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Coalitions efficaces dans les jeux booléens

Abstract : Boolean games are a logical setting for representing stra-tegic games in a succinct way, taking advantage of the ex-pressive power and conciseness of propositional logic. A Boolean game consists of a set of players, each of which controls a set of propositional variables and has a specific goal expressed by a propositional formula. We show here that Boolean games are a very simple setting, yet sophisti-cated enough, for studying coalitions. Due to the fact that players have dichotomous preferences, the following no-tion emerges naturally : a coalition in a Boolean game is efficient if it has the power to guarantee that all goals of the members of the coalition are satisfied. We study the proper-ties of efficient coalitions.
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Contributor : Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Tuesday, April 20, 2021 - 12:00:34 PM
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Coalitions efficaces dans les ...
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  • HAL Id : hal-03198316, version 1


Elise Bonzon, Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex, Jérôme Lang. Coalitions efficaces dans les jeux booléens. 16ème Congrès Francophone AFRIF-AFIA de Reconnaissance des Formes et Intelligence Artificielle (RFIA 2008), AFIA : Association française pour l'intelligence artificielle; AFRIF : Association française pour la reconnaissance et l'interprêtation des formes; Université de Picardie Jules Verne, Jan 2008, Amiens, France. ⟨hal-03198316⟩



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