, appropriate trade-offs need to be examined.

In the first subsection, we present the different heuristics (Subsection 5.1). We then present the scenario to be simulated (in terms of number of users and network topology) (Subsection 5.2). To perform the tests, realistic throughputs need to be chosen for different combinations of loads, i.e. values of $u(\ell^i)$ for each possible load ℓ^i . We provide such values in Subsection 5.3. We then compare the results obtained by the different heuristics, in terms of efficiency (the quality of the solution) and convergence speed (Subsection 5.4). We briefly comment in Subsection 5.5 on the impact of fairness on the resulting association. Finally, in Subsection 5.6, given the best heuristic, we provide experimental results about: the scalability of the algorithm on the system size, the adaptation to arrival or departure of a mobile, the comparison with other policies, and the adaptation to different kind of traffic.

5.1 The Different Heuristics for the Steps

Each heuristic actually consists of two parts:

A stopping test As time increases, the probabilities of choosing each action tends either to 0 or 1. So as to speed up convergence, we consider thresholds δ_m and δ_M such that:

$$\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, \forall i \in \mathcal{I}_n, \begin{cases} q_{n,i}(t+1) \leftarrow 0 & \text{if } q_{n,i}(t) < \delta_m \\ q_{n,i}(t+1) \leftarrow 1 & \text{if } q_{n,i}(t) > 1 - \delta_M. \end{cases}$$

When one of this operation is done, the strategies are normalized to remain in the strategy set Δ , and to preserve the condition $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_n} q_{n,i} = 1$. In the tests, we fix $\delta_m = 0.05$ and $\delta_M = 0.3$.

A step size computation : different schemes to compute $\epsilon_n(t)$ are considered.

5.1.1 Constant Step Size (CSS)

In this heuristic, the step size is predefined and constant throughout time: $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, \forall t, \epsilon_n(t) = \epsilon$. For low values (CSS_L), typically $\epsilon = 0.01$, the algorithm converges in almost all cases to the optimal solution, but at the cost of a high number of iterations. For high values (CSS_H), typically $\epsilon = 1$, the convergence and the optimality are not guaranteed anymore. Intermediate values (CSS_M), typically $\epsilon = 0.1$, are possible compromises.

5.1.2 Constant Update Size (CUS)

At each time epoch, each user computes the maximum step size so that the change of probabilities for all choices, is bounded by a predefined value Γ (fixed to 0.1 in the experiments):

$$\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, \forall i \in \mathcal{I}_n, \quad \text{abs}(q_{n,i}(t+1) - q_{n,i}(t)) \leq \Gamma.$$

By bounding the update of every user, this scheme yields smooth changes in the strategy vectors and hence can be expected to follow the behavior of the differential equations.

5.1.3 Decreasing Step Size (DSS)

The underlying idea of this scheme is to use a few iterations with large steps before using some smaller step sizes. Indeed, a big step size lets actions associated to large repercussion utilities to quickly get high probabilities of occurrence. Since the algorithm converges to a Nash Equilibrium regardless

of the initial conditions, using a few large steps amounts in changing the initial conditions so as to get close to extrema points, and hence to possible pure strategies Nash Equilibria. Then, the following iterations with smaller step sizes correspond to a good approximation of the CSS_L algorithm. These steps confirm (or infer) the fact that the extremal point closer to the one obtained after the first iterations is (or not) a Nash Equilibrium.

We consider two variants of the decreasing step size mechanism. The first one is a cyclic decreasing step size (DSSSA) (in the experiments, $\epsilon = 3/(t \bmod 10)$). During each cycle a Nash equilibrium candidate is tested. This is inspired from simulated annealing approaches.

The second variant (DSSCSS) is a decreasing step size phase followed by a constant large step size (in the experiments, $\epsilon = 4/t$ if $t < 120$ and $\epsilon = 4$ otherwise). The underlying idea is that the first phase would stabilize a certain number of users. Then, a large step size should improve the convergence speed of the others to their respective preferable choices.

5.2 System Scenario

We consider a simple scenario of an operator providing subscribers with a service available either through a large WiMAX cell or a series of WiFi hot spots.

For each simulation, a topology is chosen randomly, according to 3 parameters (the number of users, the number of WiFi hot spots and the number I_n of possible choices for each user). More precisely, for each user:

- The first choice is the WiMAX cell and one of the 8 possible zones (as defined in Section 5.3), picked at random (uniformly).
- All other $I_n - 1$ choices are one of the Wifi cells, picked up according to a uniform law. As explained in Section 5.3, we consider that all mobiles in a common Wifi cell receive the same throughput.

