Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Worst case attacks against binary probabilistic traitor tracing codes

Teddy Furon 1, 2 Luis Perez-Freire 2, 3 
1 TEMICS - Digital image processing, modeling and communication
IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires, Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique
Abstract : An insightful view into the design of traitor tracing codes should necessarily consider the worst case attacks that the colluders can lead. This paper takes an information-theoretic point of view where the worst case attack is defined as the collusion strategy minimizing the achievable rate of the traitor tracing code. Two different decoders are envisaged, the joint decoder and the simple decoder, as recently defined by P. Moulin \cite{Moulin08universal}. Several classes of colluders are defined with increasing power. The worst case attack is derived for each class and each decoder when applied to Tardos' codes and a probabilistic version of the Boneh-Shaw construction. This contextual study gives the real rates achievable by the binary probabilistic traitor tracing codes. Attacks usually considered in literature, such as majority or minority votes, are indeed largely suboptimal. This article also shows the utmost importance of the time-sharing concept in a probabilistic codes.
Complete list of metadata

https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00505893
Contributor : Teddy Furon Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, March 29, 2011 - 12:00:10 PM
Last modification on : Friday, February 4, 2022 - 3:22:09 AM

Links full text

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : inria-00505893, version 1
  • ARXIV : 0903.3480

Citation

Teddy Furon, Luis Perez-Freire. Worst case attacks against binary probabilistic traitor tracing codes. 2009. ⟨inria-00505893⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

103