Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Cryptographic Protocols Analysis in Event B

Nazim Benaissa 1 Dominique Méry 1 
1 MOSEL - Proof-oriented development of computer-based systems
INRIA Lorraine, LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications
Abstract : We consider the proof-based development of cryptographic protocols satisfying security properties. For instance, the model of Dolev- Yao provides a way to integrate a description of possible attacks, when designing a protocol. We use existing protocols and want to provide a systematic way to prove but also to design cryptographic protocols; moreover, we would like to provide proof-based guidelines or patterns for integrating cryptographic elements in an existing protocol. The goal of the paper is to present a first attempt to mix design patterns (as in software engineering) and formal methods (as a verification tool). We illustrate the technique on the well known Needham-Schroeder public key protocol and Blake-Wilson-Menezes key transport protocol. The un- derlying modelling language is Event B and is supported by the RODIN platform, which is used to validate models.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Dominique Méry Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, November 11, 2009 - 2:18:12 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 4, 2022 - 3:32:54 AM


  • HAL Id : inria-00431264, version 1



Nazim Benaissa, Dominique Méry. Cryptographic Protocols Analysis in Event B. Seventh International Andrei Ershov Memorial Conference «PERSPECTIVES OF SYSTEM INFORMATICS» - PSI 2009, Jun 2009, Novosibisrk, Russia. ⟨inria-00431264⟩



Record views