The strategy vector is initialized with equal probabilities: $\forall n \in \mathcal{N}, \forall i \in \mathcal{I}_n, q_{n,i}(0) = 1/I_n$.

5.3 Throughput of TCP sessions in WLAN and WiMAX

Computing the throughput experienced by a packet in a wireless environment is extremely hard due to the complexity of the physical system (as opposed to wired system, where the physical medium is separated from the outside world, and hence has reliable properties, the wireless link quality changes at every instant, due to the environment: air quality, buildings and physical obstacles, etc). Therefore, actual closed formula available in the literature were obtained using strong assumptions on the outside world and

do not refer to throughput of a single packet but of means of flows. Indeed, as the number of packets in any connection is large, the flow is usually approximated as a fluid.

In addition, the useful throughput of a connection, also called *goodput* depends on the network protocol. Roughly speaking, two main elements have strong impact on the achieved goodput: first is the physical system, which depends on the technology in terms both of maximum capacity and multiplexing technology, second is the transport protocol. In this simulation study, we consider the case of TCP flows for which good throughput approximations are available in the literature. Yet, the use of UDP flows, or a mixture of TCP and UDP flows do not impact the performance of the algorithm. (Note that allowing users to use either TCP or UDP protocol for their transmission amounts, in the algorithm, to considering an additional zone in the network cell.)

Equations of throughput in WiFi cells Based on [19], we consider that the throughput of connection i is

$$u_n(\ell^i(s)) = \frac{L_{TCP}}{l^i (T_{DATA} + T_{ACK} + 2T_{TBO}(l^i) + 2T_W(l^i))}$$

where $l^i = \sum_{n \in \mathcal{N}} \ell_n^i$ is the number of mobiles connected to network i , $L_{TCP} = 8000$ bits is the size of a TCP packet, T_{ACK} is the raw transmission times of TCP ACK (approximately 1.091 ms), T_{DATA} the raw transmission times of a TCP data packet (about 1.785 ms). Then, T_W and T_{TBO} are the mean total time lost due to collisions and back-offs respectively. These depend on the collision probability of each packet, and hence on the load of the network. This collision probability can be numerically obtained via a fixed point equation given in [19]. Figure 8 displays the throughput of a WiFi cell, as a function of the load.

WiMAX As opposed to WiFi, the WiMAX technology uses OFDMA multiplexing. Hence, each user receives a certain number of carriers which are converted into a certain amount of throughput depending on the chosen modulation and coding scheme, which greatly depends on the link quality at the receiver side. We consider a fair sharing in terms of carriers [20], *i.e.* if p users are present in the WiMAX cell, each of them will receive $NbSCarriers/p$ sub-carriers, similarly to processor sharing. Hence, the goodput experienced by a user in zone z (corresponding to a coding scheme) is roughly the fraction $1/p$ of the throughput she would obtain if she were alone in the cell.

For a single user within the WiMAX cell, we follow experimental values obtained in [21] for IEEE WiMAX 802.16d for its eight zones:




Figure 8: Capacity of a WiFi cell as a function of its load (in bit/s). The maximum is reached with 3 users.




Figure 9: Average performance of the heuristics (CUS , $DSSSA$, $DSSCSS$, $CSSL$, $CSSM$ and $CSSH$ resp.) with different loads (with 5% confidence intervals).

Modulation	QAM64 3/4	QAM64 2/3	QAM16 3/4	QAM16 1/2
TCP goodput	9.58	8.88	6.80	4.50
Modulation	QPSK 3/4	QPSK 1/2	BPSK 3/4	BPSK 1/2
TCP goodput	3.37	2.21	1.65	1.08

5.4 Comparisons between Heuristics

Figure 9 displays the performance (in terms of global throughput) obtained by the six heuristics (CUS , $DSSSA$, $DSSCSS$, $CSSL$, $CSSM$ and $CSSH$




Figure 10: Average number of iterations before convergence of heuristics (CUS , $DSSSA$, $DSSCSS$, CSS_L , CSS_M and CSS_H resp.) for different loads (with 5% confidence intervals).

resp.) as a function of the total number of users N . For a given load, all heuristics have been tested on the same topology to allow a fair comparison.

