G. B. Dantzig and C. B. Eaves, Fourier-Motzkin elimination and its dual, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series A, vol.14, issue.3, pp.288-297, 1973.
DOI : 10.1016/0097-3165(73)90004-6
URL : https://doi.org/10.1016/0097-3165(73)90004-6

W. Dantzig, G. B. Dantzig, and P. Wolfe, Decomposition Principle for Linear Programs, Operations Research, vol.8, issue.1, pp.101-111, 1960.
DOI : 10.1287/opre.8.1.101

S. Denegre, Interdiction and Discrete Bilevel Linear Programming, 2011.

J. Edmonds, Maximum matching and a polyhedron with 0, lvertices, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards B, vol.69, pp.125-130, 1965.
DOI : 10.6028/jres.069b.013
URL : http://doi.org/10.6028/jres.069b.013

J. Farkas, Theorie der einfachen ungleichungen, Journal fr die reine und angewandte Mathematik, pp.1-27, 1902.

C. Público-de, Informe 2015: Observatorio del narcotráfico en Chile, 2015.

. Fischetti, Interdiction games and monotonicity, 2016.

. Fischetti, Redesigning Benders Decomposition for Large-Scale Facility Location, Management Science, vol.63, issue.7, 2016.
DOI : 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2461

K. Flegel, M. L. Flegel, and C. Kanzow, On M-stationary points for mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, vol.310, issue.1, pp.310286-302, 2005.
DOI : 10.1016/j.jmaa.2005.02.011
URL : https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2005.02.011

K. Flegel, M. L. Flegel, and C. Kanzow, On the Guignard constraint qualification for mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints, Optimization, vol.163, issue.6, pp.517-534, 2005.
DOI : 10.1080/02331939508844060

. Fortz, Dantzig-Wolfe Reformulation for the Network Pricing Problem with Connected Toll Arcs, Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics, vol.41, pp.117-124, 2013.
DOI : 10.1016/j.endm.2013.05.083
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01255256

. Gent, . Walsh, I. P. Gent, and T. Walsh, The TSP phase transition, Artificial Intelligence, vol.88, issue.1-2, pp.349-358, 1996.
DOI : 10.1016/S0004-3702(96)00030-6
URL : https://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(96)00030-6

. Ghare, Optimal interdiction policy for a flow network, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, vol.12, issue.1, pp.37-45, 1971.
DOI : 10.1002/nav.3800180103

. Harsanyi, . Selten, J. C. Harsanyi, and R. Selten, A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information, Management Science, vol.18, issue.5-part-2, 1972.
DOI : 10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80

. Haskell, Robust protection of fisheries with compass, Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp.2978-2983, 2014.

. Hochbaum, Security routing games with multivehicle Chinese postman problem, Networks, vol.195, issue.3, pp.181-191, 2014.
DOI : 10.1016/j.artint.2012.11.004

R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, 1960.

E. Israeli, System Interdiction and Defense, 1999.

. Jain, Security Games with Arbitrary Schedules: A Branch-and-Price Approach, 2010.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511973031.009
URL : http://teamcore.usc.edu/manish/files/aaai10.pdf

. Jain, Quality-bounded solutions for finite bayesian Stackelberg games: Scaling up, The 10th International and Multiagent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp.689-696, 2011.

C. Kolstad, A review of the literature on bi-level mathematical programming, 1985.

. Korzhyk, Complexity of computing optimal stackelberg strategies in security resource allocation games, Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), pp.805-810, 2010.

. Kullback, . Leibler, S. Kullback, and R. A. Leibler, On Information and Sufficiency, The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol.22, issue.1, pp.79-86, 1951.
DOI : 10.1214/aoms/1177729694
URL : http://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729694

. Labbé, A Bilevel Model of Taxation and Its Application to Optimal Highway Pricing, Management Science, vol.44, issue.12-part-1, pp.1608-1622, 1998.
DOI : 10.1287/mnsc.44.12.1608

M. Labbé and A. Violin, Bilevel programming and price setting problems, Annals of Operations Research, vol.81, issue.2, pp.141-169, 2016.
DOI : 10.1007/BF02191670

M. Laffont, J. Laffont, and D. Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, 2009.

T. Laffont, J. Laffont, and J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 1993.

G. Leitman, On generalized Stackelberg strategies, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, vol.26, issue.4, pp.637-643, 1978.
DOI : 10.1007/BF00933155

. Marecki, Playing repeated Stackelberg games with unknown opponents, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems (AAMAS-12), 2012.

