Abstract : Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games. For many games of interest, this new solution concept provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than solutions offered by traditional game concepts -- such as Nash equilibrium --. In this paper, we investigate iterated regret minimization for infinite duration two-player quantitative non-zero sum games played on graphs.
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00492237 Contributor : Emmanuel FiliotConnect in order to contact the contributor Submitted on : Tuesday, June 15, 2010 - 3:36:59 PM Last modification on : Tuesday, October 19, 2021 - 12:55:34 PM Long-term archiving on: : Wednesday, September 15, 2010 - 8:33:05 PM
Emmanuel Filiot, Tristan Le Gall, Jean-François Raskin. Iterated Regret Minimization in Game Graphs. 35th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, Aug 2010, Brno, Czech Republic. ⟨inria-00492237⟩