The small constant step size (CSS_L with $\epsilon = 0.01$), provides the best performance. It is are even tested optimal for the small values of N , up to 20.

Most heuristics stay within 10 % of the optimal (except for $DSSCSS$ whose performance can be poor). Also note that the total capacity of the system is less than 36 ($10 * 2.6$ (WiFi) + 9.58 (WiMAX)) Mbit/s. Thus the best heuristic is always within 5 % of the optimal. Finally, it should be noted that the medium constant step size (CSS_M) with $\epsilon = 0.1$ is always very close to the best (CSS_L) and that the constant update size (CUS) performs better and better when the number of users grows.

As for the number of iterations, it varies widely between the different heuristics, even on a logarithmic scale (see Figure 10). The CUS heuristic is a clear winner here (with an average number of iterations never above 80). Meanwhile, CSS_L does not always converge within the limit of 20,000 iterations set in the program.

Under high loads, CUS provides the best compromise with very fast convergence and reasonable performance. Under light load, the constant step size of medium size (CSS_M) is also an interesting choice, for its performance is almost optimal and its number of iterations remains below 100.

5.5 Impact on Fairness

Consider the following scenario: a set of 20 users, each having 3 available choices among 10 cells. The WiMAX cell is numbered 0 and its 8 zones are numbered from 0 to 7. The set of choices of the users are $I =$

$$\begin{array}{lll} \{\{0, 1\}, \{8\}, \{1\}\} & \{\{0, 5\}, \{6\}, \{4\}\} & \{\{0, 1\}, \{6\}, \{9\}\} \\ \{\{0, 2\}, \{2\}, \{6\}\} & \{\{0, 3\}, \{8\}, \{9\}\} & \{\{0, 6\}, \{4\}, \{9\}\} \\ \{\{0, 7\}, \{3\}, \{6\}\} & \{\{0, 4\}, \{1\}, \{2\}\} & \{\{0, 6\}, \{6\}, \{9\}\} \\ \{\{0, 5\}, \{3\}, \{4\}\} & \{\{0, 6\}, \{3\}, \{1\}\} & \{\{0, 7\}, \{9\}, \{6\}\} \\ \{\{0, 3\}, \{8\}, \{1\}\} & \{\{0, 6\}, \{4\}, \{7\}\} & \{\{0, 6\}, \{9\}, \{5\}\} \\ \{\{0, 0\}, \{6\}, \{5\}\} & \{\{0, 5\}, \{4\}, \{1\}\} & \{\{0, 6\}, \{6\}, \{4\}\} \\ \{\{0, 3\}, \{3\}, \{4\}\} & \{\{0, 3\}, \{8\}, \{4\}\} & \end{array}$$

The optimal association scheme, for $\alpha = 0$ (efficient scheme) and $\alpha = 2$ (fair schemes) are respectively:

$$\begin{aligned} A_{\text{eff}} &= \{2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 0, 2, 1, 1, 1\}, \\ A_{\text{fair}} &= \{0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 0, 1\} \end{aligned}$$

resulting in throughputs of:

$$\begin{aligned} T_{\text{eff}} &= 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225, \\ &\quad 0.824, 0.824, 0.824, 2.245, 2.246, 9.58, \quad 0.824, 1.225, 0.824, 1.225. \\ T_{\text{fair}} &= 2.22, \quad 1.225, 2.22, \quad 1.225, 1.125, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, \\ &\quad 2.245, 1.225, 1.225, 2.246, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.225, 1.125, 1.225. \end{aligned}$$

The efficient scheme achieves a total throughput of 31.29 Mb/s. The fair scheme suffers a degradation of slightly less than 10%, with a total throughput of 28.34 Mb/s. Yet a closer look at the figures indicates that the efficient scheme leads to high differences between users (user 1 only obtains a throughput of 0.8 Mb/s while user 16 is granted 9.58 Mb/s). As for the fair association scheme, on the other hand, all users benefit from throughputs higher 1.1 Mb/s. As in bandwidth allocation mechanisms in wired systems[11], the parameter α hence allows to finely tune the compromise between maximum global throughput and fairness between users.

