On the Realizability of Contracts in Dishonest Systems

Abstract : We develop a theory of contracting systems, where behavioural contracts may be violated by dishonest participants after they have been agreed upon — unlike in traditional approaches based on behavioural types. We consider the contracts of [10], and we embed them in a calculus that allows distributed participants to advertise contracts, reach agreements, query the fulfilment of contracts, and realise them (or choose not to). Our contract theory makes explicit who is culpable at each step of a computation. A participant is honest in a given context S when she is not culpable in each possible interaction with S. Our main result is a sufficient criterion for classifying a participant as honest in all possible contexts.
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [15 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01529594
Contributor : Hal Ifip <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, May 31, 2017 - 9:59:58 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, May 31, 2017 - 10:00:58 AM
Long-term archiving on : Wednesday, September 6, 2017 - 2:44:39 PM

File

978-3-642-30829-1_17_Chapter.p...
Files produced by the author(s)

Licence


Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Identifiers

Citation

Massimo Bartoletti, Emilio Tuosto, Roberto Zunino. On the Realizability of Contracts in Dishonest Systems. 14th International Conference on Coordination Models and Languages (COORDINATION), Jun 2012, Stockholm, Sweden. pp.245-260, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-30829-1_17⟩. ⟨hal-01529594⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

57

Files downloads

76