Deciding knowledge in security protocols under some e-voting theories

Mouhebeddine Berrima 1 Narjes Ben Rajeb 1 Véronique Cortier 2
2 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : In the last decade, formal methods have proved their interest when analyzing security protocols. Security protocols require in particular to reason about the attacker knowledge. Two standard notions are often considered in formal approaches: deducibility and indistinguishability relations. The first notion states whether an attacker can learn the value of a secret, while the latter states whether an attacker can notice some difference between protocol runs with different values of the secret. Several decision procedures have been developed so far for both notions but none of them can be applied in the context of e-voting protocols, which require dedicated cryptographic primitives. In this work, we show that both deduction and indistinguishability are decidable in polynomial time for two theories modeling the primitives of e-voting protocols.
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Mouhebeddine Berrima, Narjes Ben Rajeb, Véronique Cortier. Deciding knowledge in security protocols under some e-voting theories. [Research Report] RR-6903, INRIA. 2009, pp.29. ⟨inria-00375784⟩

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