Taxation for Green Communication

Abstract : Nowadays energy saving and reduction of electromagnetic pollution become important issues. One approach to these problems is the introduction of taxes on the energy dissipation. In this paper we investigate a taxation game between a user or a provider or a group of users and the taxation authority. This is a Stackelberg game where the taxation authority acts as a leader and users or service providers act as followers. Clearly too big taxes will strongly discourage the user of wireless technology and hinder the progress and too small taxes will lead to a wasteful use of the energy resources and may also lead to reckless use of the radio resources. We study several important particular cases with complete and partial information. We focus on the problem of finding taxation strategy in closed form and investigating how incomplete information of authorities about users impacts the equilibrium strategy.
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Communication dans un congrès
WiOpt'10: Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, May 2010, Avignon, France. pp.209-213, 2010
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Eitan Altman, Konstantin Avrachenkov, Andrey Garnaev. Taxation for Green Communication. WiOpt'10: Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, May 2010, Avignon, France. pp.209-213, 2010. 〈inria-00496479〉

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