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An Auctioning Mechanism for Green Radio

Cristina Comaniciu 1 Narayan B. Mandayam 2 Vince H Poor 3 Jean-Marie Gorce 4 
4 SWING - Smart Wireless Networking
Inria Grenoble - Rhône-Alpes, CITI - CITI Centre of Innovation in Telecommunications and Integration of services
Abstract : In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes' dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00499400
Contributor : Jean-Marie Gorce Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, July 9, 2010 - 2:09:31 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 4, 2022 - 3:12:15 AM

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  • HAL Id : inria-00499400, version 1

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Cristina Comaniciu, Narayan B. Mandayam, Vince H Poor, Jean-Marie Gorce. An Auctioning Mechanism for Green Radio. Journal of Communications and Networks, IEEE & Korea Information and Communications Society, 2010, Green Radio : Energy efficiency in wireless networks, 12 (2), pp.114-121. ⟨inria-00499400⟩

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