Verification of Security Protocols

Véronique Cortier 1
1 CASSIS - Combination of approaches to the security of infinite states systems
FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174), INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are widely used in our everyday life. They may achieve various goals depending on the application: confidentiality, authenticity, privacy, anonymity, fairness, etc. Their verification using symbolic models has shown its interest for detecting attacks and proving security properties. A famous example is the Needham-Schroeder protocol [23] on which G. Lowe discovered a flaw 17 years after its publication [20]. Secrecy preservation has been proved to be co-NPcomplete for a bounded number of sessions [24], and decidable for an unbounded number of sessions under some additional restrictions (e.g. [3,12,13,25]). Many tools have also been developed to automatically verify cryptographic protocols like [8,21].
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Conference papers
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Submitted on : Tuesday, October 27, 2009 - 4:25:28 PM
Last modification on : Friday, July 6, 2018 - 3:06:10 PM

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Véronique Cortier. Verification of Security Protocols. 10th Conference on Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation - VMCAI'09, Jan 2009, Savannah, United States. pp.5-13, ⟨10.1007/978-3-540-93900-9_5⟩. ⟨inria-00426764⟩

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