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Conference Papers Year : 2009

Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-repudiation Protocole with an Active Intruder

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Abstract

Non-repudiation protocols have an important role in many areas where secured transactions with proofs of participation are necessary. Formal methods are clever and without error, therefore using them for verifying such protocols is crucial. In this purpose, we show how to partially represent non-repudiation as a combination of authentications on the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol. After discussing the limitations of this method, we define a new one based on the handling of the knowledge of protocol participants. This second method is general and of natural use, as it consists in adding simple annotations in the protocol specification. It is very easy to implement in tools able to handle participants knowledge. We have implemented it in the AVISPA Tool and analyzed the optimistic Cederquist-Corin-Dashti protocol, discovering two attacks. This extension of the AVISPA Tool for handling non-repudiation opens a highway to the specification of many other properties, without any more change in the tool itself.
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Dates and versions

inria-00376450 , version 1 (17-04-2009)

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Francis Klay, Laurent Vigneron. Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-repudiation Protocole with an Active Intruder. 5th International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust - FAST 2008, Oct 2008, Malaga, Spain. pp.192-209, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-01465-9_13⟩. ⟨inria-00376450⟩
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