Provably Secure Non-Interactive Key Distribution Based on Pairings

Régis Dupont 1, 2 Andreas Enge 1, 2
2 TANC - Algorithmic number theory for cryptology
LIX - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau], Inria Saclay - Ile de France, Polytechnique - X, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique : UMR7161
Abstract : We define a security notion for non-interactive key distribution protocols. We identify an apparently hard computational problem related to pairings, the Bilinear Diffie--Hellman problem (BDH). After extending Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara's pairing based protocol to a slightly more general setting, we show that breaking the system is polynomially equivalent to solving BDH in the random oracle model and thus establish a security proof.
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Article dans une revue
Discrete Applied Mathematics, Elsevier, 2006, 154 (2), pp.270-276
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00386311
Contributeur : Andreas Enge <>
Soumis le : mercredi 20 mai 2009 - 19:03:11
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:22:14

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  • HAL Id : inria-00386311, version 1

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Régis Dupont, Andreas Enge. Provably Secure Non-Interactive Key Distribution Based on Pairings. Discrete Applied Mathematics, Elsevier, 2006, 154 (2), pp.270-276. 〈inria-00386311〉

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