To understand these differences, let us compare the loads between the associations:

$$L_{\text{eff}}^{\text{wifi}} = \{3, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3\}, \quad L_{\text{fair}}^{\text{wifi}} = \{1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2\}.$$

From Fig. 8, one can see that the maximum capacity for the WiFi cells is obtained for a load of 3 users. Hence, the efficient scheme tries to obtain as many cells with load 3 as possible. Meanwhile, the WiMAX capacity is maximal when its users all belong to zone 0. Hence, such users are automatically associated to this cell (in our case there is only one such user, which obtains a throughput of 9.58 Mb/s).

On the other hand, the fair scheme tries to find balanced association schemes. Hence, the loads of the different WiFi cells are close to one another⁶ (here ranging between 1 and 2) and the WiMAX cell is associated to some users belonging to efficient zones. Their number is chosen so as to obtain similar performance as for users remaining in the WiFi cells.

Hence, while purely efficient schemes produce lightly loaded WiMAX cells (with only the users in zone 0), the fair scheme leads to more balanced loads (here, 4 users in the WiMAX cell and about 2 users in each WiFi cell).

5.6 Further simulations

While very small constant step sizes provided limit points with near optimal performance, all heuristics but CUS needed several thousand steps before convergence for scenarios with more than 10 users and/or cells. The number of steps for CUS never topped 100 and its limit points also proved very good (a few percent of the optimal). All simulations reported in this subsection use the CUS heuristic.

5.6.1 Scalability

Here, we investigate the impact of the number of mobiles and the number of cells each mobile can connect to on the speed of convergence (Figures 11,12)). Unlike in the previous section where the criterion of convergence speed was the number of iterations of the algorithm, here, we measure the average number of handovers for a mobile before convergence. It can be argued that this new measure of convergence is more relevant since handovers are costly for mobiles. Figures 11,12 show that the mean number of handovers is smaller than 20 when mobiles have 2 choices, and smaller than 25 when mobiles have 3 choices, even for large numbers of mobiles.

5.6.2 Adaptation to Arrivals and Departures

The association algorithm has to be run at every arrival or departure of a user in a cell. Here, we simulate the occurrence of such events. Typical time scales compare nicely: while arrivals or departures of users in WiMAX or WiFi cells occur every minute or so, the association algorithm converges in less than a second in most cases.

In Figures 13, 14, the arrivals follow a Poisson process. Each incoming mobile has a message of exponential random size to download. One unit of time corresponds to the duration of an iteration of the algorithm. In the second figure, white noise may model perturbations on the cell capacity (fading) as well as errors on the measures of the real throughput.

⁶Note that they cannot be strictly equal due to the discrete nature of the problem.




Figure 11: Mean number of handovers for a mobile when she has 2 choices, as a function of the total number of mobiles (full lines represent the average measure and the upper and lower 5% confidence interval).




Figure 12: Mean number of handovers for a mobile when she has 3 choices, as a function of the total number of mobiles.




Figure 13: Adaptation to arrivals and departures: the heuristic smoothly and quickly reconverges after state change.




Figure 14: Stability with respect to measurement errors: behavior of the algorithm when the throughput of all cells has a white Gaussian noise with 0.45 variance.




Figure 15: Percentage of efficiency gain by using our algorithm in comparison to the fixed choice of WiFi cell for each incoming mobile. The number of mobiles is variable, but the number of WiFi cells is fixed to 15.

5.6.3 Comparison with Naive or Sub-optimal Methods

In this section, we compare our algorithm to naive allocation methods for incoming mobiles.

Fixed Allocation to a WiFi Cell. The first naive method for a mobile consists in always connecting to a WiFi cell if it is possible. It is inspired by the only currently deployed technology implementing vertical handovers called GAN (Generic Access Network), also known as Unlicensed Mobile Access (UMA). Actually, GAN only enables to switch between WLAN and GSM/UMTS. The capacity of WLAN networks is so much larger than the one of GSM/UMTS networks that switching to WLAN network whenever possible is almost always a good choice. That is why the network selection of GAN is very basic: the handset gives absolute preference to 802.11 networks over GSM. However, the GAN selection scheme is unlikely to be efficient in more complex settings, especially when the load of WiFi cells becomes very large and when WiFi cells compete against WiMAX or LTE cells whose performance are closer to WiFi than UMTS. Figure 15 shows the relative improvement of our algorithm compared to GAN-like approach.

