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Journal Articles ACM Transactions on Computational Logic Year : 2008

Complexity results for security protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and commuting public key encryption

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Abstract

We show that the insecurity problem for protocols with modular exponentiation and arbitrary products allowed in exponents is NP-complete. This result is based on a protocol and intruder model which is powerful enough to uncover known attacks on the Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH.2) protocol suite. To prove our results, we develop a general framework in which the Dolev-Yao intruder is extended by generic intruder rules. This framework is also applied to obtain complexity results for protocols with commuting public key encryption.
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Dates and versions

inria-00329740 , version 1 (13-10-2008)

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Yannick Chevalier, Ralf Kuesters, Michael Rusinowitch, Mathieu Turuani. Complexity results for security protocols with Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and commuting public key encryption. ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, 2008, 9 (4), pp.Article 24. ⟨10.1145/1380572.1380573⟩. ⟨inria-00329740⟩
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