M. Mcmasters, A. W. Mcmasters, and T. M. Mustin, Optimal interdiction of a supply network, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, vol.12, issue.3, pp.261-268, 1970.
DOI : 10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5

R. Mcnaughton, Scheduling with Deadlines and Loss Functions, Management Science, vol.6, issue.1, pp.1-12, 1959.
DOI : 10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1

J. Moerenhout, Formulation et résolution du jeu de securité, 2012.

H. Möller, Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg und sein beitrag fur die Wirtschaftswissenchaft, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol.105, issue.3, pp.395-428, 1948.

. Morais, A Branch-and-cut-and-price algorithm for the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game, Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics, vol.52, pp.309-316, 2016.
DOI : 10.1016/j.endm.2016.03.041
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01398027

J. F. Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. of the National Academy of Sciences, pp.48-49, 1950.
DOI : 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
URL : http://www.pnas.org/content/36/1/48.full.pdf

R. Padberg, M. W. Padberg, and M. R. Rao, -Matchings, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol.7, issue.1, pp.67-80, 1982.
DOI : 10.1287/moor.7.1.67

. Paruchuri, Playing games for security: An efficient exact algorithm for solving bayesian Stackelberg games, Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems -. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp.895-902, 2008.

. Paruchuri, An efficient heuristic approach for security against multiple adversaries, Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems , AAMAS '07, pp.1-181, 2007.
DOI : 10.1145/1329125.1329344

. Pita, Deployed ARMOR Protection: The Application of a Game-Theoretic Model for Security at the Los Angeles International Airport, Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: Industrial Track, AAMAS '08. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp.125-132, 2008.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511973031.004

. Pita, Effective Solutions for Real-World Stackelberg Games: When Agents Must Deal with Human Uncertainties, Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems AAMAS '09. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp.369-376, 2009.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511973031.010
URL : http://www.ifaamas.org/Proceedings/aamas09/pdf/01_Full%20Papers/05a_11_63_FP_0616.pdf

M. Tambe, Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems , Lessons Learned, 2011.
DOI : 10.1017/CBO9780511973031

C. Vicente, L. N. Vicente, and P. H. Calamai, Bilevel and multilevel programming: A bibliography review, Journal of Global Optimization, vol.3, issue.3, pp.291-306, 1994.
DOI : 10.1080/02533839.1983.9676730

A. Violin, Mathematical programming approaches to pricing problems, 4OR, vol.14, issue.1, 2014.
DOI : 10.1007/s10288-015-0289-4

B. Stengel and S. Zamir, Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies, School of Economics-Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics (LSE-CDAM), 2004.

L. A. Wolsey, Integer programming, 1998.

R. Wood, Deterministic network interdiction, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, vol.17, issue.2, pp.1-18, 1993.
DOI : 10.1016/0895-7177(93)90236-R
URL : https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(93)90236-r

. Yin, TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems Using Game Theory, AI Magazine, vol.33, issue.4, pp.59-72, 2012.
DOI : 10.1609/aimag.v33i4.2432

. Yin, Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness, AAMAS, pp.1139-1146, 2010.

Z. Yin and M. Tambe, A unified method for handling discrete and continuous uncertainty in bayesian Stackelberg games, Conitzer, W. and van der Hoek, 2012.

Z. Zhang, J. Zhang, and Q. Zhang, Stackelberg game for utilitybased cooperative cognitiveradio networks, Proceedings of the Tenth ACM Interna- 1.1.1 Bimatrix for Rock-Paper-Scissors game, 2009.
DOI : 10.1145/1530748.1530753

. Korzhyk, Complexity results for single type of attacker SSG due to, p.23, 2010.

. Unstabilized, C&B c,q ) vs. stabilized (? = 0.5) (C&B c,q ) on an SSG instance 68

=. , =. {5}, K. .. , and 8. , Average IP solution time, for different values of ?, over instances where I, p.75

=. , =. {5}, K. .. , and 8. , Average LP solution time, for different values of ?, over instances where I, p.76

=. , =. {5}, K. .. , and 8. , Average number of nodes, for different values of ?, over instances where I, p.76

H. Mippg, Quality of the lower bound and solution time using, p.79

=. J. {5}, K. .. , and 7. , C&B x ) of stopping cut generation during root node solve. Instances I, p.86

=. J. {5}, K. .. , and 7. , C&B x,q ) of stopping cut generation during root node solve. Instances I

K. =. {45 and 8. , C&B c ) of stopping cut generation during root node solve. Instances J = {5}, p.88

K. =. {45 and 8. , C&B c,q ) of stopping cut generation during root node solve, Instances J = {5}, issue.2, p.88

6. , .. .. 10}, and K. , 16Performance profile graphs over instances I=J={5, p.92