On the performances of Nash Equilibria in Isolation Games.

Abstract : We study the performances of Nash equilibria in isolation games, a class of competitive location games recently introduced in Zhao et al. (Proc. of the 19th International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC), pp. 148–159, 2008). For all the cases in which the existence of Nash equilibria has been shown, we give tight or asymptotically tight bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability under the two classical social functions mostly investigated in the scientific literature, namely, the minimum utility per player and the sum of the players' utilities. Moreover, we prove that the convergence to Nash equilibria is not guaranteed in some of the not yet analyzed cases.
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Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer Verlag, 2010, 〈10.1007/s10878-010-9300-3〉
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00530967
Contributeur : Gianpiero Monaco <>
Soumis le : dimanche 31 octobre 2010 - 16:22:37
Dernière modification le : mercredi 1 décembre 2010 - 11:20:01

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Vittorio Bilò, Michele Flammini, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli. On the performances of Nash Equilibria in Isolation Games.. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer Verlag, 2010, 〈10.1007/s10878-010-9300-3〉. 〈inria-00530967〉

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