Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Abstract : Security protocol verification has been a very active research area since the 1990s. This paper surveys various approaches in this area, considering the verification in the symbolic model, as well as the more recent approaches that rely on the computational model or that verify protocol implementations rather than specifications. Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.
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Communication dans un congrès
Pierpaolo Degano and Joshua Guttman. First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12), 2012, Tallinn, Estonia. spv, 7215, pp.3--29, 2012, lncs
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Soumis le : mercredi 18 septembre 2013 - 17:37:51
Dernière modification le : lundi 5 octobre 2015 - 16:59:09
Document(s) archivé(s) le : vendredi 20 décembre 2013 - 15:03:39

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Bruno Blanchet. Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models. Pierpaolo Degano and Joshua Guttman. First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12), 2012, Tallinn, Estonia. spv, 7215, pp.3--29, 2012, lncs. <hal-00863388>

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