Prescriptive and descriptive obligations in dynamic epistemic deontic logic

Abstract : Normative sentences can be used to change or to describe the normative system, known as prescriptive and descriptive obligations respectively. In applications of deontic logic it is important to distinguish these two uses of normative sentences. In this paper we show how they can be distinguished and analysed in a dynamic epistemic deontic logic.
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00556080
Contributor : Guillaume Aucher <>
Submitted on : Monday, January 17, 2011 - 5:55:07 PM
Last modification on : Friday, November 8, 2019 - 3:06:02 PM
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Guillaume Aucher, Guido Boella, Leendert van der Torre. Prescriptive and descriptive obligations in dynamic epistemic deontic logic. AI Approaches to the Complexity of Legal Systems, Dec 2009, Rotterdam, Netherlands. pp.150-161. ⟨inria-00556080v1⟩

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