Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Conference papers

Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models

Abstract : Security protocol verification has been a very active research area since the 1990s. This paper surveys various approaches in this area, considering the verification in the symbolic model, as well as the more recent approaches that rely on the computational model or that verify protocol implementations rather than specifications. Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.
Document type :
Conference papers
Complete list of metadata

https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00863388
Contributor : Ben Smyth Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, September 18, 2013 - 5:37:51 PM
Last modification on : Friday, January 21, 2022 - 3:19:30 AM
Long-term archiving on: : Friday, December 20, 2013 - 3:03:39 PM

File

BlanchetETAPS12.pdf
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00863388, version 1

Collections

Citation

Bruno Blanchet. Security Protocol Verification: Symbolic and Computational Models. First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12), 2012, Tallinn, Estonia. pp.3--29. ⟨hal-00863388⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

158

Files downloads

411