Power Attack on Small RSA Public Exponent

Abstract : In this paper, we present a new attack on RSA when the public exponent is short, for instance 3 or 216+1, and when the classical exponent randomization is used. This attack works even if blinding is used on the messages. From a Simple Power Analysis (SPA) we study the problem of recovering the RSA private key when non consecutive bits of it leak from the implementation. We also show that such information can be gained from sliding window implementations not protected against SPA.
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Communication dans un congrès
Louis Goubin and Mitsuru Matsui. Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2006, 8th International Workshop, 2006, Yokohama, Japan. Springer, 4249, pp.339-353, 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/11894063_27〉
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https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00563960
Contributeur : Pierre-Alain Fouque <>
Soumis le : lundi 7 février 2011 - 16:28:56
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:19:17

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Pierre-Alain Fouque, Sébastien Kunz-Jacques, Gwenaëlle Martinet, Frédéric Muller, Frédéric Valette. Power Attack on Small RSA Public Exponent. Louis Goubin and Mitsuru Matsui. Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2006, 8th International Workshop, 2006, Yokohama, Japan. Springer, 4249, pp.339-353, 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 〈10.1007/11894063_27〉. 〈inria-00563960〉

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