. .. , let g i be the function from sequences to sequences that swaps the cacti visited in rounds ? (?, i) and T + 1 ? i

. ?-(?,i)-=-?-t-+1?i, ;. .. All-j-?-[t-]-\-{?, and . T-}, T + 1 ? i}, (g i (?)) T . Then, U 2 (g(?)) ? U 2 (?), and for all t ? {?T + 1

. Proof, We proceed by induction, showing that every step g i can only increase the value of U 2

, By definition of A(?), every cactus is visited at most twice in ?, once before ?T and once after ?T + 1. There are three cases to distinguish: Case 0: ? 1 = ? T , i.e, ? (?, T ) = 1. In this case we have g T (?) = ?. Case 1: ? 1 is not revisited, The first step is applying function g T , which swaps the first cactus visited and the cactus visited in round ? (?, T )

, T ? 1} such that ? t * = ? 1 and ? (?, t * ) = 1. In this case, ? ? (g T (?), T ) = ? (?, t * ) = 1, ? ? (g T (?), t * ) = ? (?, T ) > 1, ? ? (g T (?), t) = ? (?, t) for all t ? {?T + 1, . . . , T ? 1} \ {t * }, and therefore, U 2 (g T (?)) ? U 2 (?) = r ? T

, = (r ? T ? r ? t * )(? (?, T ) ? 1)

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