Allocation to the Best Cell. As for this second naive method, an incoming mobile acts selfishly: she probes all available cells and always connects to the one that offers the best throughput at connection time and does not change ever after. Figure (16) shows the difference of the global throughput when we use the both methods of association. We see that our algorithm




Figure 16: Evolution of the global throughput using the association algorithm ("algo") and greedy probing ("selfish"). At time 0, the configuration is the same, and the arrival processes of users are identical in the two cases. Since the throughputs for mobiles are different in the 2 schemes, the departure times are different. The mean performance in this period of time is 40.1 for (algo), and 29.9 for (selfish).

achieves a significant better throughput than the selfish method. This is yet another illustration of the fact that selfish behaviors lead to a bad use of the resources.

Comparison with the Throughput as Payoff. At last, we compare our algorithm when we use the repercussion utility as payoffs for mobiles (Section 3.2) which ensures the convergence to an locally optimal point, to the same algorithm when the payoff is equal to the throughput: $r_n \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} u_n$ for all users. See Figures 17,18 and 19. Here the gain is much lower but both algorithms roughly have the same convergence time.

5.6.4 Real-Time Traffic vs Elastic Traffic

The question here is to know whether real time traffic can be taken into account in the algorithm. In fact, for elastic traffic, utility for users is intimately related to the throughput they receive. For real time traffic like voice or video transmission, users require a certain level of throughput. Hence the idea is to build a different utility function for these users.

The first idea is to have a null utility if the throughput is under a certain threshold, and a utility equal to 1 otherwise. The algorithm works well with this utility but is long to converge because the discontinuity causes a




Figure 17: Percentage of efficiency gain when using repercussion utilities instead of throughputs, when the number of mobiles varies. The ratio of the number of WiFi cells divided by the number of mobiles is constant and equal to 1 over 5.




Figure 18: Similar to Figure 17, but the number of WiFi cells varies and the number of mobiles is constant and equal to 30.




Figure 19: Like Figure 18, but with a constant number of mobiles equal to 20.




Figure 20: Dependency of the time of convergence when the ratio of elastic traffic varies. The number of mobiles is 30.

bang-bang behavior of the users. This problem can be avoided by transforming the utility function: under the threshold the utility is still 0, and becomes $1 - \exp(-u_n(\ell^{s_n}))$ above it. This provides good solutions in terms of convergence speed as well as a good overall utility. In Figure 20, we show the behavior of the time of convergence of this heuristic when the ratio of real-time traffic vary. The impact of this ratio on the time of convergence is not significant.




Figure 21: Traffic made of 30 initial users with 90% mice. Average packet size for elephants is 20 times the average packet size for mice. The figure shows the total throughput when all users apply the algorithm. The average total throughput is 39.05Mb/s .

5.6.5 A Dynamic Scenario: between Mice and Elephants

Here, we consider that the global traffic is shared by two kinds of traffic called *mice* and *elephants*. The mouse traffic corresponds to short lived connections (< 1 second) and the elephant traffic to long connections (up to one minute). There are relatively few elephants and a large number of mice (90%), but globally, the ratio of elephant traffic represents approximately 85% of the global traffic. Whereas our algorithm is well adapted to elephant traffic, since the time of convergence is negligible with respect to the duration of the connection, it is not the case for mice traffic. In Figures 21 and 22, we compare two scenarios, when both mice and elephants use the algorithm and when only elephants do so (while mice always connect to one WiFi cell). The second method reduces the number of handovers and preserves the overall throughput (even giving a small gain) as seen in the Figures 21 and 22.

At last, Figure 23 shows the performance gain when we apply the algorithm for mice and elephants in comparison with applying it only to the elephants. It points out the fact that both methods have a similar efficiency, but the second ensures a low rate of handovers. It is interesting to notice that this is independent of the ratio of mice traffic. That means that the loss of throughput due to the algorithm (which is important when the percentage of mice is high), is balanced by the loss of optimality of the second method.




Figure 22: Same configuration and arrival process as in Figure 21. In this figure, mice are directly allocated to the WiFi cell without applying the algorithm. The mean throughput is 39.19Mb/s .




Figure 23: Percentage of gain by running the algorithm for mice and elephants instead of running it only for elephants as a function of the percentage of mice traffic (the global traffic average remains constant).

6 Conclusion and Future Works

In this paper, we have designed a distributed algorithm that selects an efficient (in terms of fairness or global throughput) network association in heterogeneous wireless networks. Simulations show that this method is relevant, in comparison with naive method. This opens the way to several interesting future works, such as the implementation of such methods in modern mobile devices in collaboration with Alcatel-Lucent.

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