Monitoring Confidentiality by Diagnosis Techniques

Abstract : In this paper, we are interested in constructing monitors for the detection of confidential information flow in the context of partially observable discrete event systems. We focus on the case where the secret information is given as a regular language. We first characterize the set of observations allowing an attacker to infer the secret behaviors. We consider the general case where the attacker and the administrator have different partial views of the system. Further, based on the diagnosis of discrete event systems, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which detection and prediction of secret information flow can be ensured and a construction of a monitor ensuring this task.
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Communication dans un congrès
European Control Conference, Aug 2009, Budapest, Hungary. pp.2584-2589, 2009
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  • HAL Id : inria-00420420, version 1

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Jérémy Dubreil, Thierry Jéron, Hervé Marchand. Monitoring Confidentiality by Diagnosis Techniques. European Control Conference, Aug 2009, Budapest, Hungary. pp.2584-2589, 2009. 〈inria-00420420〉

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